More to the point, the Defense Department's "role isn't to sustain defense contractors' profits independently of the security they are actually meant to provide," de Rugy wrote at National Review's The Corner, a conservative blog. "Private-sector profit margins or even private-contractor job losses shouldn't prevent sensible reductions in federal spending."
Economist Benjamin Zycher produced perhaps the most thorough assessment of Fuller's study (and others like it) and showed how they grossly exaggerate the harmful economic effects of spending cuts and largely ignore the benefits. "[T]he defense sector is too small a part of the economy," Zycher notes, "for changes in defense spending to have large aggregate effects on GDP." And, historically, defense spending has not had that effect. There is no correlation between defense spending and GDP growth, and Zycher concludes, therefore, that cuts would have very little long-term impact in the future.
Like de Rugy, Zycher argues that it is appropriate for resources to shift out of the military sector and into private sector as wars end and threats diminish. The United States cut spending after the Korean War, after the Vietnam War, and after the Cold War, and these reductions did not throw the national economy into a tailspin, though some individuals and firms did have to seek out other opportunities.
Government spending takes money out of the private sector in the form of taxes or debt (which is simply taxes on future generations) and redeploys that money in the public sector. Granted, the Pentagon represents a special part of the public sector, one that, ideally, creates a genuine public good-- safety. But much of what Americans spend on their military doesn't actually defend them -- it goes to defending people in other countries who have chosen not to defend themselves. Americans are growing increasingly aware of the unfairness of the current system, and they're tired of it.
But the claims that Pentagon spending has uniquely salutary economic effects -- or, conversely, that cuts will have disproportionately harmful ones -- suffer from a basic conceptual error: They ignore the opportunity costs. Simply put, Pentagon spending cuts can be expected -- all other factors being equal -- to generate greater economic activity elsewhere.
The reason why was captured by French philosopher Frédéric Bastiat in 1848. The bad economist, Bastiat explained, focuses only on those economic activities that are plainly visible; a good economist, by contrast, takes account of both the seen and the unseen. It is not enough, for example, to focus on the economic activity that occurs when a careless child breaks a window. True, the glazier gets to sell the shopkeeper a new one, but the shopkeeper had the benefit of a fine window before it was broken. Paying for the repair (the seen) necessarily prevents him from spending that same money elsewhere, thus denying the shoemaker or the butcher of a sale (the unseen) and denying the shopkeeper the benefit of a new pair of shoes or a healthy meal.
The discussion that has taken place during the closing days of the U.S. election season about possible military spending cuts has been predictably narrow. Politicians in Washington focus on the jobs they supposedly create when they spend the people's money, and too little attention has been paid to the unseen benefits that would accrue if the resources that are currently spent on the military were released into the private sector. Put another way, there has been too much focus on the visible effects of ships and planes that are built, and not nearly enough on the houses, schools, and businesses that never are.