What do you do when refugees who need help live under the control of Pakistan's Taliban or Somalia's al-Shabab? Send aid, knowing that some of it might fall into the "wrong" hands -- or withdraw, leaving thousands or millions in peril? The answer, as U.N. Under-Secretary-General John Holmes told Foreign Policy's Elizabeth Dickinson today, is simple: you figure out a way to get the job done -- and it might involve talking to the bad guys (yes, that includes the Taliban).

Holmes's words about humanitarian compromise in AfPak couldn't come at a more pertinent time. Last week's attack on the U.N. guesthouse in Kabul has sent the organization packing; at least a portion of the team's foreign employees will be relocated, possibly outside the country. Meanwhile across the border, the United Nations has been forced to pull out of northwest Pakistan for security reasons, and a suicide bombing that left five U.N. World Food Program employees dead has forced the organization to question how long it can stay on the ground. In both countries, the United Nations and other humanitarians are facing hard choices about how they will deliver aid to millions in need. In his interview, Holmes tells FP about his frustrations with NATO troops and the dangerous melding of military and humanitarian roles. And since the crises don't stop in South Asia, Holmes touches on the financial crisis, climate change, and Darfur as well.

Foreign Policy: Tell us about the current humanitarian situation in Pakistan, where millions have been displaced recently.

John Holmes: Two and a half million people [were] leaving [the Swat valley] in a very, very short space of time [earlier this summer] -- one of the biggest movements that people can remember like that. It was [also] a very unusual situation in that only about 10 percent of those people actually went into camps; most of them were in host communities, and therefore they were harder to reach. We had to be fairly quick in responding and innovative by creating hubs where people could come and collect [food and supplies]. Now, 1.5 million people have gone home but that means 1 million are still there. We [also] have a new wave of people who have come out of South Waziristan -- 200,000 or 250,000. They are coming out into an area to which we have no access, so we have to operate through local NGOs.

It is a very complicated aid operation, and now we face very significant security threats to it. The attack on the World Food Program was the Taliban saying, "We do not approve of what you are doing." We have to assume that is not the last attack of its kind we are going to see. We have to reflect carefully on what kind of footprint can we have in Pakistan under the current circumstances. There is no question of pulling out; it is more [about] how much can we still do and how do we do it?

FP: Taking the example of Pakistan, could you walk me through the logistics of an aid operation under such difficult security circumstances?

JH: What you want to do normally is have your international staff on the ground [doing the] coordinating. That is now becoming extremely difficult in Pakistan, so you have to operate more through local staff, who are not more dispensable but are able to operate in ways that are less high profile. Then, you need to find local NGOs which have capacity and independence to operate and are not either too close to the government or too close to the others. [Take for example the] World Food Program: You have stocks of foods that you will ship to various distribution points and then use a local NGO who you trust to be the distributors of that food. Then you might have another NGO who are the monitors for at least some check and a balance -- some assurance that whatever you are providing is getting to where it needs to get to and not disappearing off into the markets or into the hands of the Taliban.

But the operating standards will have to drop a bit. If you assume, and we do, that these operations are necessary to keep people alive, then you have to accept those kinds of compromises in order to keep the aid flowing.

FP: In the example of Afghanistan, where some U.N. staff may have to depart due to security concerns, how does that process change, since you are operating on the same turf as NATO forces?

JH: It is very difficult coexisting with a military operation. The problem in Afghanistan is that there is more confusion than we would like between military and civilian roles. So you have the military, particularly the U.S. military, doing development and sometimes saying they are doing humanitarian assistance. And we say, "No, please don't do that and please don't say you are doing that, because you are putting in danger the real humanitarians." We have a major issue of liaison, communication and explanation to do with the military. If you [the military] can provide security assistance in a general sense, that is good. But otherwise, it is best left to the humanitarian experts, who will be there after you are gone and therefore need to preserve their independence and their impartiality.

