Argument

The Musharraf Boomerang

Could the new Pakistani government’s pursuit of the country’s former dictator be its own undoing?

During his first two stints in power in the 1990s, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif clashed with four heads of the powerful Army, the last of whom deposed him in 1999. Now, a year into his third stint as prime minister, tensions are rising once again between Sharif and top Army officers, who are incensed over developments surrounding the prosecution of former military ruler Pervez Musharraf, who, incidentally, is the man who overthrew Sharif in 1999.

On March 31, Musharraf was indicted for high treason by a special court constituted by the Sharif government. In a bid to deter potential coup-makers, the civilian framers of Pakistan's 1973 Constitution included an article that designates the suspension or abrogation of the Constitution as an act of high treason, which is punishable by death or life imprisonment. The government has opted to prosecute Musharraf for his 2007 imposition of emergency rule, not for his 1999 coup, which had been endorsed by many politicians and judges who have since come to oppose him. Prosecuting Musharraf for the latter would probably force the government to prosecute other Army officers and government officials who aided Musharraf's 1999 coup, opening up a broader confrontation with the Army.

Still, the Army brass has been discomfited by the fact that a former senior commander and war veteran -- one who was president of the country for seven years, no less -- stands accused of treason. And so the brass appears to have taken measures to aid Musharraf as he sought to avoid indictment. After months of delay tactics, including the convenient discovery on more than one occasion of small, undetonated bombs along Musharraf's route to court and three months holed up in a military hospital, the former president finally appeared before the special court at the end of March to be indicted. On March 31, Musharraf became the first military ruler in Pakistan's history to be indicted for subverting the Constitution.

The circumstances surrounding Musharraf's decision to show up before court are murky, however, and are cause for growing distrust between the civilian government and the Army. Some figures close to the military, including politician Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, have alleged that elements connected to the civilian government had indicated to the military leadership that Musharraf would be allowed to leave Pakistan on medical grounds upon being indicted. Indeed, at the time of Musharraf's indictment, Islamabad was rife with rumors of a plane sitting at a military base near the capital, waiting to whisk the former president off to Dubai. Najam Sethi, a prominent talk-show host close to Sharif (who appointed Sethi as head of the high-profile Pakistan Cricket Board), had also argued that there was a deal in place to let Musharraf leave the country. Indeed, it is possible that the Musharraf camp and the Army was duped into having the former military ruler appear before court, believing that it was part of a quid pro quo allowing him to exit the country.

The stance of members of Sharif's own government toward Musharraf also hardened in the lead-up to the former Army chief's indictment and afterward. Their criticism of the Army has further inflamed civil-military tensions. In a speech to the National Assembly in late March, Railways Minister Khawaja Saad Rafique said ominously of the Musharraf trial: "This is a golden day. And this moment was destined to come in Pakistan. This moment also came in Turkey. Our voice will not falter in saying this. Those Army generals who commit treason against their oath, Article 6 proceedings will be initiated against them." Days later, he told the press, "Gen. Pervez Musharraf is a traitor. He's the biggest criminal in Pakistan." He called on the former military ruler to "become a man" and present himself before the court. Pakistani television networks have been adding additional fuel to the fire, playing Rafique's statements ad nauseam, along with a fiery anti-Army address from 2006 by Khawaja Asif, now the defense minister, in which he called Pakistan a "welfare state" for a "specific class" -- the Pakistan Army.

On April 7, in what the military's press office described as a response to the "concerns of soldiers," the new Army chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, said that the Army "will resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional pride." Two days later, during a monthly meeting at the Army's headquarters, senior Pakistan Army commanders reportedly expressed displeasure with Asif's statements, with some Pakistani television reports claiming they went as far as demanding Asif's resignation. Rather than disappearing, however, Asif has continued to come on television talk shows, avoiding controversial statements, but at the same time indicating that neither he nor the civilian government will back down. In recent days, Asif has gone out of his way to praise the military -- but in the larger picture, such verbal concessions by the civilian government are minor given that Asif remains as defense minister and the trial of Musharraf continues.

The Musharraf trial is not the only recent development that has inflamed civil-military relations. At the end of January, the prime minister was expected to announce a military offensive against the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan, something that the Army had been advocating since December. Instead, he made a last-minute reversal as momentum for military operations was reaching its peak and announced the formation of a peace committee. Peace talks have sputtered along since then, with the Army still uncomfortable with the process but having no choice but to go along with the civilian government's directives. A number of Pakistani media commentators have also made allegations that the civilian-run Intelligence Bureau has been spying on the military-run Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

Although the Sharif government has made concessions to the Army on other issues, including pushing forward the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (decried by activists as comparable to the U.S. Patriot Act), it is clearly challenging the Army on issues that hit close to home.

