Israel’s Three Gambles

Can Israel get away with its attacks on the Syrian regime?

Israel's recent attacks against Syria are the latest, dramatic development in a conflict that is already spiraling out of control. In the past few days, Israeli aircraft reportedly targeted Iranian surface-to-surface missiles headed for Hezbollah, as well as Syrian missiles in a military base in the outskirts of Damascus. Israel's strikes show, once again, its intelligence services' ability to penetrate the Iran's arms shipment route to Lebanon and its military's skill in striking adversaries with seeming impunity. But Israel is also risking retaliation and further destabilization of its own neighborhood -- in ways that may come back to haunt it.

With much of Syria outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Israel is particularly wary of chemical weapons or advanced conventional weaponry falling into the wrong hands, whether it's extremist Sunni opposition groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or, more immediately, Assad's and Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The missiles Israel sought to hit in the first attack on Friday have a significantly larger payload, greater accuracy, and longer range than the bulk of the Lebanese Shiite group's current arsenal. Contrary to the allegations of the Assad regime that claims Israel's strikes prove it is backing the opposition, Israel is not throwing its weight against Assad. Indeed, Israel's latest strikes represent the latest in a long-standing policy of denying the transfer of arms that could alter the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah -- weapons systems such as advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles; the Iranian-made Fateh 110 surface-to-surface missiles (reportedly targeted this weekend) that would significantly increase Hezbollah's threat to northern Israeli cities; or additional surface-to-sea weaponry, such as the kind successfully used against an Israeli ship in July 2006.

More broadly, the Israeli strike is meant to disrupt the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah nexus. Iran has long provided Hezbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars (the exact amount is unknown and probably fluctuates considerably) and a wide range of weaponry, including anti-tank missiles and long-range rockets. Since Hezbollah's birth in the early 1980s, Syria has served as intermediary, allowing Iranian forces to deploy within Lebanon and serving as a transit point for Iranian weapons -- something Hezbollah's Lebanese opponents have complained about, as well as Israel.

The strikes are a gamble, however, for three main reasons. The first bet is that Syria will not respond. Israel has long been a whipping boy for Arab regimes short on domestic credibility: it's not hard in this part of the world to paint any opponents as Zionist stooges. Bashar, like his father Hafez before him, backed Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups in the name of the "resistance," hoping to win points at home and throughout the Arab world -- while distracting attention from his tyranny and economic failures. Indeed, early in the Syrian uprising, the Assad regime tried to create a crisis by pushing Palestinian refugees living in Syria to return to Israel  to divert attention from the crackdown. This failed, but the Israeli strike offers a chance to try again.

Israeli leaders, however, believe that this playbook is dated. When Israel hit the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007, Assad and his cronies remained mum and did not retaliate. Today, Israeli strategists are gambling that Assad is too embattled to risk escalation. His military forces are weak and overstretched already, facing fierce domestic opposition with no effective airpower. Further losses to Israel and its air force would deprive the regime of desperately needed elite forces. Indeed, Israel seems rather sure of itself: as the smoke was still clearing, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu projected business as usual, departing on a state visit to China.

Perhaps even more important, if Assad tries to use Israel as a foil he risks further losses, which would be politically humiliating and potentially extremely damaging for a regime that is already on a knife's edge. The Israeli strikes show that it can violate Syrian sovereignty with impunity, and the Syrian opposition is now charging that Assad has repeatedly failed to protect Syrian soil from Israel. The Syrian Opposition Council, a leading opposition political grouping, is trying to play the Israel card itself, noting that it "holds the Assad regime fully responsible for weakening the Syrian army by exhausting its forces in a losing battle against the Syrian people." Meanwhile, the remaining nationalists in the Syrian military resent this embarrassment, risking Assad further defections and desertions.

The Syrian president's calculations may change, however, if his regime's grip on power slips further. As Middle East expert Kenneth Pollack argues, Assad still thinks he can win this thing; but if he becomes desperate, he will be far more willing to lash out, using everything in his arsenal to prevent defeat. Attacking Israel would be a desperate move -- but Assad is becoming a desperate man.

