'The Law of Politics' According to Sergei Lavrov

An exclusive interview with Russia's top diplomat.

INTERVIEW BY SUSAN B. GLASSER | MAY/JUNE 2013

FP: Do you feel that you were misled on the Libyan resolution, that you supported something that Russia in fact does not support?

Lavrov: We stated clearly that the mandate given by the resolution on which we and the Chinese abstained was grossly violated. The no-fly zone is about not allowing the military aircraft flying, and that's it. And that's it. The coalition was not patrolling the no-fly zone and was not ensuring the no-fly zone. It was taking out targets on the ground, directly participating in the internal conflict.

FP: Do you think there are any situations in which humanitarian intervention is justified?

Lavrov: Well, you know this issue has been discussed a lot, including at the United Nations. It is a generally accepted rule and norm of international law that sovereignty cannot be used as a pretext for gross violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, genocide, military crimes. And all this has been clearly spelled out in 2005 when the United Nations General Assembly was convened at the summit level and adopted a declaration where this "responsibility to protect" concept was described. It clearly stated, that declaration, that the priorities given to the efforts of the states themselves who have the obligation -- the primary obligation -- to protect their population, that the priority must be given to political means. And that only in case when a state exhausts all its possibilities and is not able to protect the population, it is only then that the international community can interfere, but only when the Security Council so decides. So this issue is closed. The rules have been agreed. It is a consensus resolution -- declaration. And yes, my answer is yes, there are some situations when this interference is inevitable -- on the decision of the Security Council.

FP: How would you describe your own view of international relations? Many people with whom I have spoken have suggested that you are ultimately a realist -- a Russian realist -- and that you're not looking for ideology to play a role as much as defending Russia's national interest. Is that a fair assessment?

Lavrov: Well, that's what I believe we are trying to do. I don't believe in ideology in international relations. I started, you know, to work as a diplomat during the Soviet days, and in spite of ideology being very high on the Communist Party agenda, I can assure you that in practical terms we have always been trying to be pragmatic. And this is the case now, and the Russian Federation is promoting a policy internationally which will be uniting countries, not really creating some artificial ideological dividing lines. We have enough ideological dividing lines already. The situation in Europe is a case in point. NATO has lost its raison d'être after the disappearance of the Soviet Union.… Then we have the year 2014 when NATO will leave Afghanistan, though not entirely. But NATO is clearly in search of a reason to exist basically, and the new concept which NATO endorsed at its latest summit raises some questions because NATO was created as a defensive alliance. It is now proclaiming its right to act militarily anywhere, anywhere on Earth, if NATO believes that its interests under the United Nations have been affected negatively. It certainly is a new twist in thinking, and also you know it creates, it comes into confrontation with NATO obligations -- with NATO members' obligations -- under the United Nations Charter and under the Organization [for] Security and Co-operation in Europe. Because we have proclaimed in OSCE the principle of indivisible security, and we said that no one of us would increase our security -- no one would increase his security at the expense of security of others. And missile defense is a case in point because missile defense is certainly considered by Russia as creating problems for our security. That's why we again and again come back to this. But ideally we would like this principle of indivisible security to be made legally binding. Now it is just a political declaration. So this is something which illustrates the remaining ideological elements of foreign policy. I am convinced that NATO is becoming more and more ideological and its expansion is absolutely artificially promoted, creating unnecessary dividing lines, as I said. Because we have nothing which would really separate us in practical [terms]. We have the same concerns. We have the same threats. We have the same challenges. And to keep the closed military alliance in a situation when we need to get united universally is really not helpful.

FP: The new Russian foreign-policy concept that President Putin signed … in February speaks of Russia as playing a "balancing" role in the world. Against whom is Russia balancing? And do you see the United States or NATO as an adversary these days?

