Lost Tribes

This Israeli election is not about Bibi. It's about nothing.

Israelis will go to the polls on Jan. 22 to elect a new parliament and, by extension, government -- an event that has so far attracted relatively little international attention. Understandably so: Benjamin Netanyahu just came closer than any Israeli prime minister in more than two decades to serving out a full parliamentary term, and nobody expects him to lose. His putative challengers from the center have been unable to find, coalesce around, or attract enough support for a credible alternative candidate.

If this election does have a headline, it is the coming of age of Israel's new right, encapsulated by the candidacy of Naftali Bennett, 40, the new leader of Habayit Hayehudi, the "Jewish Home" Party, which is storming to third place in the polls, having shared the honor of being the smallest party in the outgoing Knesset. Bennett, a former advisor to Netanyahu, is an interesting character: A dot-com millionaire of American parentage, he served in the military's elite Sayeret Matkal unit, wears a kippa, and is deeply rooted in the national religious movement. Bennett's soft-spoken style often obscures his hard-line views: He is radically pro-settler and even annexationist in his position on the territories. Israel's most popular political satire show, Eretz Nehederet ("A Wonderful Country"), has caricatured him as a new software app: the iBennett, a modern version of the old settler model -- "no beard, no crazy-mystical gaze, smaller kippa" -- but with occasional glitches (the spoof iBennett character recognizes there are other nations in God's promised land, sounding reasonable, but then reverts to type by claiming "God will strike them with a plague of frogs").

Alongside Bennett's rapid rise, Jan. 22 is best understood as a "Tribes of Israel" election -- taking identity politics to a new level. Floating votes may exist within the tribes of Israel, but movement between tribes, or political blocs, is almost unheard of. Israelis seem to relate their political choices almost exclusively to embedded social codes rather than contesting policies.

Indeed, with all the personal rivalries, splits, mergers, and divisions within the four major tribes, it's remarkable how little this campaign has been about the serious issues facing Israel. There is precious little substantive policy debate, even by Israeli and general Western standards. Iran, for instance, has barely featured at all in this campaign season. The race has also not really been about the Palestinians. Bennett may have produced a plan for annexing 60 percent of the occupied West Bank and formalizing an apartheid system, but in election rallies, ads, and interviews, his party emphasizes social issues, military service, and his version of Jewish values, de-emphasizing not only his annexation plan but also the settler radicalism of his list.

This theme of "don't mention the Palestinians" is also a driving motif for the centrist leaders of the Labor Party and Yesh Atid (a new party led by TV personality Yair Lapid), with their focus on domestic issues. Only Tzipi Livni, who broke from Kadima to found her own Hatnuah Party, and the left-wing Meretz Party emphasize the two-state option and the conflict, but Livni's prescriptions convey a decidedly stale feel. They are irresponsive to the changing regional realities and growing strength of Hamas, and elicit something of a "been there; tried that" reaction from the public. All of which allows Netanyahu's message of staying the course to go largely unchallenged.

The left's efforts to recreate 2011's mobilization around social and economic issues have largely fallen flat, despite the efforts of Shelly Yachimovich, the new Labor Party leader. Yachimovich seemed to believe she could ignore national security issues and set an agenda of "it's the economy, stupid." It was a naïve strategy, one that has marginalized Labor by placing it outside the national security conversation, and has led to Labor's declining popularity during the campaign. By failing to establish herself as a credible rival to Netanyahu across the gamut of national issues, Yachimovich has also made her economic platform less relevant. Even the secular-religious fights of yesteryear and the question of universal military conscription lack a cutting edge and passion this time around.

What remains is a tribal contest between Israel's four major political-electoral camps: Netanyahu's Zionist right (including the far right and national religious right), Livni's Zionist center (only Meretz still defines itself as Zionist left), the ultra-Orthodox bloc, and the bloc overwhelmingly representing Palestinian Arab citizens. But it's not much of a contest, as the latest polls show each tribe winning roughly the same number of seats it holds in the outgoing Knesset: respectively, around 50, low to mid 40s, high teens, and just over 10. In other words, an alliance of the right and ultra-Orthodox continues to hold a majority of the 120-seat body.