Israel's second gamble is that Hezbollah will not retaliate. Since the bloody 2006 war, Israel's border with Lebanon has largely been quiet -- indeed, the quietest it has been for generations. After that destructive and indecisive conflict, Hezbollah silenced its guns, fearing that provoking Israel would lead to another bloody clash for which it would take the blame. Now, however, the Lebanese militant group is in a box. With Hezbollah forces fighting side-by-side with Assad, they have lost popularity in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world. Once lauded as heroes for standing up to Israel, now they are scorned for siding with a butcher against his own people.

Meanwhile, within Lebanon, the Syrian war is stoking sectarian tension, leading militant Sunnis to condemn Hezbollah and Shias in general, and diminishing Hezbollah's claim that it is a champion of all Lebanese, not just Shias. But with Israel striking at Hezbollah's crown jewels, its weapons supplies, a non-response damages its credibility. The temptation to restore its reputation -- and create a distraction that turns Israel's attentions from Damascus -- may prove too great.

Israel's third gamble is one shared by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps the United States -- that increased meddling by neighbors will lead to the collapse of Syria. In Israeli eyes, the only thing worse than Assad's regime in Syria would be chaos in Syria, with either Hezbollah gaining access to Syria's arsenals or jihadist groups allied with al Qaeda (like Jabhat al-Nusra) assuming control of swathes of Syrian territory. In this scenario, Syria would then become an incubator of jihad on Israel's border, much as Israel fears that Sinai, to its south, has already become. Hezbollah, at least, can be deterred, but the roving al Qaeda groups have no fixed address and care little about protecting ordinary Syrians from Israeli retaliation, making them far harder to deter. Jihadists might use Syria's ballistic missile and chemical weapons arsenals against Israel, forcing an invasion in response, or at least repeated attacks. Israel's Syrian border, so peaceful -- through deterrence -- for so long, would again be a war zone.

Israel is preparing for all of these possibilities by increasing its intelligence gathering operations (evidenced by the successful attacks this weekend) and bolstering its border defenses. Old guard posts on the Golan have been re-staffed and the Israeli northern command has recently drilled a whole reserve division in a mock-emergency call-up exercise. Israel also deployed Iron Dome anti-missile batteries and temporarily closed the civilian airspace in the north of the country. Such preparation may decrease the carnage any Syrian or Hezbollah response causes and give Israeli leaders some political breathing space -- but they won't solve the fundamental tensions caused by the chaos and uncertainty in Syria and Lebanon.

Perhaps the best Israel -- or any of America's regional allies -- can do now is to try to protect its interests in Syria, while managing the unrest and violence that spills out of the country. Yet here the United States has an important role to play. In different ways, key U.S. allies -- Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey, and now Israel -- are intervening in Syria. Ideally, the United States would make its own objectives and strategy clear to its allies and convince them to bolster America's own policy. But for now the Obama administration does not seek overtly to lead the international response to the Syria crisis. That's not quite good enough. At the very least, Washington needs to coordinate allied interventions so together they make it more likely that Bashar's regime will fall and Syria will return to stability. At the very least, the administration must make sure they are not working at cross purposes and that the actions of one power do not harm the interests of another.


National Security

Time for Kerry to Face Facts

As America's top diplomat heads to Moscow, here are some tough questions he needs to answer about the Obama administration's flawed nuclear treaty.

On the third anniversary of the signing of New START, the Obama administration's strategic arms agreement with Russia, Secretary of State John Kerry published the administration's best case for the success of the treaty, titled "Time to Face Facts." In it, he urges us to "relentlessly" follow the facts about the treaty. We agree, but by doing so, we are led to very different conclusions from his about the treaty's purported accomplishments. And with Kerry in Moscow this week, reportedly to discuss, among other issues, following up on National Security Advisor Tom Donilon's discussions with Russian officials about pursuing additional reductions in nuclear force, the stakes couldn't be higher.

