Democracy Lab

Cleaning House in Kenya's Police Force

Why security sector reform in Kenya has been much more successful than you might think. The latest in our series of Lab Reports on Kenya.

Kenya's generally well-regarded military has faced stinging criticism in the aftermath of the tragic Sept. 21 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, with allegations of rivalries and "friendly fire" between army and police units and looting by soldiers. Kenya's police, which have a decidedly less than stellar reputation, became the focus of similar censure in October when David Kimaiyo, Inspector General of the police, was condemned for an "assault on the freedom of expression" after he summoned several journalists over their coverage of Westgate. After a public uproar, the requests were subsequently cancelled. Additionally, recent reports on elite police units have documented abuses. 

While these developments certainly raise a number of important questions and reveal persisting challenges, the prevailing narrative of police ineptitude arguably leaves out the most important part of the story. Kenya has actually made substantial -- if incomplete and fragile -- progress on police reform over the past five years.

There's a reason why security sector reform efforts in Kenya have focused on the police. Kenya's military has a well-established reputation for professionalism and has generally stayed out of politics (with the possible exception of a coup attempt in 1982). As a result, Kenya's soldiers have little involvement in political violence. By contrast, in the lead-up to Kenya's March 2013 elections, many observers derided the pace and extent of the then coalition government's efforts to reform the heavily politicized police force. (In the photo above, members Kenya's police force take cover during the September attack.)

The police reform agenda featured prominently in both Kenya's new constitution, which passed in 2010, and the 2008 powers-sharing agreement that put an end to the ethnically-driven 2007-2008 post-election violence, which was triggered by a close presidential election and allegations of fraud and ultimately left over 1,100 dead and 600,000 displaced. While criticism of the slow pace and implementation of police reforms since 2008 is warranted, during the March 2013 election the Kenyan police acted in an apolitical and generally professional manner, helping to contain tensions after the tight poll -- which, despite widespread concern of renewed bloodshed, was not followed by large-scale violence.

It's important to understand the broader historical context. Police systems in sub-Saharan Africa have long been used by elites to wield political authority, from the colonial period through the contemporary multi-party era. Independence leaders inherited and largely maintained centralized colonial policing structures, as the police proved to be useful tools for suppressing political competition and consolidating control. In the two decades since the "third wave" of democracy brought political liberalization to much of the continent in the early 1990s, the language of African policing shifted in many countries towards accountability and democratically oriented reform programs. In practice, however, the police generally remain political instruments and continue to play an often deleterious role in governance and political violence, from harassment of the opposition in Zimbabwe to widespread extrajudicial killings in Nigeria.

Until recently, the history of policing in Kenya was no exception. Successive Kenyan presidents -- from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi to Mwai Kibaki -- maintained firm executive control over Kenya's two police branches (the Kenyan Police Force and the Administration Police), and used the force to exercise political control. In 1964, Kenyatta jettisoned police autonomy a year after independence, retained the paramilitary structure of the colonial police, and employed the police to suppress political dissent. The use of the police for political purposes deepened in the 1980s under the increasingly autocratic Moi, as units were deployed to attack and torture political opponents. Moi ignored calls for police reform after the move to multi-party politics in 1991, using the police to arm ethnic militias and suppress opposition voter turnout in the violent and flawed 1992 and 1997 elections.

In an environment of violent crime and endemic corruption, Kibaki came to power in 2002 on a campaign of renewal, launching a police reform program in 2003 that aimed to professionalize the decaying, corrupt force and experiment with community policing. The rhetorical move toward democratic policing achieved little, however, as Kibaki continued the Kenyan tradition of using the police for regime security. That became vividly apparent as a result of police involvement in the 2007-2008 post-election violence, where the police were implicated in 36 percent of the officially recorded 1,113 fatalities and the wounding of over 500 more. The short-term triggers of the post-election violence were an exceedingly close election, reports of vote rigging, and Kibaki's decision to hastily declare victory. But the underlying roots of the violence can be traced to several longer-term trends in Kenya's history, including the state's loss over the monopoly of violence, the fragmentation of elites, and ethnically-based, high stakes "winner takes all" politics. To end the crisis, in February 2008, Kibaki and his challenger, Raila Odinga, established the coalition government that expired after the 2013 elections. As part of the power-sharing agreement, the coalition pledged to overhaul the troubled police force. To what extent was the so-called "unity" government able to deliver on its reform promise?

