The pact with the Pakistan Army allowed Nazir to maintain his hold on the Ahmadzai Wazir-populated areas of South Waziristan and continue his fight against coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. For all his hard talk against the Pakistan Army, Nazir seemed most preoccupied with his local vicinity and Afghanistan. He was educated at the Central Madrasah in Wana, South Waziristan. There's no indication he traveled elsewhere aside from Afghanistan during the 1990s, where he fought alongside the Afghan Taliban. He once told an interviewer that his father took part in the jihad against the Soviets and received inspiration from his tribe's fight against the British over a century ago. Nazir explained that the fight against the Pakistan Army was not initially one of choice, but one that was imposed on him, due to Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas post-9/11.
Nazir's killing is nothing more than a tactical success for the U.S. war in Afghanistan. His forces have been a major target of the U.S. drone campaign. His brother was killed in a drone strike in October 2011. With the absence of Nazir and some of his deputies, his network's ability to conduct operations in the Greater Paktia region of Afghanistan might be far reduced. But the strategic balance in Afghanistan remains with the Afghan Taliban. And Nazir was nothing more than an accessory to Mullah Omar's fight.
A greater impact from his death will be felt in Pakistan, where the TTP is resurging and the Pakistan Army cannot count on Nazir to stabilize the Ahmadzai Wazir portions of South Waziristan. Nazir's successor might decide to hold the Pakistan Army accountable for his former leader's death. At the very least, Nazir's organization will lack the ability to push back against the TTP. To survive, it might be compelled to realign itself with the TTP, joining hands against the Pakistan Army.
Many in Pakistan have viewed Nazir as one of the "good Taliban" -- militants who focus on ousting the U.S. from Afghanistan, but refrain from targeting Pakistan. Nazir was vital to the Pakistani military's strategy of countering the TTP and promoting the insurgency in Afghanistan. His absence will be felt as TTP terrorist attacks continue nationwide and the army has yet to have fully cleared South Waziristan.
Over the long term, Nazir would likely have become a source of trouble for the Pakistani state, especially if a political settlement were reached in Afghanistan. Nazir would probably have sought to hold on to his fiefdom or partner with other jihadists to impose their brand of sharia on the rest of Pakistan. For the Pakistani military, Nazir's exit from the scene was ultimately necessary, but with the TTP still active in South Waziristan, his departure was a bit too soon.
The government of Pakistan desperately needs to rid itself of the jihadist Frankstein monsters its military has created. How exactly it does that is the million-dollar question. While the Pakistan Army is pushing for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan, it lacks a political strategy to deal with its own Taliban. With some militants in Pakistan, there will be no political solution. The case of Maulvi Nazir demonstrates the Pakistan Army's dependence on pitting old proxies against new proxies. But the thousands killed in Pakistan in the years after 9/11 show the grim reality that for the Pakistani Army, today's friends all too often become tomorrow's enemies.
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