Let's begin with the basic purpose of strategic arms reductions agreements: to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the parties and strengthen U.S. national security. While praising the treaty as working "exactly as advertised," Kerry fails to mention anything about actual cuts in nuclear forces, in stark contrast with his comments prior to ratification, when, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he repeatedly emphasized White House talking points that the agreement would reduce the maximum number of strategically deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces by one-third. Those of us who testified that this was simply false -- because of the bomber-counting rule and the fact that the treaty would require cuts in U.S. forces only -- were either ignored or derided. Our assessments of the treaty as unilateral disarmament in the guise of a two-party agreement were summarily rejected.

So what are the facts? In the initial New START data exchange, Moscow announced that it was already well below the new limits on deployed delivery vehicles set by the treaty. This should have come as no surprise. The Russian defense minister at the time, Anatoly Serdyukov, had earlier told the Duma, "We will not have to make any cuts to our strategic offensive weapons" because Russia's strategic nuclear weapons were already under the treaty limits for both warheads and launchers. Contradicting statements by Kerry and Obama, Serdyukov announced that Russia intended to build up to the treaty limits.

In other words, New START provided Moscow an incentive to go up, not down, in strategic nuclear arms. As for the United States, New START will reduce the number of deployed delivery vehicles by about one-fourth. Given these facts, it is perhaps understandable why the new secretary of state chose to say nothing about nuclear reductions, which was, after all, the treaty's ostensible objective. The one-sided nature of the actual reductions certainly looks more like unilateral disarmament than mutual, bilateral reductions.

While ignoring the facts on nuclear reductions, Kerry praises the treaty on two grounds. First, he declares that, because U.S. and Russian inspection teams have conducted multiple on-site visits, the "verification regime works." This assertion -- that "boots back on the ground" equals effective verification -- was a principal argument of treaty supporters.

But again, the facts belie the conclusion. Because the treaty eviscerates telemetry exchanges and ends the on-the-ground monitoring of Russia's missile production facility, the United States is no longer able to argue credibly what Kerry asserts -- that New START strengthens mutual confidence and predictability.

Second, Kerry lauds New START for setting a positive example that will elicit greater cooperation from others, increase pressure on states like Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear ambitions, and strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Unfortunately, the facts tell a different story. Since the ratification of New START, Pyongyang and Tehran have continued to advance their nuclear and missile programs. The recent talks with Iran are widely viewed as a failure, and North Korea's threats of nuclear strikes on its neighbors and the United Sates speak for themselves. And finally, the much-hyped reset in U.S.-Russia relations as a consequence of New START has totally failed to produce more constructive Russian policies on Iran (the 2010 U.N. sanctions notwithstanding) and Syria, and it has done nothing to modify Russian military doctrine, which still envisions the United States and its NATO allies as the principal threat to its interests.

Finally, Kerry reminds us that Obama intends to pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons, "strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and non-deployed." But this fact should concern those who believe in a strong and secure America able to deter and defend against attacks on the U.S. homeland and on the country's friends and allies. For this administration, ideology trumps reality. No other country has adopted the U.S. policy of "no new nuclear capabilities" or unilateral disarmament. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others are not following the U.S. example; all are modernizing and expanding their forces. The governments in London and Paris have restated their commitment to ensuring a modern deterrent in light of the uncertain, dangerous world in which we live. The Obama administration stands alone, leading from the front, but with no followers and in the wrong direction.

Although another agreement with Russia is possible, such an agreement would likely be even worse than New START and would have an even more detrimental effect on the U.S. ability to provide for extended deterrence and effective missile defenses. Here, the administration's willingness to pay a high price through concessions on missile defenses to Russia and China is clear, and ironies abound. It is the facts in Northeast Asia that presumably drove Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's decision to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska (a capability Kerry has long derided but now touts to America's Asian allies). Hagel, however, also revealed the decision to end the Aegis SM-3 IIB program that was to constitute Phase 4 of U.S. plans for missile defenses in Europe. This concession, referred to as a "significant signal" by former Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher, was meant to entice Russia to the negotiating table -- a gift for which the administration received nothing in return. Moscow's predictable reaction was to demand more, just as it did when Obama canceled missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in September 2009, again with nothing in return.

When Kerry says it's time to face facts, he is right. We hope he will take his own advice.

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