Let Them Eat Apple Pie

Income inequality in the U.S. is now as bad as it was in aristocratic Europe. Are the bread riots finally coming?

Inequality has come out of the fiscal shadows. U.S. President Barack Obama, a scrupulous consensus-builder who long avoided all zero-sum formulations, is now rallying citizens to stand with him against "the relentless, decades-long trend" of income inequality. Bill de Blasio became New York's mayor by campaigning on the issue. And earlier this week, Christine Lagarde -- the executive director of the International Monetary Fund (the epicenter of neo-liberal orthodoxy) -- told New York Times columnist Eduardo Porter that she was very concerned about the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality.

Everyone's a convert -- except, of course, for the Republican Party. Congressman Paul Ryan's budget plan (which the GOP-controlled House has now adopted) proposes to cut the top tax rate both for individuals and corporations from 35 percent to 25 percent and to sharply reduce virtually all forms of domestic spending which benefit the poor and even the middle class.

It's almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which the Ryan plan would not increase what is already the most unequal distribution of income and wealth in the industrialized world. If the Republicans were applying for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization package they'd be laughed out of the office. Republican intransigence virtually assures that efforts to address inequality in the United States will be carried out at the local rather than the national level.

Wealth distribution in the United States is now as skewed as it was in ancien regime France, according to Thomas Piketty's magisterial new work, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. But not only are there no signs of bread riots, the American economy is now growing faster than that of all but a few Western nations, including France and England. The problem with gross inequality is that it's so, well, gross that one tends to assume it will produce terrible effects which it may not actually yield -- for example, increasing labor unrest.

Economists remain very much divided over those effects. In another interview with Porter, sociologist Lane Kenworthy, author of an upcoming book with the working title Should We Worry About Inequality?, said that he saw no evidence that rising inequality in the West had limited economic growth or reduced employment, though it had hobbled middle-class income growth, among other things. And ultimately, Kenworthy concluded that there was more than enough reason to pursue redistributionist policies.

Whatever those doubts, Lagarde's open embrace of the subject means that the effects of inequality will be on the agenda at the IMF meetings this coming week. And that, in turn, may help remove the stigma that only lefties who would rather re-distribute revenue than generate it care about inequality. The argument for dramatically increasing the minimum wage is big in Seattle, where techies feel guilty about low-paid baristas, but not in Pittsburgh. Occupy Wall Street, the revolt of the many against the few, fizzled.

Yet the moment of quickening may not be far off. A debate over the salience of inequality has already begun to split the Democratic Party, with de Blasio and Massachusetts Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren on one side and New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the other. Piketty's Capital feels very much like a Category 4 hurricane that hasn't yet made landfall. A French economist, Piketty draws on a vast store of historical data to argue that the broad dissemination of wealth that occurred during the decades following World War I was not, as economists then mistakenly believed, a natural state of capitalist equilibrium, but rather a halcyon interval between Belle Époque inequality and the rising inequality of our own era.

"Broadly speaking," Piketty writes, "it was the wars of the twentieth century that wiped away the past to create the illusion that capitalism had been structurally transformed." Piketty's most provocative argument is that the discrepancy between the high returns to capital and much more modest overall economic growth -- briefly annulled during the mid-century -- ensures that the gulf between the rich (who profit from capital investments) and the middle class (who depend chiefly on income from labor) will only continue to grow.

Is capitalism itself the cause of rising inequality? Or rather is it, as others argue, that globalization has turbocharged wealth while hollowing out much of the middle class?

Whatever the case, inequality in the West is increasing in ways which seem politically, if not also economically, unsustainable. Piketty points out that the dynamic of redistribution upwards is so remorseless that only two years after the immense wealth-destroying effect of the global financial crisis, the upper-tenth in the United States once again received 46 percent of national income, not counting capital gains, as it had in 2007. Still, that understates real disparities, since the top 1 percent take home 20 percent of national income.

The United States is the outlier both in degree of inequality and in its resistance to address the problem. Yet, as Piketty points out, it was a deep national aversion to inherited privilege that in the years after World War I led the United States to raise the top income tax rate to over 70 percent, where it remained until Ronald Reagan became president. Throughout the middle decades of the century, the United States and Britain -- today's joint guardians of the citadel of economic liberalism -- led the world in confiscatory taxation; both also taxed "unearned" income yet more heavily.

Sustained economic growth had dulled the appetite for redistribution. Americans will tolerate even vast inequality so long as a rising tide lifts all boats. But middle-class incomes have been flat for a generation. Today's right-wing populism will eventually run aground on the rocks of economic stagnation. A recent IMF policy paper notes that rising inequality is producing rising demands for redistributionist policies. Indeed, the authors point out that one good reason to address the problem is to forestall populist solutions which could kill the goose that lays golden eggs. It was prudent reform, after all, that prevented the Great Depression from destroying all faith in capitalism.

But the free-market conservatives who now dominate the Republican Party insist that all such solutions kill the goose, or at least severely limit the goose's egg-laying gifts. They will argue that to the death. The authors of the IMF paper, however, conclude that "redistribution appears generally benign in its impact on growth; only in extreme cases is there some evidence that it may have direct negative effects on growth." In a separate account of policy prescriptions, IMF economists suggest that developing nations address rising inequality through "means-tested cash transfers" rather than policies offering universal benefits, and by targeting health and education spending towards those services used chiefly by the poor.

In the West, where up to half of national income is taxed, slowing inequality means returning to the more progressive tax policies of an earlier era. Piketty's chief policy prescription, which he concedes is "utopian," is a global tax on all forms of capital -- i.e., a wealth tax. He also supports restoring the top rate on income taxes to the levels of half a century ago. I'm guessing that many economists, not to mention all rich people, will question his belief that an 80 percent tax on incomes over $500,000 or $1 million will not harm economic growth in the United States.