The real fluidity, and it is considerable, is in the movement of votes and seats within the major tribes, and especially the largest two -- the right and center. A note of caution is in order: Polls are only polls, and elections can surprise -- there are suggestions that up to one in five voters may be undecided, and that the polls may be overemphasizing calls to fixed landline telephones. But few observers expect the final results to change much.

The ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) and Palestinian Arab blocs show the least fluctuation. The Haredi parties -- both Shas, made up of Sephardim, or Jews of Middle Eastern origin, and United Torah Judaism, made up of Ashkenazim, or Jews hailing from Central and Eastern Europe -- have had to contend with uncharacteristic internal dissent and breakaway factions. Yet the polls show they are likely to retain their strength (around 10 to 12 and five to six seats respectively). Likewise, the largely Palestinian Arab parties -- the more Islamist United Arab List, nationalist Balad, and communist and coexistence-oriented Hadash -- are set to retain their almost equally divided share of 10 to 11 seats, although lower voter turnout among Palestinian Arabs could push this number down. The politics of this bloc continues to be shaped by their exclusion, including by the centrist Zionist parties, as potential legitimate coalition allies (or even opposition allies) and the right's efforts to ban their participation in elections. These efforts were recently squashed again by the Supreme Court. But if a more extreme Knesset continues to push a ban and succeeds in its judicial reforms, then Palestinian Arabs' non-participation cannot be ruled out. That would be a huge game-changer for Israeli democracy.

Much has been made of the center bloc's disarray. In the last elections, the Zionist center bloc was represented by two parties -- Kadima and Labor -- that secured a combined total of 41 seats (28 and 13 respectively). A side story in this election will be Kadima's (near?) disappearance, mainly due to defections as well as a poor performance in opposition and a brief period serving in Netanyahu's coalition last summer. Yet, in polling, the center bloc maintains almost the exact same number of seats, with Labor now in the mid to high teens, Livni's Hatnuah and Lapid's Yesh Atid both scoring around 10 seats, and Kadima perhaps scraping back in with two. The remaining margin is likely to go to Meretz, up one or two seats in polls from its existing three. As noted, the early promise of a dramatic Labor resurgence under Yachimovich and her socioeconomic platform has largely fizzled out. Nevertheless, the center bloc in parliament will now be less rightist. Kadima's dwindling faction included a number of settlers and their sympathizers, as well as initiators and supporters of harsh anti-democratic legislation. A strengthened Labor will include a more prominent core of progressives. Livni's new party list will also be characterized by a more consistently liberal-democratic orientation than the hodgepodge that was Kadima, while Yesh Atid is least predictable, defined by little more than its leader's attractive TV persona.

The most significant and potentially consequential shifts are taking place within the right-wing bloc. Netanyahu kicked off this election season by creating a unified list between his Likud Party and the Yisrael Beiteinu Party of former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman -- the Likud-Beiteinu list. That combination had 42 seats (27 + 15) in the outgoing Knesset, but is predicted to drop to the low- to mid-thirties. Overall, the non-Haredi rightist bloc seems to be holding at about the 50-seat mark. Given the way the joint Likud-Beiteinu list is composed, Likud looks to become a rump faction of only about 22 members. Almost all those lost votes seem to have shifted one step rightwards to Bennett's Jewish Home -- overtly Jewish-chauvinist and territorially expansionist. A party even further to the right, Otzma LeYisrael ("Strength to Israel"), may also cross the threshold and receive two or more seats. (Elements of these two parties had seven seats combined in the last Knesset, a number that looks likely to more than double.) It should not go unmentioned that the Likud list is itself more hard-line, having upgraded a cohort of politicians who overtly advocate a greater Israel annexationist policy and having purged the handful of members considered defenders of Western-style democracy (notably, Dan Meridor, Michael Eitan, and Benny Begin). 

