House has passed the fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Like last
year and the year before that, the bill constrains the Pentagon's ability to
implement the New START agreement with Russia -- which limits both sides to
1,550 deployed strategic warheads -- while simultaneously making budget
decisions that will result in much deeper cuts than that.
have already written at
about the perverse state of affairs afflicting the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
President Barack Obama and Congress are arguing at knife point over relatively
minor cuts, when the ugly truth is this: The budget cuts they have imposed will
bring the number of U.S. deployed strategic nuclear warheads well below 1,000
by about 2030. Neither the president's budget nor the House's version of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) include any hint that Obama or his opponents
have come to grips with this reality.
problem is that, in 2010, the president, in order to get New START through the
Senate, committed to meet the treaty's limits by deploying 60 nuclear-capable
bombers, 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 240 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles. And he promised
to invest significantly in replacing all three legs of the nuclear triad, committing
to spend about $200 billion over 10 years to sustain and modernize the nuclear deterrent.
But then the 2011 Budget Control Act resulted in significant across-the-board
cuts through "sequestration." How the United States is going to spend more on
nuclear weapons while drastically cutting defense spending has never been
make matters worse, the first 10 years of investment tell only part of the
story. Over the next 30 years -- the amount of time it will take to replace the
triad -- the United States will spend about $1 trillion to sustain and
modernize its nuclear forces.
can argue about whether $1 trillion over 30 years is a lot of money. (I find
the argument that it's not works better inside Washington than out.) We can
argue whether the current nuclear forces provide that sort of value, what sort
of nuclear relationship Washington is likely to have with Moscow and Beijing,
and whether those resources might be better spent on conventional capabilities.
At some level, however, these discussions are academic because the United
States simply doesn't have the cash.
problem is not finding a trillion dollars over 30 years. The problem is that
the United States is now facing what a Defense Department official called a
"modernization mountain" -- a period of very high expenditures on nuclear
weapons in the 2020s. Although the official in question was strapping on his
crampons, this story is going end like Jon Krakauer's Into
Thin Air. (Spoiler alert: Lots of climbers die.) Reports and studies
that account for nuclear spending tend to make 10-year estimates, stopping just
before the modernization mountain gets steep in about 2024 and creating the illusion that the expenditures are feasible. In
truth, things are going to get really, really ugly.
reason for this sorry state of affairs is political: No one in Washington wants
to take responsibility for the scale of the coming reductions. In 2013, the president
made a rather timid proposal
to reduce deployed forces by one-third, despite the fact that deeper reductions
are imminent. His political opponents, some of whom want more nuclear weapons, so categorically oppose Obama and his
signature call for a world without nuclear weapons that many would probably
happily sacrifice the triad for a chance to accuse the president of unilateral
disarmament. The result is that Obama is trudging up the modernization
mountain, egged on by preposterously bellicose opponents, in total denial about
the brewing budget storm that will sweep them all off the mountain and bury the
triad in ice.
get a sense of the problem, it helps to look comprehensively at the plans to
replace all three legs of the triad during the 2020s. Here are the three major
programs, along with current plans for new nuclear warheads. The following cost
estimates are not ones I made up. All I have done is curate existing estimates
and timelines, providing a few comparisons:
ballistic missile submarine, also known as SSBN(X). Government
cost estimates for building 12 boats are $77 billion to $102 billion through
2042. The Navy needs to bring one boat into service each year after 2030. (Because
you pay for each boat before it is built, procurement ranges over 2019 to 2033.)
Any slippage, even by one year, will reduce the total number of boats. Right
now, the plan is to drop to 10 boats, before going back up to 12 after a number
of years. If you believe that, I have some oceanfront real estate in Albuquerque
where we can base the last two.
A new heavy
bomber, also known as LRS-B. The most common estimate is $55 billion
for 80 to 100 aircraft, though that number does not include research and
development costs. The bomber is dual-capable, but the Air Force plans to delay
certifying it to carry nuclear weapons. (The Air Force promises to get around
to certifying the aircraft for nuclear missions eventually. We can base any
nuclear-capable LRS-Bs at the new naval base in Albuquerque.) The new bomber
also needs a new cruise missile, which goes by the abbreviation LRSO. The LRSO
program is reportedly in disarray with cost estimates between $20 billion and $30
billion -- though some of that cost includes a new warhead.
A new intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). According to the Air Force, the existing Minuteman ICBM force
will become "unsustainable" after 2030. Rand Corp. estimates that a replacement
ICBM might cost between $84 billion and $124 billion. (Extending the life of
the current system is nearly as expensive: $60 billion to $90 billion.) Making
the new missiles mobile -- as some Air Force officials have advocated -- would
cost tens of billions of dollars more, based on similar U.S. programs from the
1980s. Exotic schemes like basing the new ICBM in tunnels are no cheaper.
course all these missiles need nuclear warheads -- and the infrastructure to make
them. The Obama administration has this crazy plan called "3+2" that envisions
three warheads for the intercontinental/submarine-launched ballistic missile force
plus two warheads for delivery by aircraft.
This program starts with the $10 billion to $12 billion program to develop a
bomb called the B61 Mod 12. It is worth noting that the Government Accountability
Office has already said that this program cannot be executed with anticipated
The National Nuclear Security Administration, which is responsible for building
the warhead, more or less says, "we'll figure it out," which, based on its track record, is laughable.