Lavrov: No, we don't see them as adversary. And we -- Russian military doctrine says that we see a danger not in NATO as such, but in NATO trying to play a global role with global military reach, NATO making its military posture universal. Not NATO as such, but this intention to grab everything. And the second -- again, not threat but danger -- we see in NATO expansion accompanied by moving military infrastructure closer to our borders. When the NATO-Russia Council was created, when the Warsaw treaty was dismantled … there was a deal, which was repeated later, that there would be no movement of NATO east. Then this honor pledge was not honored, and when the Russian Federation and NATO established their relationship in the late '90s there was a pledge on paper that there would be no substantial combat capacity of NATO moved to the territory of new members. This is not honored. Therefore we would really be very much eager not to be dissatisfied with political promises but rather get some legally binding guarantees. That's why we have the position on the missile defense, which I explained to you.

FP: You've been Russian foreign minister for longer than anyone in the post-Soviet period. Do you see any changes in Russia's foreign-policy position in that period of time, and have you seen any change between having President Medvedev in office and the return of President Putin to power?

Lavrov: You know, we have been -- remember how we together with France and Germany protested the war in Iraq in 2003, and you remember what position we took on Libya, what position we are taking on Syria, and we have been told by so many Western partners that you will pay for this, that you are losing the Arab world, and so on and so forth, which was wrong. And which is wrong. In Iraq we have the government which is the result of the American intervention, and this government wants to be friends with Russia. The new Libyan authorities want us to continue the projects, economic and otherwise, which we started with the Qaddafi regime, not because they just have some preferences but because they believe that in the modern world it is not wise just to rely on somebody and not to talk to others, especially since we have a lot to offer.

We have history with the Arab world. We have long history with African countries when we firmly supported decolonization. And, by the way, the borders which were left after decolonization probably are the biggest source of trouble in Africa, when ethnic groups are just cut in the middle artificially -- Rwanda, Uganda, Mali, whatever. So, take Sudan. And countries remember that we have always been consistent. We were never saying that you know we can support somebody in Libya and then fight the same people in Mali. Terrorists are terrorists, and when aggressive instincts are not being stopped, we are getting into trouble. So my answer is very straightforward. We have always been telling the truth.

And that is what our famous diplomat Alexander Gorchakov was writing, and he was one of the most efficient and brilliant diplomats in Europe. He was always saying that openness is the key to success. In foreign policy, you have always to lay down your interests bluntly, the way people will understand -- and even if these interests do not coincide with the interests of your partner, even if those interests contradict the interests of your partner. If those are legitimately inspired interests, if they are clearly explained, it is always better than to try to go into Byzantine-style intrigues and so on and so forth.

As for the changes in the Russian foreign policy, yes, we have more domestic strength, if you wish. We have become stronger economically; we have been successfully resolving the social problems, raising the level of living -- the standards of living -- of the population. Yes, a lot is to be done. But the change is very much noticed. And we feel the change. And Russia feels more assertive -- not aggressive, but assertive. And we have been getting out of the situation where we found ourselves in the early '90s when the Soviet Union disappeared and the Russian Federation became what it is -- you know, with no borders, with no budget, no money, and with huge problems starting with lack of food and so on and so forth. It is a very different country now. And of course we can now pay more attention to looking after our legitimate interests in the areas where we were absent for quite some time after the demise of the Soviet Union. Africa is a case in point. We now have Russian companies which show interest in doing business in Africa. Africans are interested in having us there. They don't want just to be dominated by one or two investors. They want more countries, and I believe this is a healthy -- this is a healthy desire. Latin America -- we economically have become strong enough to look that way as well. And there are many projects which are hugely beneficial between us and Latin American countries. Asia-Pacific of course -- we are a Pacific power, and it is absolutely important for us, including for the development of the Far East and eastern Siberia in the Far East, to get closely integrated in the Asian-Pacific economic process. That's basically what we are doing now in addition to traditional diplomacy in Europe, with China, India. We have a much, much broader agenda because we have more capacity, economically first of all.

AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images

 

Susan B. Glasser is editor in chief of Foreign Policy.