In the Haredi bloc, the main story is a breakaway faction challenging Shas (with ex-MK Haim Amsalem having formed his own more integrationist party) and the apparent failure to receive any perceptible boost from the return of former leader Aryeh Deri from a prison-induced absence or from the weakening of the Sephardi appeal of the new Likud-Beiteinu joint list.

Overall, the center is shifting a little leftwards and the right is lurching toward its radical extremes. Netanyahu will almost certainly be back for another term. Given how little change there is among the four major tribes, and how few real issues are on the table, you might think these elections don't matter very much. You would be wrong.

For one thing, Netanyahu will have to form a new government -- and this one could be perceptibly different in character than the last. There is unlikely to be an Ehud Barak to sound reasonable at home and abroad, particularly in Washington. It will be very hard to exclude the large group of settler radicals that constitutes Bennett's Jewish Home, the Likud faction will be smaller and itself more extreme, the ultra-Orthodox and newly-strengthened national-religious will make for less easy bedfellows, and Lieberman himself may have reasons to force elections relatively early in the term of the new Knesset (he is being indicted on charges of fraud and breach of trust and if convicted but not imprisoned would have to sit-out the remainder of the Knesset term, hence his possible interest in an early dissolution of parliament). Moreover, while none of the centrist parties can be definitively ruled out as potential coalition partners, Yachimovich is on record as saying no, Livni has been the most pointed in campaigning against the area of Netanyahu's policies least likely to change (national security), and while Lapid seems most keen to join, he offers Netanyahu the most meager moderating cover at home and abroad and is an untested quantity in general.

Meanwhile, all of the policy issues that have gone ignored during the election campaign -- Iran, the Palestinians, internal democracy, and state-religion -- will soon come roaring back. Assuming Netanyahu assembles a rightist coalition, the most intriguing question will be the ways in which the enhanced radicalism of the parliament and government will find expression. The outgoing Knesset has already contributed to a democratic recession in Israel (the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and the Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel have documented the anti-democratic and discriminatory laws passed), an impasse in peace efforts, a frenzy of settlement activity that has produced unprecedented European frustration and condemnation, discomfort in the U.S.-Israel relationship (albeit with Netanyahu maintaining the upper hand), and glimpses of Palestinian diplomatic and grassroots activism, notably at the United Nations and in unarmed protests. Israel has also climbed quite high up a tree in threatening to strike Iran.

But the Palestinians are not going anywhere -- at least not of their own volition. The next coalition will likely find it even harder to pretend to the world that a 2009 Netanyahu speech in which the phrase "two states" was uttered is a genuine policy commitment. Two states was never formally adopted as government or Likud policy, it does not appear in the campaign of the Likud-Beiteinu party (in fact, it has been disavowed by Likud candidates and is considered to be a key reason there is no party platform), and it is safe to predict that it will also not be adopted by Netanyahu's next government.

The defining fault line of the new coalition will be less about two states or not, and more focused on the struggle between proactive annexationists and status quo merchants, meaning yet more deepening and entrenching of occupation. In the old Israeli political map, those considered "solutionists" were the two-staters. In the emerging Israeli political map, the "new solutionists" advocating action now are Greater Israel annexationists (a significant cohort of the Likud-Beiteinu and Jewish Home lists). One can still expect the status-quo camp to carry the day, and international reaction to yet more violations of international law to still be plodding and rhetorical rather than meaningful, but two connected factors should not be underestimated -- what Israeli overreach toward the Palestinians (settlement radicalism, collapsing the Palestinian Authority) could unleash, and the possibility of a more challenging Palestinian counterstrategy eventually emerging, especially in the new regional environment.