As my recent research highlights, two main factors helped achieve substantial, albeit sluggish and incomplete, police reforms in Kenya under coalition government: first, a low degree of political influence in the police; and second, strong police reform provisions in the text of the power-sharing agreement. A unique combination of factors led the police to become deeply politicized, as noted above, but police leaders never amassed enough of a power base to reciprocally influence the political sphere, a symbiotic relationship that is often seen in other cases such as Zimbabwe. These two factors allowed local, regional, and international actors to leverage the power-sharing text and push reforms forward, while, at the same time, recalcitrant police leaders were unable to sufficiently block reforms.

Thus, in spite of a halting pace and constant pushback from anti-reform elements, several significant legislative and constitutional police reforms took place during the tenure of the coalition government from 2008 to 2013. Kenya's new constitution, promulgated in August 2010, contained major changes to security and police governance, including provisions to diminish political manipulation and increase accountability of the police. The new constitution also merged the two police forces into one National Police Service, which was intended to help streamline the often overlapping and conflicting mandates of the two branches (the Administration Police was a colonial relic, created to help local chiefs with policing and administrative issues). In August 2011, three key police reform laws were passed: the National Police Service Bill, the National Police Service Commission Bill, and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill. Passage of such reforms has set in motion the long process of reshaping police governance in Kenya.

Implementation of these institutional reforms has lagged due to a number of factors, but mostly due to a lack of political will from elites and recalcitrance from some within the police leadership. Here's what a member of the Kenyan government's Police Reforms Implementation Committee, Odour Ong'wen, told me in an interview in 2011: "The first major obstacle we are seeing as a committee is the resistance from the very top [of the police hierarchy].... A staggering majority are resisting." However, due to a lack of political influence, these efforts to resist change have largely been fruitless.

Kimaiyo, the first Inspector General of the reformulated National Police Service, who was a director in the Ministry of Internal Security when I interviewed him in 2011, acknowledged the difficulties in operationalizing institutional reforms: "The recommendations are there on paper," he told me. "Implementation is a problem." In spite of these obstacles and the real potential for a rollback under a new administration, it appears this institutional legal framework helped depoliticize the force ahead of the 2013 elections.

Notwithstanding fears about preparedness, during the ultimate test of the fledgling reforms -- the March 2013 national elections -- police conduct was, overall, commendable, which clearly stands in stark contrast to the 2007-2008 election. The police force deployed officers to areas that saw outbreaks of violence in 2007-2008, and was quick to send reinforcements to areas that did suffer from violence in the days before the March poll. In a move that could have implications for the quality of Kenya's democracy, Kimaiyo even instituted a ban on public demonstrations during the election period. In a recent post-mortem on the election, the International Crisis Group (ICG) concluded that police behavior during the March elections was "greatly improved" from the previous election, characterizing their performance as a "measured response."

Of course, there's still considerable justification for harsher verdicts. The ICG report itself highlighted several instances of questionable use of live ammunition and excessive use of force during the election period, episodes which are under investigation by the Independent Policing Oversight Authority. Additionally, a report released last month by the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Kenyan NGO Muslims for Human Rights is particularly critical of Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, which they allege is responsible for a laundry list of abuses, including torture, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances.   

These worrying incidents -- combined with police conduct during Westgate and the subsequent crackdown on journalists, additional charges of major abuses of Somali and other refugees, persistently high levels of corruption, fundamental questions about effectiveness, chronic budget shortages, and continuing impunity for previous political violence -- highlight the many remaining challenges in turning  reforms into a reality.

Nonetheless, a new legal framework and improved police conduct during the March elections suggest real movement on reforms, particularly in depoliticizing the force. That said, recent efforts to amend two police reform bills to transfer some powers back to the police commissioner, which are currently being debated in parliament, suggest that the possibility of a reversal remains high under the new government of Uhuru Kenyatta.