Sharif's gamble might just work. The Army is embroiled in multiple counterinsurgencies, and its new chief, Gen. Sharif -- who came into office at the end of November -- is just getting settled, though he's gaining a reputation for swift and decisive action. Prime Minister Sharif, meanwhile, has the backing of the Army's primary allies: Beijing, Riyadh, and Washington. In 2013, China announced a proposal to make tens of billions of dollars' worth of energy and infrastructure investments in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia recently gave Pakistan $1.5 billion in aid. And the United States has been supportive of Sharif's economic reform efforts, and the bilateral relationship is on a stable trajectory, with the countries resuming their strategic dialogue process and intelligence cooperation.

The federal government's opposition is also weak and ill-positioned to push for early elections or the government's ouster. The public face of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the country's second-largest party, is Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, who cannot speak publicly in Urdu unless it's scripted. Most of his public statements are tweets. The out-of-touch Zardari spent at least $1.5 million in government funds on a cultural festival in the PPP-governed Sindh province, while dozens have died since December of malnutrition in the province's Thar region. Meanwhile, the country's third-largest party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), is in a state of crisis, facing internal dissent and possible fracturing.

Still, to weather a storm from the Army, Sharif would need the backing of other political parties, lest they bandwagon with the Army against him. After Musharraf's indictment, Sharif reportedly consulted with Imran Khan of PTI and Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP over whether to let the former dictator leave the country, which he ultimately decided against. It is unclear whether Khan and Zardari offered their support to Sharif at the time. Even if they did, however, it is no guarantee of continued backing in the future. For example, in an April 10 television interview, Khan distanced himself from the trial he had once ardently supported, saying that it is being viewed, by the Army in particular, as selective justice. For his part, Zardari, in a public address in late December, pledged to support Sharif against Musharraf, whom he described as a "tomcat" who "has been trapped." But after egging Sharif on, in a major address on April 4, Zardari made no mention -- direct or indirect -- of Musharraf, who had just been indicted. On April 16, Sharif and Zardari held a meeting in which they vowed to protect democracy. The meeting of the heads of Pakistan's two largest political parties strengthened Sharif's hand vis-à-vis the military. But such a boost could be fleeting should the prime minister's political standing erode. And it is Sharif -- not the Dubai-based Zardari -- who is taking the risk in prosecuting Musharraf.

When it comes to the Musharraf trial and Pakistani Taliban peace talks, Pakistan's Army brass has had to go with the flow and adjust its red lines to accommodate an increasingly assertive civilian government. In the end, Sharif might manage to secure Musharraf's conviction without jeopardizing his position as prime minister. But even short of a full-fledged clash, the hardening of civil-military tensions will be bad news for Pakistan.

Facing a Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas, an ethnic separatist insurgency in Baluchistan, and leadership transitions in Afghanistan and India, a civil-military consensus on major issues is imperative for Pakistan's security. Normalizing relations and pursuing accountability are also essential for Pakistan to become a healthy democracy. But in its persistent and, at times, aggressive pursuit of Musharraf, the Sharif government has made the once-reviled dictator sympathetic in the eyes of many in Pakistan. As a result, Sharif risks having the tables turned, losing his own trial in the court of public opinion, and fomenting a backlash from other power brokers, including the Pakistan Army.

Photo: Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images

Argument

Don't Be a Menace to South (China Sea)

...and other strategies for managing the world's most important bilateral relationship.

As President Barack Obama prepares for his trip to Asia this week, he will face questions not just about the administration's signature rebalance, or "pivot" toward that region, but also about the crisis in Ukraine. The leaders Obama will meet in South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines will be preoccupied with what appears to them as a potential Asian parallel to the challenge Europe faces: How can the United States and its friends and allies deal with an increasingly assertive regional power? Put more bluntly -- as the leaders will surely do in their private talks with Obama -- how would the United States respond if China should resort to unilateral territorial intervention in their own backyard?

The administration's strategic shift to East Asia in 2011 was built on two pillars. First, the United States would pursue its long-term interest in peace and stability in East Asia through sustained commitment to its traditional allies; second, it would build a cooperative, constructive relationship with a rising China, while also managing differences. 

In theory, this strategy is intended to take account of the inevitable growth of China's influence while reducing the danger that the relationship will lead to instability or even conflict. But in recent months, as China has pressed its territorial claims in the East and South China seas, the viability of this strategy has been increasingly put to the test. China's unilateral acts -- including its November declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea that included the disputed Senkaku Islands administered by Japan (which Beijing claims and calls the Diaoyu) and its efforts to block the resupply of Philippine Marines on the disputed Second Thomas shoal -- have frightened China's neighbors and led to questions of what the rebalance means in the context of these troubling moves.

The Obama administration has repeated its long-standing position that it takes no position on the merits of the sovereignty disputes, but opposes the use of force or coercion to resolve them. And it has asserted that it stands by its treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines. But that has not led to significant progress. The risk of conflict remains high.

The situation in Asia is arguably more complex than in Ukraine, where the United States has no bilateral security treaty but has clearly stated that Russia has infringed on Ukraine's sovereignty. Conversely, while the United States has formal treaty obligations in East Asia, it acknowledges that the countries in question differ on territorial sovereignty. And by taking no position it admits to the situation's ambiguity.