The empowered ultra-nationalist camp will also look for gratification inside the green line, continuing (possibly with greater success) its pursuit of anti-democratic and discriminatory legislation, its aggressive provocations toward Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel, and its impressive record of securing appointments for its camp in key governmental agencies while ousting the remaining islands of liberalism, with a notable target being the composition and competences of the Supreme Court -- what many consider to be the last remaining firewall for Israeli democracy. All of which will take place in a more restricted, more overtly partisan, and less pluralist media environment. Without wishing to be too alarmist, should the ultra-nationalists succeed, especially on judicial reform and appointment issues, Israel may enter uncharted territory in its long journey of divorce from democratic principles.

Finally, the domestic front also carries the seeds of trouble for Netanyahu. To an outsider, the differences between the national-religious and ultra-Orthodox may appear to revolve around rather opaque definitions of religious practice, degrees of acceptance of modernization, and even choices of garments and head-covering. There are fundamental disagreements, however, that are much more likely to come to the fore in a parliament and coalition in which there is almost an equity of power between the national-religious (traditionally Zionist) and the Haredi (traditionally non-Zionist). The massively emboldened national-religious Jewish Home Party has, in its campaign, been touching the rawest nerves in relations between the two religious sectors and in how they view the state, not least military service. There will be potentially explosive divisions over this issue as well as control of religious councils, and funding priorities that could get to the core of their competing interpretations of how Jewish law views the very existence of the state of Israel -- a supreme value for religious nationalist Zionists versus a reality of dubious religious legitimacy for the Haredi non-Zionists. Issues that have been swept under the carpet and that have allowed for a relatively easy coexistence might now surface in unpredictable ways. Shas spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef has already threatened that his community will leave the country if attempts are made to draft them into the army.

The main bright spot for a new Netanyahu administration -- and it could be very bright indeed by the second half of a full Knesset term -- is the economic impact of a gas-revenues generated windfall, expected to start coming online within the next two years from the Tamar and Leviathan natural gas fields. Analysts estimate the gas could add a 12 billion shekel windfall to Israel's economy in 2013, or as much as 1 percent of GDP.

This notwithstanding, the right's troubles should create fertile ground for a revival of the center left and a return to the politics of serious contestation next time elections come around. Netanyahu has made several mistakes in this campaign that could come back to haunt him, including the alliance with Lieberman's party and his clumsy attacks on Bennett, which have served only to strengthen the latter. In so doing, Netanyahu has also reminded everyone how susceptible he is to pressure.

The clarity offered by hard-liners on the right and their potential overreach should encourage a rethinking, a rebranding, and a proffering of a genuine alternative by the opposition. The cohort of new lawmakers is set to include some overtly progressive rising stars (notably highly-placed women on the Labor list, such as fourth-placed Merav Michaeli and eighth-placed Stav Shaffir) alongside a possible strengthening of Meretz. Prospective fallout between the ultra-Orthodox and nationalist-Orthodox camp could also be utilized to build new coalitions if the center-left is able to overcome its anti-Haredi animosity.

Any prospect of a return to genuinely competitive elections, however, would require four ingredients that are glaringly missing from the opposition as Jan. 22 approaches: a credible leader, a degree of unity, a substantive alternative vision for Israel, and an ability to make common cause with fellow citizens who are Arab Palestinian, not Jewish or Zionist. These are serious obstacles indeed.

For now, however, this election will likely mark an acceleration of Israel's long-predicted (not least by former Israeli leaders Ehud Olmert and Barak) journey toward a hegemonic nationalism resembling apartheid-era South Africa. The remaining question is whether the next Knesset also manages to produce a genuinely democratic and fighting alternative.


Democracy Lab

Preparing for the New Syria

Sooner or later, the war will end, and Syrians will have to sit down and talk about the future of their state. Here's a roadmap.

The situation in Syria is deteriorating. The viciousness of the Assad regime, the rising sectarian divisions, and the lack of coherence among the opposition make the task seem overwhelming. Yet the history of past civil wars offers many practical lessons for defining post-war settlement.

Civil wars are manifestations of failed politics, as existing institutions and processes have been unable to provide common ground. Significant portions of the population feel sufficiently oppressed that they take up arms against their government and, faced with the choice of cracking down or losing power, those in control apply force or outright violence to maintain the existing order.