Pressure from civil society and international actors played a large role in pushing the police reform agenda forward under the coalition government in Kenya. In order to consolidate on past gains and avoid backsliding, it is incumbent on both domestic and international actors to continue to monitor and push the Kenyatta administration to fully implement and translate police reforms from paper to practice.

SIMON MAINA/AFP/Getty Images

Democracy Lab

Africa's Powerhouse

Why Kenya's economy is the linchpin of a promising new zone of growth in East Africa. The latest in our series of Lab Reports on Kenya.

Lately many observers have been avidly discussing the recent high rates of economic growth in Africa. Speaking in Washington earlier this year, Donald Kaberuka, the president of the African Development Bank offered some cautionary words. While the good economic news from the continent may well represent a turning point from a past characterized by hopelessness, he said, Africa nevertheless remains far from a tipping point. To reach such a threshold, Africa requires major investments in three "I's": institutions, integration, and infrastructure. Even with the recent robust growth experienced over the past decade, Africa still suffers a major infrastructure deficit. Most of the countries have relatively weak institutions. And the regional integration project has been slow and marred by compliance and commitment deficits. Thus, as Kaberuka noted, although Africa has reached a turning point, progress to a tipping point is not an easy journey.

One of the regions in Africa that is making remarkable progress in all these "I's" is the East African Community. The EAC's original members -- Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania -- have recently been joined by Rwanda and Burundi. South Sudan is expected to join the community soon. The region has fast-tracked regional integration and has seen considerable progress in institutional reforms. Moreover, East Africa boasts much greater political stability than it has at any time in its recent past, and peace has been restored in most of the countries. The region has also seen major investments in both national and regional infrastructure; many more projects have been planned and are scheduled to commence shortly. On Nov. 28, for example, President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya inaugurated the commencement of construction of a rail project that will link Kenya's coast town of Mombasa to Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), and Juba (South Sudan). With positive growth trajectory predicted over the medium term, the EAC has a good chance of reaching a developmental tipping point. (The photo above shows Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni waving an EAC flag during an event attended by the region's other leaders at Mombasa Port in August.)

Within the EAC, the Kenyan economy is the anchor. The overall performance of the region will to a great extent depend on what happens in Kenya. Kenya's economy is the largest in the region and is much more dynamic than those of other member countries. The country's economy is much better linked to the other economies in terms of investment flows and trade. Thanks to its more advanced human capital base, its more diversified economy, and its role as a leader in the information communication revolution in the region, Kenya's economy is expected to remain strong, creating salutary benefits to the other member countries. The prospects for a strong economy are boosted by recent institutional reforms that have culminated in the adoption of a new constitution that provides for devolved governance.

Kenya's economic dominance in the region is based on a strong private sector that has evolved under relatively market-friendly policies for most of the post-independence era. Kenya's record of relative political stability and its lack of dramatic ideological shifts over the same period have done much to cement its position. By contrast, the other members of the EAC have had rather turbulent political histories. In the case of Tanzania, a radical ideological orientation to socialism under the policy of "Ujamaa" was the cornerstone of founding President Julius Nyerere's government. Such factors undermined the growth of the private sector in the other EAC countries. Though these countries have undertaken substantive reforms, and are now on a positive growth trajectory, Kenya is likely to hold onto its dominant position for the near-to-medium future.

EAC member countries have diverse political histories. The five countries attained their independence in the 1960s. Tanzania was the first (1961), followed by Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda in 1962, and Kenya in 1963. Despite achieving political independence at the same period, the countries' political development has been somewhat heterogeneous. Only Tanzania and Kenya escaped major internal conflict and military rule. Uganda's Milton Obote was ousted in 1971 by Idi Amin, and what followed was a devastation of the country's economy brought about by Amin's policies, including the eviction of Asians, the nationalization of private enterprises, and the expansion of the public sector. Idi Amin was ousted through a military coup in 1979 by Milton Obote, who was again overthrown by General Tito Okello, who ruled for six months before being ousted by the current Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni.

