So, if the United States has a 20-to-1 advantage in nuclear weapons that can reach across the Pacific, why should Congress worry about China when thinking about arms reductions with Russia? It should not.
In fact, what we do know about the Chinese arsenal should make Congress more confident about U.S. arms reductions with Russia, not less.
First, although the U.S. military and the intelligence community do not believe that China's arsenal is being undercounted, even if it was, the difference would not threaten the United States. The U.S. arsenal is survivable regardless of how many weapons China -- or Russia -- has. According to a May Defense Department report, the ability of U.S. weapons to survive an attack is more important than the number of weapons on either side. For example, the report said that Russian deployment of forces in numbers significantly above New START limits "would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture."
Moscow -- and by extension, Beijing -- would not be able to achieve military advantage by "any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces," the report says, because sufficient U.S. forces would survive and be able to retaliate. This second-strike survivability comes primarily from Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, "a number of which are at sea at any given time." The report says that a nuclear first strike by Russia "will most likely not occur."
Second, although it may sound paradoxical, the United States should want China to have a survivable arsenal, too. China's nuclear force is too small to pose a first strike threat to the United States. Instead, Beijing's strategy is to field a nuclear force that could survive a U.S. first strike and respond to "inflict unacceptable damage to the enemy," as the Pentagon puts it. Thus, by being survivable, China does not need to match U.S. or Russian forces bomb-for-bomb, but needs just enough to make its adversaries think that a few missiles would be left after a first strike. So it is not necessarily a problem if China is fielding mobile missiles or SLBMs on submarines or hiding weapons in tunnels. In fact, the more survivable Beijing's arsenal is, the smaller it can be.
What the commission fails to mention, oddly, is the role U.S. missile defenses play in motivating China's modernization efforts. The 2012 Pentagon annual report says that China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles to ensure its strategic deterrent remains viable "in the face of continued missile defense advances in the United States." Ultimately, if the United States is really concerned about a Chinese nuclear arms build-up, then it needs to rethink its missile defense policy in Asia.
Yes, it would be nice if Beijing were more transparent about its arsenal, and from a nonproliferation perspective an expanding Chinese nuclear force is a concern. But from a strategic perspective, China's nuclear force is no reason to complicate or delay the next round of U.S.-Russia arms reductions. Consultations with China are a great idea, but Washington and Moscow need to draw down their forces significantly before formally involving others in such negotiations.