Peace becomes possible when one side wins clearly and can dominate and impose its agenda; or when a stalemate has developed and sufficient consensus on a political solution has emerged; or when peace is imposed externally. Peace agreements usually take place when a framework is mutually acknowledged and agreement on a final goal and process has been reached by a sufficient number of actors. These goals usually follow at least one of four patterns:

Creation of an inclusive state. In this scenario the government recognizes the rights of all citizens and the repression of a particular group (or groups) is acknowledged as the source of conflict. Parties agree to restructure state institutions, change their relationships with one another, and transform the relationship between the citizen and the state through the rule of law. This was done in many Central and Latin American peace agreements, including those in Colombia, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Decentralization. Here stakeholders craft a response to demands for local autonomy or greater representation. Success in decentralization demands attention to detail: Which decision-making rights are to be reallocated to which level? This was the central focus of conflicts in Indonesia (Aceh and East Timor) and the Philippines (Mindanao) as well as in the European cases of Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Decentralization can be further broken down into three possible models: recognition of territorial unity of the state (Macedonia); a transitional phase followed by decision on unity or separation (Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Sudan); or a ceasefire ending the conflict and a broad commitment to a future political solution (Indonesia and Abkhazia in Georgia). In the cases of Mexico and the Philippines, insurgent communities achieved significant degrees of autonomy. In Sudan and the case of East Timor in Indonesia, conflicts led to full secession.

A fresh start. In some cases, any consensus on the form and function of authority breaks down and new rules need to be put in place. When the existing constitution seems beyond salvaging, it can be completely rewritten. In Sudan and Nepal, large portions of the population experienced the state as an instrument of repression. Major military and social movements eventually forced far-reaching renegotiation of the basic understanding between the government and the people. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan illustrates the complexity of such negotiations. It involved a new national constitution, a constitution for South Sudan, and constitutions for ten southern Sudanese states, plus agreements on power-sharing, wealth sharing, land and security. Experience shows that mentoring and implementing such complex agreements are vital and very difficult tasks. Syria may eventually find itself in need of such facilitation.

Creating a legitimate center. In Afghanistan, Cambodia, and East Timor, genocidal, despotic, and destructive regimes that inspired decades of violence left warring parties unable to find a legitimate middle ground. In all these cases, the United Nations facilitated the creation of states with some legitimacy at home, and which also appeared legitimate, at least for a time, both to regional powers (who could act as "spoilers" if they chose) and to the international community.

The role of mediators is particularly important as prolonged conflicts usually become internationalized and regional or other major international powers take sides. A mediator's credibility therefore depends not only on the willingness of warring parties to agree but also on outside support. When all national, regional and international actors are aligned, there is a greater likelihood of fashioning relatively enduring agreements. By contrast, when regional players have been divided or actively hostile to peace agreements (as in 1990s Afghanistan), they often fail. Mediators, however, can be taken more seriously if they can back up the process with credible threats including: use of force, ending sanctions, recognizing sovereignty or marshalling reconstruction resources.

When framing peace agreements, lessons from the past have shown that balancing operational objectives are integral to failure or success. Tensions exist between efforts to promote short- and long-term stability. Violence needs to be stopped as soon as possible, and this will take the cooperation of warring parties. In the long term, however, parties will have to create a constitution that creates an enduring framework for order and stability. This is best accomplished through institutions and organizations that privilege principles of accountability, even-handedness, and citizenship. When a peace agreement fails to address underlying causes of conflict and continues to uphold contending elites, the likelihood of return to conflict within five years is high.

How to Apply the Lessons to Syria

The key political challenge in Syria is twofold: first, to avoid the deepening and broadening of the civil war, and second, to prepare Syria to be governed differently in the future. Achieving both tasks requires aligning different Syrian groups, regional actors, and key international players around a minimum common agenda.

