Necessary Roughness

Enough with Obama's "don't do stupid sh*t" policy. Only U.S. airstrikes can save Iraq from collapse.

The dramatic events in Iraq -- with the al Qaeda in Iraq offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), driving Iraqi government security forces out of Mosul, Iraq's second city, then rampaging down toward Baghdad -- present as great a challenge to the international order as the seizure of Crimea two months ago. One can only imagine how U.S. veterans feel about their Iraqi allies allowing areas that Americans secured with their blood fall into the hands of our worst enemies. The United States needs with utmost urgency to respond and the Obama administration needs to reset its foreign policy for a world that doesn't respond kindly to a "don't do stupid sh*t" approach to diplomacy.

The ISIS challenge to the Iraqi state is far greater than the capture of Fallujah by that movement five months ago. ISIS has an extraordinary ability to maneuver effectively, using combined arms tactics involving snipers, suicide bombers, heavy infantry weapons, and personnel seasoned in the Syrian fighting to overwhelm Iraqi security forces far superior in numbers and equipment. The rout in Mosul illustrated the sorry state of the Iraqi forces: badly led, ill-trained, poorly motivated. The fault for this lies squarely in the arms of the Iraqi government. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pushed, even before U.S. forces left, to replace competent generals with desk warriors valued solely for their loyalty to him. Combat units were purged of Sunni Arabs and Kurds, and the resulting overwhelmingly Shiite troops were allowed -- for example, in Mosul in 2010 -- to parade their pro-Maliki election posters and Shiite banners honoring the sect's heroes Hussein and Ali.

In Sunni areas such as Mosul or Fallujah, these troops were seen as occupiers, not saviors.

But the Maliki government didn't stop at politicizing the military: It oppressed the Sunni Arab minority in other ways, while picking unnecessary fights over autonomy and oil exports with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Legal action against Sunni vice president Tariq al-Hashimi in 2011, and far more serious charges against Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi a year ago, mixed with brutal repression of "protest tent camps" in Sunni areas, all contributed to an estranged Sunni Arab population. That said, Sunnis have not generally favored ISIS's extremist agenda (almost half a million Mosul residents, mainly Sunni Arabs, have fled the ISIS invasion, into Kurdistan). The pattern of repression by what was seen as a Shiite government and army eroded the natural loyalty Sunni Arab as well as other Iraqi citizens have for their state.

Finally, the decision by Maliki's party (and, to be fair, supported by most others), to deny any residual American military force after 2011 undercut American efforts to provide counterterrorism support, a U.S. air presence, training of Iraqi ground combat units, and high-level Washington attention, all of which could have been crucial in stopping ISIS. Thus, while it is impossible to imagine the explosive rise of ISIS without factoring in the anarchic Syrian civil war, mistakes by Baghdad and Washington surely contributed to today's disaster.

Now we have the nightmare scenario. ISIS is now marching towards Baghdad. Its defining strategy is to establish a Sunni religious state, while waging a total war against the region's Shiite population. It is difficult to imagine this Middle Eastern blitzkrieg seizing largely Shiite Baghdad, with a population several times that of Mosul. The KRG and central government forces will fight much harder in their own ethnic/religious territory than in Sunni areas, as we saw this week with the Kurds establishing control over Kirkuk. ISIS cannot seize the whole country. But it is difficult to see the regular Iraqi Army regaining territory in the Sunni areas, absent new military -- and perhaps national -- leadership, and without tough training, better equipment, and large-scale air support, now largely lacking.

While a Sunni Arab Islamist movement thus cannot conquer a much larger Kurdish/Shiite area, what ISIS can do is destabilize the entire country by besieging Baghdad and cutting off essential services and revenue streams, beginning with the Baiji refinery to the north.

Stopping this jihadist offensive should be, but is not yet, a key Obama administration priority. The president's own words undergird this fact. In September 2013, before the U.N. General Assembly, the president listed four criteria in the Middle East that would affect vital U.S. interests and which he would be prepared to use military action to defend against. Three are directly relevant to the struggle underway in Iraq: 1) supporting allies and partners who confront external aggression (in this case not just Iraq but NATO ally Turkey, and close partners Israel and Jordan); 2) defending the free flow of energy to the world (according to the International Energy Agency, Iraq has the potential to produce 6 million-plus barrels of oil daily); and 3) combating terrorism (ISIS is now the biggest al Qaeda affiliate).

The 11-year American effort over two administrations to create a unified Iraq built on Western constitutional and political values is hanging by a thread. Washington's understandable inclination will be likely be more of the same: for the umpteenth time, seek to reconcile Iraq's three major ethnic/religious groups; encourage Prime Minister Maliki to reach out to tribes and seek conciliatory efforts with Sunnis; and rush in some helicopters and other equipment.