Burundi has been marred by civil unrest since its independence, a conflict primarily between the Hutus and the Tutsis, the two main ethnic groups. Burundi, one of the five poorest countries in the world, has seen its growth and development curtailed by civil unrest. Rwanda, the smallest country in East Africa in terms of geographical size, experienced one of the worst genocides in history in 1994, in which over half a million people were killed within approximately a hundred days. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was a culmination of the ethnic and political rivalry that long existed between the Hutu and the Tutsi (the same groups that were involved in the conflict in Burundi).

Tanzania boasts a large reservoir of resources: land, water, and mineral wealth. Although the country has been politically stable in recent decades, the development of the private sector was greatly hampered by the Ujamaa policy. The Ujamaa village was a concept propagated by President Nyerere, based on the ideals of "African Socialism," which stipulated that the president should determine how the country's natural resources were allocated and used. There was no freehold land ownership. Cultivation of land was collective, as the land rights were transferred to the elected village councils, "the Ujamaa." The Ujamaa concept not only affected agriculture but also nationalized the banks and industry and made the government the biggest employer. As a result, the private sector declined. The country became dependent on international aid. A nation rich in natural resources became one of the poorest in the world.

Although Kenya has never experienced military rule, and its political environment can be described as somewhat democratic, the country has had its share of politically instigated violence along ethnic divisions and tribal lines. Even though elections in Kenya have been marred by flaws and irregularities, the country is considered to have a wider democratic space compared to its neighbors.

Following the post-election violence in 2007-2008, Kenya held a constitutional referendum in August 2010, approving a new constitution that brought several important reforms. Among other things, the new constitution allows Kenyans to initiate referenda, thus promoting popular initiative. This democratic environment is not enjoyed in Uganda, where Yoweri Museveni has held power for the last 25 years, and who has stated that he will run yet again in the 2016 elections if his party endorses him.

In Rwanda, Paul Kagame has held the presidency since 1994; during that time, critics have accused him of infringing on media freedom and suppressing the opposition. Burundi has been somewhat democratic in its elections, but the country has also experienced presidential assassinations and at least one coup d'etat since it embraced democracy. Tanzania has a multiparty democracy (though Chama Cha Mapinduzi has been the dominant party since 1977).

As previously observed, Kenya has the largest economy amongst the members of EAC in terms of GDP. Kenya's GDP accounts for 40 percent of the region's GDP, followed by Tanzania at 28 percent, Uganda at 21 percent, Rwanda at 8 percent, and lastly Burundi at 3 percent. In terms of GDP at current market prices, Kenya's 2011 GDP stood at $34 billion, well ahead of the closest rival economy, Tanzania, with a GDP of $24 billion.

Compared to other African countries, Kenya has very limited arable land and rainfall -- but it also boasts the most sophisticated agricultural sector. Horticulture contributes the highest percentage of agricultural gross domestic product (33 percent), followed by food crops (32 percent). Industrial crops and industrial crops contribute 17 percent each. Kenya has consistently done well in horticulture and tea production and export. The horticulture industry has existed since pre-colonial times and continued to flourish when the export market was opened in Europe in the post-independence period.

Kenya is doing better than Tanzania in this industry because of the infrastructural rigidities inherent in Tanzania's export system. Tanzania produces much more horticulture produce than Kenya but sells very little overseas. Compared to Kenya, Tanzanian farmers grow the produce on a small scale and lack networks to enable them combine their harvest at lower costs when exporting. Additionally, higher freight charges at Kilimanjaro International Airport and Julius Nyerere International Airport in Dar Es Salaam, coupled with inadequate storage facilities at the airports, make it even harder for Tanzania to export. By contrast, Kenya's Nairobi Jomo Kenyatta airport is well served by major airlines and charter operators, making it easier to access European markets and the rest of the world. The Kenyan government has also supported this sector by ensuring that supply chain bottlenecks are minimized as much as possible by streamlining the process. At the same time, the Ministry of Agriculture has steadily increased funding for irrigation projects and subsidized fertilizers.