The most significant item on the agenda is establishing the nature of the regime. One option might be for Syria to become a secular republic like Turkey, where a Muslim majority unites around ties of citizenship. Another possibility might involve a sectarian compact like Lebanon's, which ensures different ethnic and religious groups participation in the state. A third could entail a Sunni-dominated regime where sectarian and ethnic minorities become marginalized, persecuted, or forced into exile.

As important is the fate of the current leadership. No one wants to repeat the experience of Iraq, where de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of the army created a class of disgruntled ex-regime supporters. At the same time, exiled leaders need to assure the population that they are committed to a democratic process and will not attempt to take power by fiat, as Ahmed Chalabi tried to do in Baghdad.

More broadly, the key question is the fate of the Alawites and other groups who had tied their fortunes to the Assad regime. The opposition has a choice: If it wants to fight to impose its will on the pillars of the regime, then it has to accept a prolonged conflict. Alternatively, it can offer a vision of a political process and a political system that allows all parts of Syrian society to reach an understanding on the future, guarantees all identity groups safety and assured avenues for participation, and substitutes politics for violent confrontation. The more clearly and credibly a post-Assad agenda can be articulated (and the broader the consensus around it), the more likely the transition is to succeed.

If the focus lies on accommodating elites by apportioning the government through a spoils system, rather than creating a political consensus by building a citizen-centered state over the medium term, Syria will face the prospect of repeated instability. When elite accommodations are frozen, corruption gets consolidated and new tensions emerge. If a stable order is to be the outcome, then the political process has to allow for emergence of new forces through democratic processes and the participation of constituencies of citizens in the decision making process, including women, youth, and business communities. Chile, Spain, Finland, and Eastern Europe all allowed for such an inclusive democratizing path.

Given the suffering imposed by the Assad regime on Syria's citizens in general, and on members of the opposition in particular, the demand for a culture of political tolerance will be hard to satisfy. Without it, however, a descent into a vicious circle of revenge and instability is highly likely. The Syrian people need a sense of hope and confidence in the future. This hope can be best engendered by articulating a vision and program of action that can create a consensus among all stakeholders on the necessity of peace, and a pathway for creation of an inclusive order. Speed is required to secure a consensus on key questions, while participation is critical to building consensus on the answers. South Africa, Colombia, and the Philippines provide some examples of broader citizen dialogues on an inclusive future.

Depending on the choices made about this agenda, working groups could and should be formed to address each of the issues listed below.

The Rule of Law

The absence of rule of law has been a distinctive marker of the Assad regime. A clear legal framework is an important precondition for any successful transition. Among the issues to be addressed:

  • Establishing a basic legal model for the new regime. (Should the current constitution be modified? Should the pre-Ba'ath constitution be revived? Or should a specific legal framework be adopted for the transitional period?)
  • Specifiying a process and timeline for a new constitution, including the basic direction a constitution should take.
  • Defining the powers of the transitional government. (Should it have executive and legislative powers, or will there be both an executive and a legislative body? How will the checks and balances be maintained?)
  • Setting up a transitional justice mechanism to address and redress grievances.
  • Defining how laws should be made during the transitional period: how are laws to be amended, healed, or promulgated, and what is the validity of any laws made during this period?
Provision of Security

During the transitional period, security must be provided. At the same time, existing security institutions need to be immediately reformed in order to make them accountable to the public and to the civilian leadership. Although the army must be immediately removed from politics and internal affairs, and although its finances must be made transparent, it cannot be disbanded: Soldiers employed by the army are less likely to be recruited to a new insurgency. Using the army as a large reconstruction force is one option.

A series of Latin and Central American countries dealt with this challenge by shifting the balance between the army and the police and institutionalizing civilian control of the security sector. The army was made responsible for defending the nation against external threats. The police were exclusively responsible for internal security. It is important to establish a police force that earns the community's trust. The experience of these countries also demonstrates the importance of maintaining the peace, with the enormous benefits of violence avoided and reducing costs of providing security.