2030, the United States needs to buy nine of the 12 SSBN(X) boats, 80 to 100 LRS-B
bombers, a new nuclear-armed cruise missile, and 400 new ICBMs, all the while working
on replacements for three of the warheads in the "3+2" concept. Upgrades to
command-and-control systems, as well as new facilities to handle plutonium and
uranium, are extra. Most of the procurement spending will occur between 2024
and 2030. At its peak, the United States will spend about $15 billion on
procurement each year for six years to keep this modernization on track.
you are interested, there is a longer discussion of these costs in a new monograph
from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies: "The Trillion
Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Modernization over the Next Thirty Years.")
a share of the defense budget, that's comparable to what Ronald Reagan's administration
spent during the last great modernization of the triad. Whether or not one
believes that Russia or China poses a similar threat as did the Soviet Union of
the early 1980s -- and I am pretty down on Mr. Putin at the moment -- the
cultural zeitgeist is simply in a different place. When we remade Red Dawn, it was for
laughs. It is very hard to imagine devoting a Reagan-like portion of the
defense budget to procuring nuclear weapons delivery systems today. It is also
important to keep in mind that the Reagan administration wasn't able to fully
realize its plans, either. Congress significantly cut the purchase of Peacekeeper
ICBMs, B-2 bombers, and Ohio-class SSBNs.
or not you think rebuying the nuclear deterrent is a good idea, it should not
be controversial to note that many defense programs go over budget and fall
behind schedule. So, is it likely that the new submarine, bomber, and ICBM
programs will experience no further cost growth or schedule delays? No, it is
not bloody likely.
likely are cost overruns and schedule delays that result in deep reductions in
the number of forces -- reductions that will lack any strategic rationale and that
will kill off what remains of the bilateral arms control process with the
the following scenario: The Navy and the Air Force are going to do everything
possible to save the new submarine and the new bomber. But these programs are
already stretched thin. The Navy currently plans to procure 10 new ballistic
missile submarines. Any further delay of even a year or two will drop that
number further, to only eight boats. (Again, no one believes the United States
will replace the lost boats on the back end, absent a dramatically different
security environment.) Navy officials are already winging about the impact of
the SSBN(X) on the shipbuilding budget. Keeping this program on track will be a
Air Force is in worse shape. As one colleague said about Air Force priorities,
"They will throw everything else out to protect 'the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit' -- the tanker, the F-35, and the LRS-B. If you're not on that list,
you're on the table. Guess what's not on that list?" That means the Air Force
may well cannibalize the funds for modernizing its ICBMs to make sure it can
buy large numbers of new aircraft. In a funding crunch, the ICBM force is on
the outside looking in. The Air Force is not going to spend $60 billion to $90
billion to preserve the ICBM force at the same time that its precious F-35 and
LRS-B programs are at their most expensive.
are also signs that the Air Force will try to avoid spending the funds
necessary to certify the LRS-B (as well as the F-35) to carry nuclear weapons,
which is more expensive than one might think. That would allow it to cancel the
new cruise missile too. It's not a stretch to imagine that we wind up with lots
of new conventional-only bombers, with the Air Force having cannibalized the
nuclear mission. As the B-52 bomber eases into retirement, only the B-2 (good
through 2058) retains a niche capability for delivering nuclear gravity bombs,
though its days are numbered unless the LRSO gets built.
United States could easily end up with a force sometime after 2030 that
comprises eight ballistic missile submarines and some number of B-2s. Do the
math: The submarines have 16 launch tubes each, meaning about 400 warheads
deployed at sea at any given time, assuming no change in operational practices.
The B-2 might retain a nuclear mission, though probably not without a new
cruise missile. Each can carry 16 gravity bombs, meaning another 160 or so
warheads deployed at any one time. I actually think this is a pretty rosy
scenario, given that we are starting from the premise that the SSBN(X) and
LRS-B must be fully funded, starving legacy programs to do it. But, basically, the
United States would have a slightly larger version of France's nuclear arsenal.
president is not in favor of unilateral disarmament. But if he were, my advice
to him would be: KEEP TRYING TO REBUY THE ENTIRE FORCE.
500 or 600 deployed nuclear weapons is nothing to sneeze at. The world would
not come to a crashing end. Although smaller than the Russian force, the U.S.
arsenal would still be larger than China's. But the process of getting there
would be ugly. Messy cuts with little or no strategic rationale would surely
alarm America's allies, especially those that share borders with Russia. And
it's a little hard to imagine sustaining political support for a bilateral arms
reduction process with the Russians, who by the way are investing heavily in a new
generation of land-based missiles.
other than undermining deterrence, alarming allies, and destroying what remains
of the bilateral arms control process, the current U.S. path is a wonderful
model of bipartisan cooperation on national security.
alternative, of course, is a process of managed reductions, with careful
attention to phasing and efforts to negotiate with the Russians. (It's worth
noting that I am much more hawkish on Russia than most, but arms control is founded
on the notion that sometimes it makes sense to cooperate with an enemy like Mr.
first step in managing the inevitable reductions would be for Congress to ask
for a full cost estimate of both existing systems and new systems through the end
of their lifetimes. This estimate needs to be presented in a year-by-year format
so policymakers can see choke points in the schedule and identify unrealistic
plans. (The NDAA requires a report on nuclear modernization from the
Congressional Budget Office, but like other such reports, it too will look out
only 10 years.)
sense is that such a study would make clear the core problem: Replacing the entire
fleet of ballistic missile submarines and bombers at the same time is really
expensive. Current plans to replace the Minuteman ICBM and develop a new
generation of nuclear warheads before 2030 are not realistic, given the huge
expenditures required by the new submarine and bomber. Trying to do everything
at once is not the answer. Proposing a schedule of investments that do not pile
up into an insurmountable modernization mountain might be, but the president
and Congress need realistic cost estimates over the entire lifetime of each
system to do it.
planning won't preserve the size of America's nuclear force. It may not even
preserve the triad. But the U.S. nuclear deterrent would stand a much better
chance of getting off the modernization mountain alive.
Bennie J. Davis III/U.S. Air Force via Getty Images