[The civil-military relationship] is not easy in the best of circumstances, and in Afghanistan it is extremely difficult. There are circumstances in which the only way to deliver aid is through the military, particularly in very insecure environments. But that is very much the last resort. Occasionally, they are not delivering it, but we have to deliver [assistance] in a military escort. That is not at all what we want because it can give the impression that the humanitarians have some other political agenda. But sometimes there are no other choices, so you simply have to make those compromises in the interest of actually getting that aid through.

For us to be safe, the vital point to get across is that what we are doing is based on need and has nothing to do with politics. We help people whether they are under Taliban control or government control. We are not rewarding people for being under one or the other. It is a tough message to sell, and there are many people on the other side who do not believe it or choose not to believe it. So we have a major job to do to get that message across to those organizations, like al-Shabab and talk to the Taliban about what we are doing and why we are doing it, to try and persuade them to leave us alone.

FP: How has the U.S. military responded to these concerns?

JH: When we explain [our concerns] either here or [at] NATO or on the ground, people understand it. The difficulty is that the contingents rotate, so you are always dealing with new people. You just got one lot educated about why there is an issue here and then they leave. It is a dispiriting process.

FP: In a similarly rough environment, Somalia, there has been some controversy in the last few weeks, as the U.S. State Department has considered retracting humanitarian aid from Somalia based on concerns of it going to the militant group al-Shabab. How do you balance those concerns?

JH: That's precisely the calculation we have to make. No one is trying to give any aid or comfort to al-Shabab or any other rebel group. But they are in control of a lot of the territory where people who need the help are, so we can't avoid having some dealings with them -- not political negotiation, but some kind of contact to say, here is a convoy of food coming through, please leave it alone. There are checkpoints with soldiers everywhere, and they often demand money. Who is that money going to? It's very hard to say, but there are some certain minimum conditions that you cannot avoid. You have 3.5 million people in danger of starving. [W]ho would benefit most from the aid operation stopping because of concerns of aid leakage? Is it the government or is it al-Shabab? [It's] al-Shabab.

FP:  What hot spots are you looking out for next year?

JH:  Well there are some long-running ones. Our two biggest operations are in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that isn't going to change, I fear. Darfur is not as much in the news as it was, but it is not any better. The needs are still there, and the political problems are not particularly close to reaching a solution. That is a billion dollar operation, and it is going to stay that way.

FP: Following the global financial crisis, how has your role changed? Is it more difficult to convince donors to help out?

JH: It has not been as much of a problem as we feared it might be. But there is a fear that next year will be more difficult, because the appropriations for 2009 were set in 2008. For 2010, the allocations were being set in 2009, in the middle of the crisis when the fiscal effects were being felt so there is a fear that next year may be tougher.

FP: You have warned this year of the growing danger of humanitarian repercussions of climate change. Going into the Copenhagen climate talks next month, what are the priorities from your perspective?

JH:  The most important thing from our point of view is for people to understand that climate change is a not a future threat; it is a real current issue for many countries and people. I have lost count of the number of African [government] ministers who have come into my room and said, "Yes, we have had floods before, but never like this. The farmers don't know what to do."

There needs to be a recognition that the humanitarian consequences of climate change are with us now and they will only get worse. The negotiation in Copenhagen needs to concentrate not only on mitigation of emissions, but also on helping countries adapt to climate change.

I think we have succeeded in the last year in getting the message across to the negotiators. The reality is, if there is not a significant adaptation fund, the developing countries won't sign up [to the agreement].

Foreign Policy: Shortly after the Obama administration's reversal on the missile defense system in Central Europe, you were quoted as saying that you hoped this would disabuse Polish leaders of the "dream of basing everything on a bilateral alliance with the United States." Do you still feel that way?

Radoslaw Sikorski: The administration has now explained its position more thoroughly, and we are now satisfied and want to go where the U.S. is leading, toward a more adaptive and more proven system. [The new system] will take longer to construct, but will create fewer tensions in our region. I think we're now on the same page with the U.S., and we are ready to address the details and the amendments to the agreements I signed with the previous administration.

FP: What was the reason for your initial dissatisfaction with the change?