Internal Reorganization of the State

The Assad regime was created to serve the Assad family. If a new regime is to serve the citizens of Syria, then government must be re-organized. The restructuring can either be part of a coherent vision, adapted to changing circumstances, or reactive and piecemeal. The region has significant capability in organizational development, including Turkey, Lebanon, and the Gulf.

A good starting point, and one with successful precedents elsewhere, would be an institutional inventory of Syria's existing government institutions, both in Damascus but also at various levels of government and local organizations. Such a survey would encompass rules, process, organizational capacity, personnel, and culture. Any re-organization should build on existing capacity rather than assuming a blank slate.

Access to Information

The Syrian regime's monopoly on information and media must be replaced by a framework for media freedom, open information, and a culture of accountability. The new regime must immediately begin to discuss the legal and regulatory framework needed to guarantee free access to information and media, including laws on libel and hate speech as well as guarantees of press freedom. Special attention must be paid to the provision of resources for nationwide media so that it can resist becoming captive to ethnic or ideological factions that would threaten Syrian unity.

Public Finance

People and their loyalties follow money. Getting public finance right is the key to establishing authority. Afghanistan and Iraq both paid a high price for failing to pay salaries and pensions to key personnel. A working group should examine Syria's current redistribution system and work out in advance how to keep making critical payments to civil servants and security officials during a transition period, and how to procure and provide basic goods and services.

The budget is the central instrument of policy making in any organization. Any transition regime must write one as soon as possible and not wait for longer-term constitutional change. Syria, now under pressure from sanctions and suffering from a dwindling oil supply, will not have the internal resources of Iraq or Libya and will have to look for international financial support.

It would make sense to move early to establish a Trust Fund (along the lines of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)), which could pool foreign funding under unified rules for transparency and accountability, thus avoiding debilitating issues of coordination and domestic corruption. The World Bank, though it often works slowly, is far better than the United Nations at managing such funds with accountability and cost-effectiveness. An interim trust fund would have to balance flexibility and speed with requirements for accountability. Trust funds tend to work well when accompanied by well-designed and run coordination or reconstruction offices, and well-designed large scale programs that provide a framework for projects, rather than thousands of disparate projects.

Social and Economic Development

The Assad regime will leave behind a legacy of physical destruction as well as a record of fomenting division, hatred, and exclusion. It is also responsible for a large number of refugees and widespread psychological trauma. Even before the insurgency began, the economy was built around a corrupt political relationship between the regime and a merchant class. It was not designed to allow ordinary Syrians to create or accumulate wealth.

Economic governance will pose significant challenges to any new regime. The lower and middle ranks of the bureaucracy in particular are unprepared to meet contemporary standards of economic governance. At the same time, the large numbers of unemployed young people will put enormous pressure on the government to create rapid economic growth. Criminal networks will be a special challenge, given the role of smuggling and the informal economy in Syria over the last three decades as well as the insurgency's use of illicit networks to obtain arms. The current high level of extortion and kidnapping in areas where police have withdrawn indicate the kind of problems to come. In many post-conflict environments, the impunity with which fighters, strongmen, or warlords have continued to operate (whether in Afghanistan, Congo, or Liberia) has jeopardized the process.

In its first months, the transitional government will face several economic tests that may determine whether or not it is accepted as legitimate: how it compensates for destroyed assets; how it resettles people; how it provides key goods and services, from food and water to electricity, housing, health and education; how quickly it creates jobs for young people; how rapidly it establishes (or fails to establish) an open and inclusive market. The mechanism of starting a limited number of large-scale, well-designed national programs could be very relevant for Syria. There are regional examples of what works and what does not. Hezbollah gained credibility in Lebanon by moving quickly to supply housing to those displaced by war. On the other hand, the Iraqi government's legitimacy has been undermined by its failure to provide reliable electricity.