Another agricultural product that makes Kenya competitive compared to its neighbors is black tea. Kenya is the world's number-one exporter of black tea. (Tanzania and Uganda are also major producers of black tea.) Kenya is competitive in tea production and export not least due to the fact that is the home of the Mombasa Tea Auction Center, the second largest tea auction venue in the world, which, among its other advantages, provides direct feedback of market prices to factories and farmers. Additionally, favorable weather conditions and tropical rich volcanic soils result in the production of high grade tea that has a unique flavor, making it the best in the world. Incentives offered by the government, such as value-added tax exemptions, withholding tax holidays for firms that process and package tea, and Export Processing Zones that offer favorable conditions for exporters, make Kenya's tea industry a competitive cluster in the region and in the world.

In terms of intra-East African trade, Kenya ranks at the top, averaging 37 percent in 2011-2012, followed by Uganda at 24. The intra-regional trade is driven by the manufacturing industry, and particularly the Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCGs) and processed products that are major drivers of the economy. Kenya's competitive edge in this industry stems from the diversification of its exports basket, which makes it less vulnerable to shocks. Additionally, compared to the region, the country's transport system, including roads, the Mombasa port, and the airports, is more advanced than those of most other countries in the region (though there are bottlenecks at Mombasa). Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda have recently started building a superhighway from Mombasa to Kigali that will ease the movement of cargo through these countries. The fact that Kenya is one of the only two East African countries that is not landlocked (the other being Tanzania) gives the country a competitive advantage in terms of international trade. Kenya is also the region's major exporter and importer with the rest of the world.

Kenya is also very competitive in terms of human capital. It ranks at the top in terms of adult literacy rates. The adult literacy rate in Kenya is 87 percent, followed by Uganda at 73.2 percent, Tanzania at 72.9 percent, Rwanda at 70.7 percent and lastly Burundi's literacy rate is 66.6 percent. In comparison to other East African countries, meanwhile, Kenya has the highest public expenditure in education at 17.7 percent between 2008-2009 and 2011-2012, compared to Uganda, which spends an average of 10 percent. Education plays a major role in increasing productivity and economic growth and reducing poverty and inequality. Studies comparing the state of primary schools in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania conclude that a child from a poor household in Kenya is more likely to succeed than a child from a wealthy household from Tanzania or Uganda. Tanzania exhibits the worst performance among the three East African countries. Kenya also ranks on top in terms of enrollment of students in higher education, followed by Uganda and then Tanzania. In 2012, Kenya enacted the Universities Act, which is aimed at improving the quality of education at all levels by promoting separation of governance of universities and other tertiary institutions and strengthening its technical sector by separating it from the university sector. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 2013-2014 ranks Kenya 44th in quality of education out of 148 countries. By comparison, Rwanda ranks 51st, Uganda 82nd, Tanzania 100th, and Burundi 143rd.

Kenya's private sector has been more dynamic than that of the other members of the community, which has translated into a more competitive and innovative economy relative to its neighbors. The service sector has been a huge contributor to the growth of the private industry in Kenya. This sector is the largest contributor to GDP growth since 2007 in the country, according to the IMF regional economic outlook for sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya has emerged as a technological and financial hub for East and Central Africa. A major techno-city project is underway in Konza, 40 miles from Nairobi, that aims to reinforce Kenya's reputation as the regional technology leader in Africa. The project has been dubbed the "Silicon Savannah." IBM also set up its first African research lab in Nairobi, following the likes of Google, Microsoft, and Intel, which also have their regional headquarters in Nairobi.

The Nairobi securities exchange (NSE) is among the best in Africa. Participation of foreign investors in the NSE has always been encouraged and their interests protected since independence. This is demonstrated by legislation such as the Foreign Investors Act of 1964, which aimed to protect foreign investors and allowed foreigners to repatriate their earnings. Several institutional changes have been instituted to strengthen the markets, such as the establishment of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in 1990. The CMA's mission is to protect investors' interests, promote market development through research of new products and institutions, and ensure proper conduct of all licensed persons and market institutions. The introduction of the Central Depository System in 2004 further reinforced the integrity of the financial system by providing clearing and settlement services in the Kenyan Capital Markets by offering a central custody that enables simplified, swift, and secured services to the investors. Moreover, the automation of the trading system in 2006 greatly enhanced the efficiency of the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Just recently the NSE announced that it will upgrade its IT infrastructure to support the diversification of trading securities, including derivatives and futures. Market capitalization increased from $453 million in 1990 to $14.8 billion in 2012. Kenya has the most advanced capital market in the region and has over 60 listed companies on the stock exchange. The rest of the East African countries have less than 20 listed companies; Burundi does not yet have a stock exchange.

