Trade between the United States and the Middle East is much smaller, though it has increased since the collapse at Camp David. Thanks in part to new trade agreements, the share of American imports of goods and services coming from the region has risen by about two-thirds, from 3 percent in 2000 to 4.9 percent in 2012. The twist is that the new trade agreements -- and trade with the Middle East in general -- have often been pursued for political reasons.
Bahrain, Jordan, and Oman were never going to be the most crucial trading partners for the United States. Nor are they necessarily the most economically efficient sources of imports; other countries might have offered Americans lower-priced goods under the same favorable trading rules. But strengthening economic ties in the Middle East has long been seen as a useful underpinning for strategic goals: protecting Israel, isolating Iran, and maintaining a local military presence. As a result, the importance of the American economic relationship with the Middle East has been artificially maintained.
Yet America's economic interest in the Middle East is still far smaller than Europe's or Asia's. This does not stop the United States from doing most of the political legwork in the region, at least publicly. Once again, the world can bear witness to the ritual of the American president and secretary of state organizing an Israeli-Palestinian peace conference as if it were another station of the cross on the way to Golgotha. At the United Nations, American officials wail weekly about the continuing onslaught of death in Syria. Americans lead the effort to stop Iran's nuclear program, and Americans are trying to rein in the excesses of Egypt's military.
So where are the Europeans, Chinese, and Japanese? They may be active behind the scenes, but in public they look like classic free riders. Perhaps they see little to gain by involving themselves in conflicts whose economic consequences have been largely contained. They may also, as a general rule, have less of an interventionist attitude than the United States. Still, in economic terms their people arguably have more at stake in the Middle East than Americans do, and the gap between those interests is likely to increase.
If Washington's latest effort to bring the Israelis and Palestinians together fails, it may be a long time before an American president takes the initiative in the Middle East again. War and frustration have taken their toll, and the economic imperative is far from clear. To fill the vacuum, China, Japan, and the European Union could form a new coalition of partners for peace. It may seem like a stretch to imagine these three heavyweights working together on Egypt, Syria, or Jerusalem. But can they afford not to?