The best reason to raise tax rates is not to punish the rich, of course, but to raise the revenue which the United States needs to invest in infrastructure and research, not to mention to pay for Social Security and health care. That investment gap poses a clear and present danger to American global economic leadership. Rising inequality exacerbates the problem by sapping the collective political will needed to address the problem.

The obvious, and very discouraging, analogy is to global warming, where the problem grows ever more real, and more threatening, but the political system, in thrall to beneficiaries of the current state of affairs, remains paralyzed. "Without a radical shock," Piketty concludes, the "current equilibrium" will likely persist: "the New World may be on the verge of becoming the Old Europe of the twenty-first century's global economy."



The Seven Lessons of Counterinsurgency 101 in Ukraine

How to fend off the Russians, in seven simple steps.

Ukraine hangs at a precarious moment, twisting in an uncertain wind. Russian troops are still massed along the eastern border, and President Vladimir Putin seems intent on keeping his options open: Will he choose invasion, destabilization, or negotiation? The most likely path forward seems to be a Russian attempt to destabilize Ukraine through a covert campaign. The United States and its NATO allies should lean in to help the Kiev regime prepare to conduct counterinsurgency operations, given what appears to be obvious Russian support to violent separatists.

Step one should be assessing the potential for an effective insurgency and understanding the historical and cultural pressures that create it. The good news about the Russian annexation of Crimea is that it effectively reduces the remaining Russian ethnic population in the rest of Ukraine. While exact numbers are hard to define precisely, most observers believe the remaining pro-Russian ethnic population is around 15 percent: hardly a critical mass, let alone an oppressed majority. The bad news about the annexation -- in addition to losing a significant chunk of territory and the Ukrainian Navy -- is that Crimea will become a base and staging area for insurgent operations throughout eastern Ukraine.

Counterinsurgency 101 has a few basic ingredients, and many Western nations have recent first-hand experience in this complex activity in Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, the new regime in Kiev will need sound advice, political support, economic assistance, security equipment, logistical support, and intelligence analysis. Here are the seven specific lessons for Ukraine's Counterinsurgency 101:

1. Undercut the insurgency by all political and economic means.
In practical terms, this means a powerful campaign of strategic communications that makes the case -- a strong one -- that a unified, cohesive Ukraine is a home to all Ukrainians, whatever first language they speak and from wherever their ancestors hailed. A sincere and inclusive message will win over some number of ethnic Russians (but fistfights in parliament don't help). A significant part of the message is that Ukraine's best future lies not in policies that are pro-Russian or pro-NATO, but pro-Ukrainian -- meaning the freedom to evaluate where the best opportunities for the nation lie. This can be a powerful force in undermining an insurgency's message of hate, separatism, and total alignment under Russian domination.

2. Provide an economic future that makes sense.
The West must offer healthy economic inducements in the form of International Monetary Fund grants, EU assistance, and U.S. funding -- all of which appears to be on track and in the pipeline. Much of counterinsurgency is in providing alternatives to the "employment options" offered by insurgent leaders; fortunately, most young people would rather have a job or an education than be out planting car bombs. Providing funding to allow Kiev to offer those kind of job inducements is key.

3. Protect the population of Ukraine from the effects of the insurgents.
This means strong military and police presence where necessary, controlling violence in demonstrations (which must be allowed in a democratic nation), using sensible strategies to keep government services flowing, retaking government buildings with a minimum of force, and continuing to deliver government services -- from marriage licenses to courts of justice -- in order to undercut counterinsurgent strategy.

4. Get control of the borders.
This is a lesson painfully learned in Afghanistan and Vietnam, but crucial to a successful counterinsurgency strategy. This will be challenging, given Russian resources and geographic position -- especially now that they have annexed Crimea. This is where Western military support in intelligence, surveillance, information sharing, logistics, basic equipment (such as night-vision devices and communications gear), and advice and training could be very valuable without escalating the situation.

5. Defend and protect from cyberattacks.
In this emerging 21st century of conflict, a fifth element of must be understanding the plans and strategy of the opposition in this medium, and working to counter it. There is a role for traditional information sharing using signals intelligence, overhead sensors, and technical assistance here, but the fundamental activity is occurring in the cyber-world. Ukraine is under constant cyberattack from Russia and needs help and protection in order to operate effectively in countering a violent opposition.

6. Legitimize the new government in Kiev.
Popular elections, due to be held in early May, are crucial to countering the insurgent narrative of an "illegal putsch" that has taken the capital by force. Thus far, the elections are on track and demographics favor a strongly pro-Kiev vote.

7. Provide military capability to counter insurgents.
Russia has and will continue to supply intelligence, weapons and ammunition, and probably troops (in the form of Spetznaz) to guide their insurgency to destabilize and delegitimize Kiev. This pressure will only ramp up after the upcoming elections. The West should consider military-to-military assistance (short of boots on the ground), including intelligence, information, advice and mentorship, defensive weapons systems, tactical signals intelligence capability, small arms, light sensors, canine assistance, and other classic counterinsurgency tools for the Ukrainian military. This could be done easily through NATO channels given the alliance's excellent military-to-military partnership with Ukraine.

Fighting insurgencies is hard work, as we have learned all too clearly in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. But we have learned lessons that can and should be applied in these early days. Hopefully, Russia will choose neither an invasion, nor an active role in supporting an insurgency. And there is still hope for negotiations and a course of action that leaves the future in the hands of the people of Ukraine, not those pulling levers in Moscow.

But if Ukraine faces a Russian-sponsored insurgency, we have tools that can be applied. And we should be ready.