It should come as no little surprise that, in 2012, Kenya attracted the most private equity deals in East Africa. These involved investments in firms that have not gone public and are therefore unlisted on the stock exchange. The main reason for this large volume of investment is that Kenya is widely viewed as the regional economic hub because of the financial infrastructure that is already in place.

Another area in which Kenya is doing tremendously well in comparison to the other East African countries and the rest of the world is the mobile money services sector. The country is ranked number one in the world in mobile money. Mpesa, the flagship mobile phone banking product, put Kenya at the forefront of mobile money transfers and mobile banking services. Mpesa's success in Kenya is attributed to several factors: the need to provide a solution to the high cost of sending money from one place to another; the presence of a dominant player in the market (Safaricom), which was able to develop an efficient agent network; and support from the regulatory body (Central Bank of Kenya), which advocated for regulation to follow innovation.

The other East African countries have made considerable strides in mobile money, but serious challenges remain. In Tanzania, the inefficiency of the agent network and the lack of understanding of mobile money applications by potential and current users present a major problem in the mobile money industry. The major challenge in Uganda arises from the fact that the Ugandans lack a national identification system like the one in Kenya. Transferring money thus becomes a challenge.

Kenya boasts a market-based economy and the most liberal economic system in East Africa. A market-based system, among its other advantages, promotes economic efficiency and competition and encourages foreign investment. Since independence, the market structure has changed from one in which prices are influenced by the government to one in which they are determined by the market forces of supply and demand. Kenya has been a pioneer in embracing freedom of enterprise, and this manifests itself clearly in the broadcasting industry, where Kenya Television Network (KTN), the first non-pay, privately-owned TV station in Africa, was founded in Kenya. Liberalization of the agricultural sector was undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s, reducing government's control of agricultural production and marketing. This led to an environment that encouraged private sector participation in agriculture.

Moreover, building on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Kenya has developed a textile and apparel industry that exports to the United States. AGOA is a law that was passed in the United States that offers incentives for African countries to export to the United States in an effort to build free markets and open African economies. The World Bank recently hailed Kenya's private sector as the most vibrant and dynamic in East Africa. The Kenyan economy has been market-based for a longer time than all the other East African economies, and this has given it a competitive edge in attracting foreign investment to the country. Kenya has consistently attracted relatively high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI flows to Kenya have consistently been to transformative industries such as high technology. The recent FDI flows to Uganda and Tanzania are driven by recently discovered resources and are geared towards extractive industries. Kenya is the main source of FDI to its neighbors; outward investments to other countries have increased from $9 million in 2011 to $16 million in 2012. There are big Kenyan companies that operate throughout the East African region (Equity Bank, Kenya Commercial Bank, Nation Media Group).

The recent planning documents issued by the Kenyan government, The Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and Employment Creation and Kenya Vision 2030 , detail carefully designed strategies that focus on growing and developing the economy. Vision 2030 in particular aims to transform Kenya to a newly industrialized, middle-income country by 2030. It is based on three pillars: the economic pillar, which seeks to maintain and sustain economic growth of 10 percent per year for 25 years; the social pillar, which seeks to invest in Kenyans so as to improve the quality of life in education, health, and housing (among other public goods); and the political pillar, which focuses on moving the nation forward as one and envisions a democratic system that is issue-based, people-centered, results-oriented, and accountable to the public.

In conclusion, Kenya remains a vibrant and promising economy in East Africa, one that is resilient and has the ability to bounce back after political shocks such as the 2007-2008 election violence and the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi. There are challenges that the country still needs to address, above all poverty, inequality, and access to health services. The recent discovery of resources such as oil, base titanium, coal, and underground water, augur well for the country's future economic performance.

Ivan Lieman/AFP/Getty Images