The United States could abandon its neutrality and side with Japan and the Philippines on the territorial disputes, to dissuade Chinese adventurism. But such a move would deepen tensions between the United States and China without necessarily pushing Beijing to engage more diplomatically with its neighbors. And it risks moving toward bilateral confrontation with echoes of the Cold War -- a result none of the United States' partners in the region would welcome, given their deep economic interdependence with China. 

Instead, a more comprehensive approach to the changing tectonics of East Asia is needed: one that treats the territorial disputes not as isolated problems, but rather addresses the fundamental problem of dealing with a rising power.

For four decades since then-President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 trip, the relationship between the United States and China has been largely cooperative. A weak China posed little threat to the United States and its allies while offering a growing market for U.S. goods, a source of inexpensive imports for the U.S. consumer, and a partner in the struggle to contain the USSR.

But with the end of the strategic alignment based on shared concerns about the USSR, coupled with China's increasing military capacity fueled by its spectacular economic growth, both sides have increasingly questioned the sustainability of that cooperation. Many in China see the U.S. rebalance as ill-disguised containment, while many in the United States see Chinese military modernization and territorial assertiveness as strong indications that Beijing seeks to undermine Washington's alliances and drive the United States from the Western Pacific. The result threatens to be a familiar albeit tragic one: growing tension leading to conflict that serves no one's interest. And given China's huge economic potential and momentum, it is in many ways a more formidable potential adversary than Russia, despite the latter's huge stock of nuclear weapons.

Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed solving the problem by building strategic trust, and "a new form of major power relationship." But that begs the most important questions: how to build trust, and what kind of relationship can the United States and China aspire to? Compounding this challenge, the long-term intentions of both sides are inherently unknowable. The inclination in the face of such uncertainty is to prepare for the worst -- which all too frequently becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

To manage this dilemma, the United States needs a clear strategy. We propose one entitled "Resolve and Reassure."

War too often results from misplaced judgments about another country's resolve. In East Asia, and between China and the United States, the Korean War demonstrates what can happen when countries miscalculate other's willingness to act. The United States needs to project clarity about its resolve to defend its vital interests. And in the current context of East Asia, nowhere is this more important than with respect to alliance commitments. To prevent misjudgment, the United States must sustain the credibility of its treaty obligations, both in words -- as the administration has done by making clear that the Senkakus fall under the U.S. obligation to assist Japan via the U.S.-Japan security treaty -- and in actions.

That does not mean Washington must immediately unsheathe the sword if tensions escalate over China's actions near the Senkakus or disputed islands in the South China Sea, but it must make clear that it is prepared to impose significant costs if red lines are crossed -- which is why the response to Russia's actions in Ukraine is so salient to the situation in East Asia. 

U.S. allies in Asia worry that China's ability to impose economic costs against the United States might deter Washington from acting -- a concern exacerbated by U.S. and European caution in imposing costs on Russia. The late March expansion of sanctions against Russia should help reassure U.S. allies of Washington's willingness to accept the risks of economic retaliation in order to impose costs on those who cross red lines. U.S. allies will be watching closely to see if the threats of broader sanctions become more concrete in the event of further Russian encroachments.

But projecting resolve is only one part of a strategy to stabilize U.S.-China relations. The United States and its allies also have an interest in reassuring China that if Beijing acts responsibly, they will not seek to thwart its future prosperity and security. Resolve must be matched by appropriate confidence building, including the willingness to enter into mutual agreements that help make credible each side's professions of good intentions. These might include "Open Skies" reconnaissance agreements, where both sides allow territorial overflights to reduce concerns about concealment; agreements for handling incidents at sea to reduce the risk of accidental encounters that could be interpreted as deliberate provocations, whether they are or not; and restrictions on destabilizing activities in space, such as the deliberate destruction of spacecraft.

Just as important as formal agreements is the willingness of both sides to exercise restraint in defensive actions that might appear threatening; to enhance transparency to dispel misunderstandings; and to reciprocate positive actions to stimulate a virtuous circle of enhanced confidence. This might mean Chinese willingness to slow the rate of its military buildup rather than race for parity. And for the United States it might mean modifying its Air-Sea Battle concept, beginning with a more benign name such as Air-Sea Operations and a more inclusive approach toward implementation, to emphasize defensive objectives instead of offensive operations -- which some Chinese view as seeking the ability to deliver a pre-emptive, knock out blow. Both sides need to revise and coordinate their contingency planning in places like the Korean Peninsula, in order to mitigate the dangers of unwanted escalation.

This is an ambitious agenda. But if China and the United States hope to avoid the growing rivalry that has too often accompanied the interaction between a dominant and rising power, this effort is needed. A judicious combination of strategic reassurance and resolve could save the U.S.-China relationship from the spiral of mistrust that characterizes the U.S.-Russia relationship today -- and protect against the even greater dangers that could result.

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