Pick winners. Sen. Lindsey Graham summarized this viewpoint on Sunday: "There are two wars to fight -- one [is] to get Assad out of there.... The second war, unfortunately, is going to be between the majority of Syrians and the radical Islamists.... So we need to be ready to fight two wars." The theory is that if the United States intervenes militarily or provides weapons to "the opposition good guys," as Sen. Claire McCaskill described them, then Washington will have greater influence on the post-Assad, non-Islamic political leadership. Subsequently, Syria will likely align its policies with U.S. preferences.
Picking winners is not our responsibility and believing we can do so is wishful thinking. As one rebel recently told the New York Times: "We all want an Islamic state and we want shariah to be applied." It is doubtful that anything the West does today will markedly influence what role Islam plays in Syrian society or governance after Assad. Moreover, the religious faith of the people does not matter; what matters is the state's behavior in those limited areas where Syrian and Western interests overlap, specifically in confronting transnational challenges. Finally, Syria's future leaders will act in their own national interests with whatever international actor is required, regardless of who is arming or funding the revolution today.
Deter Iran and North Korea. Rep. Rogers warned this weekend: "More than just Syria, Iran is paying attention to this. North Korea is paying attention to this." Sen. Graham more vividly predicted that with Obama's indecisiveness, "we're going to have a war with Iran because Iran's going to take our inaction in Syria as meaning we're not serious about their nuclear weapons program." Their implication is that, if the United States responds to Assad crossing Obama's chemical weapons red line, Iran and North Korea will adhere to their own red lines.
There's one big problem with this logic: According to a tally by Harvard University professor Graham Allison, Iran has already crossed seven red lines put forth by the international community. Furthermore, former Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin noted this weekend: "Today it can be said that the Iranians have crossed the red line set by Netanyahu at the U.N. assembly." In addition, Israel leaders have repeatedly stressed, as Strategic Affairs Minister Yuval Steinitz declared on Sunday, "We are not making any comparison or linkage with Iran, which is a completely different matter." If Tel Aviv does not draw conclusions from U.S. inaction in Syria with Iran, why should Washington?
In October 2006, President George W. Bush warned Pyongyang: "The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action." When the Bush administration learned that North Korea -- starting in 2001 -- had clandestinely helped Syria construct a "carbon copy" of its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, it responded to both governments with silence.
Furthermore, if Kim Jong Un or the mullahs in Tehran are watching closely, it is hard to see how enforcing a partial no-fly zone over Syria with Patriot missile batteries already installed in eastern Turkey would be a demonstrable deterrent. Assuring the physical destruction of Iran's (or North Korea's) nuclear program is a significantly more intensive and riskier military intervention, which would include attacking their integrated air defense systems, command-and-control facilities, known nuclear sites, and other regime assets.
Ensure U.S. credibility. Beyond Iran and North Korea, many policymakers and publications contend that the world is carefully judging America's credibility and reputation. The Washington Post editorial board declared: "If Mr. Obama waffles or retreats on the one clear red line he drew, U.S. credibility across the region will be severely damaged." Rogers asserted: "We have lost the confidence of the Arab League." Meanwhile, Sen. Saxby Chambliss warned: The world is watching. We've got 70,000 dead people in that part of the world as a result of Bashar al-Assad. We as America have never let something like that happen before. We've taken action."
Leaving aside the multiple historical errors in Chambliss's statement, using or threatening to use force to "signal" is a fool's errand. Recall that many advocates of intervening in Libya's civil war believed U.S. action would show other dictators that they should embrace democratic demands for change. John Kerry, then the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared: "The military intervention in Libya sends a critical signal to other leaders in the region: They cannot automatically assume they can resort to large-scale violence to put down legitimate demands for reform without consequences." Columnist Nicholas Kristof claimed: "If not for this intervention...the message would have gone out to all dictators that ruthlessness works." Since Assad incorrectly interpreted the intended message from ousting Qaddafi, why would other potential friends or adversaries assess U.S. strength and credibility based on Syria?
Prevent revenge. During a recent Armed Services Committee hearing, Sen. John McCain warned Obama administration officials that Syrian children in refugee camps "will take revenge on those who failed to help them. We've failed to help." At a later hearing, he claimed: "We are breeding a generation of people who will -- as was articulated to me by a teacher in one of the refugee camps, these children will take revenge on the people who refused to help them." McCain and others appear to believe that -- unlike other opposition movements around the world that demand and fail to receive U.S. assistance -- Syrians have deeply ingrained memories and are especially predisposed to seek vengeance. This revenge is also selective, because nobody contends that vengeful Syrians will try to kill Chinese, Brazilians, South Africans, Indians, or other powers that refuse to intervene militarily or provide arms.
It was the contention of every policymaker this weekend that America is "doing nothing" in Syria. The United States has provided $385 million in humanitarian assistance, $250 million in non-lethal aid to opposition and civil society groups, and supports a massive clandestine effort to feed citizens and supply hospitals in the rebel-held areas of Syria. At the last international pledging conference for Syria, China vowed merely $1.2 million for U.N. aid agencies. If perceived inaction is the catalyst for vengeance, then future generations of Syrians should presumably target Beijing before Washington.
Protect Jordan. The contention is that the United States and regional partners should limit the potential for sectarian spillover into Jordan, since it could irreversibly destabilize the constitutional monarchy of King Abdullah II. On Thursday, Sen. Graham noted that swift U.S. action could "contain this fighting so that the King of Jordan does not fall.... The kingdom of Jordan has been a stabilizing influence in the Mideast. Jordan is under pressure from the effects of Syria." On Sunday, Graham again warned that "[Abdullah's] kingdom could fall, and he's a moderating influence." Given that 86 percent of Jordanians have an unfavorable view of the United States, it is unwise and unrealistic to expect that deploying the U.S. military to "do something" in Syria will ensure the Hashemite Kingdom's survival.
The humanitarian impulse to apply military tactics selectively in Syria, or provide advanced weapons to specific rebel groups is understandable given the horrors unfolding on the ground, overwhelmingly committed by the Assad regime. The United States could "level the playing field" with its vast conventional military capabilities, and policymakers claim these capabilities come with an obligation to use them. As Rep. Keith Ellison declared on Sunday: "I don't think the world's greatest superpower, the United States, can stand by and not do anything." Sen. Dick Durbin stated it more simply: "Something has to be done."
However, if you examine what that specific "something" is, it becomes apparent that U.S. military power cannot plausibly achieve it -- not with the level of commitment and risk that policymakers are willing to accept. A U.S. official told Reuters this weekend: "There's a lot of analysis to be done before reaching any major decisions that would push U.S. policy more in the direction of military options." Advocates of military intervention need to define their strategic objectives in Syria and outline how the use of force can accomplish it. So far, no one has done so.
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