Immediate Humanitarian and Stabilization Measures

Regardless of the type of political process that eventually ends the violence, immediate humanitarian relief and stabilization measures will be essential to avoiding further deterioration and suffering. Typically, peace agreements are accompanied by a needs assessment, usually carried out by international organizations. But such groups often lack sufficient appreciation of context, have trouble setting priorities, and do not always deliver good value. Differences of opinion on relief priorities among established organizations and constituencies can also result in considerable wrangling, ultimately leading to the creation of parallel organizations that compete with the government, the domestic private sector, and civil society organizations. In some contexts, the way that aid is organized has contributed to a culture of corruption and waste and complicated the task of improving governance. This syndrome has been particularly notable in Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and Southern Sudan. Since the economic stabilization of Syria is likely to reinforce political stabilization, it is imperative that Syria's recovery, reconstruction, and development not be taken hostage by existing orthodoxies among international organizations.

Relations with the Region and the International Community

Syria's geography means that any transitional regime needs to start thinking immediately about diplomacy and international relations. What relations will a post-Assad Syria have with Hezbollah, Iran, Iraq, or Israel? Developments in Syria will inevitably impact Lebanon's fragile political ecosystem with risks to both countries' stability.

But there are also opportunities. A new Syrian regime could create a positive alliance with Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. The European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative could provide resources, market access, and a range of experiences. The United States would have the opportunity to work with P5 members at the United Nations, especially Russia and China, to attempt to define a new consensus on a global peace and security agenda.

Because Syria has such complicated relationships with its neighbors, additional legitimacy for the process could come from international organizations. Given the stasis at the United Nations, Gulf countries that have already taken a strong stance could each or in combination address the humanitarian and reconstruction needs. For example, a Humanitarian and Reconstruction Conference could be convened by Arab countries. Holding such a conference sooner rather than later could provide a venue and platform to provide important signals about the commitment of the outside world to a transitional process, and the conditions under which their support would be forthcoming. Such conditions could provide incentives for increasing coherence among the opposition; for the standards of accountability that reconstruction and peace-building commitments would demand; and rules and approaches to the type of programs -- including inclusivity and avoidance of discrimination -- that would be underwritten by external support. A conference would provide an opportunity to agree and establish a Trust Fund as described above.


Whatever happens next in Syria, the current conflict has already changed the country forever. Assad's reliance on naked violence has stripped him of any remaining legitimacy he might have once derived from the rhetoric of Arab nationalism or from paternalistic guarantees of stability. The scale of the destruction already inflicted on the society and the physical infrastructure of the country will require tremendous effort, social imagination, political vision, and leadership to heal.

Although the insurgency is clear and united in the goal of overthrowing both Assad and his regime, its members have yet to reach a clearly articulated consensus on a coherent vision for the state, economy, and society in a post-Assad world. Serious attention to these issues could prevent extended conflict, the splintering of the state, or the hardening of a regime intent on counter-revolution. A plan to create institutions capable of bringing genuine structural change must lie at the heart of any peace-making process. The pace and sequencing of change must be planned in advance. In the past, the economic and social dimensions of transitions and peace-building have often been neglected or postponed, with terrible consequences for the chances of success.

Both internal rivals and external brokers must agree upon an agenda for transition that is inclusive and address the insecurities and interests of the Alawites now in power as well as other minority groups, members and leaders of the insurgency, and the citizenry in general. The more the opposition can agree on such an agenda, the more likely that the transition will succeed.

Those international actors who are concerned about the long term stability of Syria, as well as the Syrian internal opposition and the external diaspora, therefore have the responsibility to articulate a future for the country that is credible and feasible, and not just desirable. By gaining a better understanding of the Syrian economy and bureaucracy, and by beginning to discuss, now, the implications of different institutional and political changes, both outsiders and insiders can help to ensure a smoother and more productive transition.

Regardless of the duration and intensity of conflict in Syria, peace will eventually have to be made. Making enduring peace, however, requires drawing lessons from the successes and failures of other efforts. By presenting both the probable outcomes of the current conflict and lessons of transitions in the past, we hope to contribute to a focused discussion that can help the people of Syria reach a consensus on their future.

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