Instead of pretending that it can force Pyongyang to denuclearize, Washington should focus on containing the threat posed by North Korea. U.S. policymakers intended the March B-2 and B-52 bomber flyovers to demonstrate the durability of the nuclear umbrella, as both aircrafts are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. However, such sporadic displays of force will not convince North Korea that Washington will rebuff possible attempts at nuclear intimidation of the South in the future. But nuclear weapons on South Korean soil might.
A February poll by the Asan Institute, a South Korean think tank, said that 66 percent of South Korean respondents support the development of a nuclear-weapons program. While it could take a few years for the South to generate its own bomb, all the United States would need is a presidential order. At the stroke of a pen, Obama would enhance deterrence and reassure the South Korean people. Although China would protest, the United States could assuage it by presenting the deployment as a way of lessoning the probability that South Korean and Japanese develop their own nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang would likely be furious. But what else could it threaten that it hasn't already threatened over the last two months? And even if Pyongyang wanted to produce more nuclear weapons in response, it appears to lack the capability to do so.
Ideally, U.S. nukes in South Korea would eventually provide the leverage for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, mirroring the European experience near the end of the Cold War. In 1983, after Moscow installed a new generation of intermediate-range missiles in the Soviet Union, Washington responded with nuclear-tipped Pershing II rockets and ground-launched cruise missiles in West Germany. The result provided the United States with the clout to negotiate the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated that class of missiles for both superpowers.
U.S. deployment on the Korean Peninsula could have a similar effect. But only if Washington accepts that its current approach has failed.
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