But we are beyond that, and years of effort with far more resources than now could not sustain our goals.

Rather, we face a dramatic shakeup in Iraq and the region whose import could equal epoch-changing events in the Middle East such as Israel's 1967 victory and the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Three major developments loom: First, and most obviously, ISIS's effort to besiege Baghdad, which has the potential for enormous loss of life. Second, a possible Kurdish bid for de facto autonomy, as the central government's obvious failure threatens the Kurds' hard-won prosperity. Third, an Iranian move to secure the Shiite south, including the holy shrines at Kabala and Najaf and oil fields, and reinforce the Iraqi Army. (A Turkish response, especially given the seizure of a large consular staff in Mosul by ISIS, can be expected, followed by reactions from Jordan and the Gulf states.)

In this brew, and with time of the essence, the only game-changing U.S. move would be an air campaign against ISIS of the magnitude of that used against Muammar al-Qaddafi's forces in Libya in 2011. ISIS operates more as a conventional motorized formation than an urban insurgency, and air power could be very effective in countering it. Given the unsettled situation throughout the country, the United States probably would have to use bases in Kurdistan, Jordan, Kuwait, and/or Turkey. This is of course a dramatic course of action, without guarantee of success, and at best would only buy time for the uncertain struggle to retake Sunni Iraq (and eventually parts of Syria).

But the alternative is worse: the whole world watching as an American partner and its U.S.-equipped army collapses, and while ISIS and Iran win. The international security system we have anchored, in President Obama's words last September, "for nearly seven decades," cannot withstand many more scenes like this. And the White House, afraid of doing stupid sh*t, cannot sit on its hands.


Midfield General

Soccer's Get-Rich-Quick Scheme

Step 1: Go to the World Cup.

The World Cup isn't just a fantastic festival of football -- it's also a shop window for professional clubs looking to spice up their squads with new talent. Even for players on losing teams, the tournament offers a chance to catch the eye of the agents, scouts, managers, and executives who can seal million-dollar contracts. Plenty of established players will be in Brazil, so who else stands to gain the most?

The poorest countries sending teams to the World Cup are the four from West Africa: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Nigeria. With incomes per capita below $2,000 in all of these countries, a star footballer making the move to one of Europe's top leagues might earn more in a week than he did through all of the previous season.

Of course, big bucks are nothing new to strikers like Cameroon's Samuel Eto'o and Ivory Coast's Didier Drogba, or indeed most of the players for the West African squads. But consider the case of Cédric Djeugoué, a 21-year-old defender for Coton Sport, the current champions of Cameroon. His team is based in Garoua, a town of somewhere around 400,000 people -- depending who's counting -- in the far north of the country, where temperatures rarely fall below 90 degrees. According to Coton Sport's president, Gabriel Mbaïrobé, his players earn about $1,000 a week.

That's quite a chunk of change for anyone in Cameroon, but the deal Eto'o signed with Chelsea last year paid him £100,000 a week (about $155,000 at the time). That was a pay cut of 71 percent versus his previous wages at Anzhi Makhachkala, a team in the Russian league whose obscurity belies the deep pockets of its billionaire owner, Suleyman Kerimov. Either way, Eto'o was earning two orders of magnitude more than Djeugoué.

The youngster is scheduled to start today's match against Mexico, but just having been called into the squad will already have attracted the attention of European scouts. And Djeugoué won't be the only one looking for a shot at the big time. Ghana's Harrison Afful made it into the Dutch club Feyenoord's academy as a teenager but ended up being loaned to Asante Kotoko, known as "The Great Porcupines of Africa", in Kumasi. Now playing for Espérance Sportive in Tunis, he has recently attracted interest from France. With his 28th birthday around the corner, though, he could probably use some World Cup minutes to boost his chances of a big-money move.

Though Djeugoué and Afful may be among the lowest-paid players in Brazil, at the team level it's hard to beat Honduras. About half of its squad is based domestically, where income per capita stands around $2,300 and players' salaries are similar to those in Cameroon. Luis Garrido, a defensive midfielder known as "The Beast", is the youngest prospect who stands a chance of playing; the only younger domestic player is the third-choice goalkeeper, Luis López. For Garrido and 24-year-old playmaker Mario Martínez, a single touch of the ball could represent a once-in-a-lifetime chance at untold riches. After all, Honduras is hardly guaranteed to quality for the next World Cup in 2018.

So if any of these players do manage to take the field in the coming weeks, I'll be rooting for them no matter who the opposition might be. For them, there's much more at stake than just a trophy.

Pierre Teyssot / AFP / Getty Images