FP: Although you say that Americans expected a response, which of course they did, but they were surprised -- and it seems even many Russians were surprised -- by the specifics of the Russian response. To have it include this provision about adopted children seemed very asymmetrical.
Lavrov: It's a separate theme. The problems with the kids who have been adopted in the United States are not unique for Russian kids. We have looked into the general problems with adoption in the United States, and we discovered -- on the basis of the reports written by American NGOs -- we discovered that not only Russians but kids from other countries and the American-born kids have been subject to very unfortunate behavior on the part of their adopted parents. And I can only tell you that we tried very hard to make the agreement on cooperation in the area of adoption work, and unfortunately the State Department, which under that agreement undertook to make sure that the states would allow access by the Russian officials to the adopted kids in case of some problems, but this endeavor did not materialize. And we did not get access in a couple of cases where a state court would not allow Russian consular officials to visit kids in families where these problems were discovered. It is not very often mentioned, but Russia is not the only country which had to do this. Kazakhstan, for example, suspended the implementation of a similar agreement on adoption with the United States; so did Vietnam. And if I am not wrong, so did Guatemala. So it is a systemic problem inside the United States, and I do believe the increased public attention to this issue would help the American authorities to do something about it. On the other hand, the emotional atmosphere around this situation with adoption also helped the Russian authorities to pay more attention to the kids who for one reason or another lose their parents, and we will be doing much more than we have been doing before to make sure that these kids are treated well, that they have new families. There will be more financing for this purpose to stimulate adoption inside the Russian Federation, and I'm sure the society will feel a positive effect.
FP: So you don't see any lasting tension in the U.S.-Russian relationship as a result of this exchange of laws between the two partners.
Lavrov: You know, this was not our choice. And the aggravation of the one or another area of the relations between Russia and the United States is not what we want. I understand that it is not what the Obama administration wants as well. I met at the end of February with John Kerry, and I sensed the same desire to move forward without, of course, forgetting about the differences and trying to find a mutually acceptable solution to those different issues. But on quite a number of areas -- I listed some of them -- we have common interests, and we shall continue to be partners in cooperating in so many international and regional issues.
FP: It was Alexei Pushkov who described both you and Secretary Kerry as "professional pragmatists" and suggested that maybe you would have a good basis for getting along with him, in particular possibly in comparison with his two predecessors, like Secretary Rice, with whom you had at times a famously contentious relationship. What do you think about that?
Lavrov: Well, I don't [laughs] engage in comparing my partners. I can only say that I have good personal relations with all secretaries of state with whom I have a chance to work. It is another matter that not always these good personal relations -- also at the level of the presidents -- translated into some positive movement in practical terms. But John Kerry is a professional. He is pragmatic. And this is a very important quality for a diplomat and especially for a secretary of state. He has very good knowledge of things around the world. He has keen interest in moving some of the old problems out of the deadlock, and we discussed with him potential joint efforts on the issues of Iranian nuclear program, nuclear program of the Korean Peninsula, and of course everything which relates to the so-called Arab Spring. It is really a situation which is creating more threats so far than positive incentives.
FP: Well I definitely want to talk also about your conversations with him regarding Syria. He's expressed a willingness and an interest in continuing to find a solution that Russia as well as the United States could put forward to the civil war. At the same time, he was just criticizing you in Saudi Arabia for continuing to sell arms to the Syrian regime.
Lavrov: Well, you know on the arms sales, we never, we never tried to hide that we are implementing the contracts which have been signed quite some time ago, long before all this started. And those contracts are mostly about providing the Syrian government with anti-aircraft defensive weapons, and it is absolutely clear that Syria needs legitimately defensive capabilities because the threats are not invented -- they are quite real. And any country has the legitimate right to have defense capabilities which are not prohibited by any international treaty, and we are not violating any. So I believe that it is much more important to take a better look at the other side of the drama because the opposition is being armed by offensive weapons, by the weapons which have been also, you know, infiltrated from Libya, including MANPADS, which is a very dangerous weapon. And we have to take this information into account against the background of the leaders of the Free Syrian Army making public statements that airplanes, including civilian airplanes, and airports, including civilian airports, will be legitimate targets. This is very dangerous.
And speaking of the Syrian situation in general and about the American position and the Russian position, we have been listening for a couple of years during the previous administration of President Obama. We have been hearing appeals to us to change our position. All the time the official representatives of the State Department or the White House will be saying, "We call on Russia and China to change their position," which meant the conviction of Washington that their position was right. And I'm gratified to note some positive change which occurred on the part of those who have been denying any possibility for a dialogue as long as President Assad is in Syria. We have been consistent. We have been saying that for us priority No. 1 is to stop the bloodshed and to save lives, and therefore cessation of hostilities and dialogue without any preconditions is the best way to achieve this desired goal. And when people were telling us, "Well, we can support you only if President Assad disappears," that meant one very simple thing: that for them priority No. 1 was not saving lives but removing the president and changing the regime.
Now, we have been, you know, witnessing a very welcome change. Not only from Washington, various other European capitals, but also from the Arab countries who are now saying things which they did not say before, namely that there must be beginning of a dialogue. The leader of the so-called Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary Forces something, Mr. Khatib, with whom I met in February in Germany, he publicly stated that he would like to start a dialogue. Yes, they are putting in some preconditions, like acceptability of negotiators. The same is being done by the government. The government has said that they would be open to a dialogue with anyone, including with those who fight the government on the ground, except the people who have been engaging in terrorist attacks. But they are also putting in some preconditions. But the main thing is that both players express the desire for a dialogue. And the rest is doable by diplomatic means. And that is where international mediation could help, be it Lakhdar Brahimi, be it the secretary-general of the United Nations, be it anyone else who would be prepared to help arrange the parameters of a dialogue, the place, the venue, the composition of the delegations. But unfortunately this readiness expressed by Mr. Khatib was not supported by the rest of the coalition, and they basically canceled the offer, which is something we do not understand.
If this war in Syria continues, I am afraid that the military solution could only mean a radicalization of the country. Military solution can have only two options: The government wins, or the opposition wins. If the opposition wins on the ground militarily, I am afraid the people who have been selected for this national coalition, the people who compose the Syrian National Council, they will not be invited to Syria because the people with the guns, the extremists, would have the day. And somehow it is not mentioned publicly too often, but when the United States listed the Jabhat al-Nusra as terrorist organization, the members of the coalition of the Syrians -- this opposition, the united, national coalition -- they protested publicly, saying that those were freedom fighters. And this is a very important point. Jabhat al-Nusra is getting a lot of outside financing, a lot of arms, and by some assessment it is the most efficient opposition force on the ground, and it is affiliated with al Qaeda.
So we really have to understand what we are doing when we support one side or another. The people whom the French and the Africans are fighting in Mali now, those are the same people which Europeans supported in Libya. Some of the arms used against the French apparently are the arms the Libyan opposition received from France. So we must take a broader look at the situation. We cannot say, well, Libya is not Syria, Syria is not Mali, Mali is not Tunis, Tunis is not Egypt. This is absolutely true. Each country is different, but the process which is under way in the context of this Arab Spring is certainly a comprehensive issue involving so many aspects that we cannot afford the luxury of just limiting ourselves at every given moment by a situation in country X, forgetting about the ramifications.
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