RS: The news management and the decision-making management could have been better, but it was not unanticipated. We knew when signing the agreement with the previous administration that the new one would take a fresh look at it. So, that's been done and we now think that missile defense will be a fruitful but not exclusive part of the U.S.-Polish relationship. If the new system gets built, we like it more than the previous one.

FP: There had been reports of a probable change in strategy for months. How much of a surprise was the announcement on Sept. 17?

RS: We were not surprised by the content of it, but we were surprised by the timing. I spoke to senior administration officials on the first of September, and we agreed on a timetable for reaching the decision. It included a pre-decision consultation. We expected to jointly handle the news management of it. That did not come to pass.

FP: The announcement came on a very sensitive date for Poland, the anniversary of the Soviet invasion in World War II. Do you think the administration is committed enough to researching and understanding your region?

RS: We had a visit by the vice president since then, a good visit. We have a rich calendar of contacts over the next few weeks. Now that the administration has found its feet and listened to our concerns, I have every confidence that we will be working with this administration as we have with every previous administration.

FP: Are there differences in the tone or approach of the Obama team, as opposed to the last administraion?

RS: One thing I would say is that in the previous administrations, there were more people who knew and had served in our region for part of their career and knew our region from firsthand experience. But there is plenty of time to correct that.

FP: What's on the agenda for your meeting with Secretary Clinton this week?

RS: We have issues to discuss having to do with our region. President Obama has invited our prime minister to a disarmament conference in April. We think that should deal with not only intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also tactical. I hope to persuade Hillary Clinton to come to Poland next year to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Community of Democracies, which was a program of support for democracy launched by our predecessors. We need this program even more than we did 10 years ago. Ten years ago it looked like history had a direction toward more democracy; today the trends are much more ambiguous.

Of course, we are also partners in Afghanistan. Poland has 2,000 troops. We are responsible for Ghazni province -- 1.1 million Afghans. And this is, I understand, a crucial decision-making time for what we are going to do in Afghanistan. I have some personal perspective because I've been involved with Afghanistan for 25 years. I wrote my first book in Afghanistan. I spent six weeks in Tora Bora. I brought out the first pictures of stinger missiles from Afghanistan. So I'll be giving her a piece of my mind.

FP: So what is it you're going to recommend?

RS: If you'll allow me, I'll tell her first.

FP: From what I understand, there's growing opposition in Poland to the mission in Afghanistan. What, in your view, is Poland's strategic interest in keeping troops there?

RS: I haven't met any enthusiasts for the war in Afghanistan in the United States either! It is, like all missions, expensive and risky, and the public doesn't usually like it. In Poland, the opposition is quite wide, but not very deep. That's because our interest in Afghanistan is really our interest in NATO succeeding. We invoked Article 5 in defense of our ally, the United States, and so we want NATO to succeed so as to maintain conviction for future challenges. When NATO goes to war, NATO wins. We have no selfish national interests in Afghanistan. Just a general Western interest in keeping terrorists far from our borders.

We also feel some solidarity with Afghanistan. They defied the Soviet Union in the 1980s at the same time we defied the Soviet Union, but we've been more lucky. We would like them to be able to benefit from democracy and a free market economy, just as we have. But we have to take a fresh look at this mission because our resources are not limitless.

FP: Do you think that Obama administration's "reset" with Russia is worthwhile? Are there enough common interests for it to work?

RS: I've heard that the prisoner's dilemma has been solved with supercomputers, and apparently, the most rational behavior is to do one good thing for your partner and then to do exactly what he does. I see the Obama administration doing the rational thing: making a positive step toward its difficult partners -- not just Russia, but Iran, Cuba, and North Korea -- and then seeing how the other side responds.

I would only advise that the more you talk to Russia, the more you should talk to Russia's neighbors, who sometimes feel vulnerable, particularly after what Russia did in Georgia a year ago. We would like relations between Russia and the U.S. to be better than they are. We don't want to be a front-line state. Russia is our second largest trading partner. If there were a return to confrontation, we would be much more adversely affected than the United States. The trick is to persuade Russia that she can be a significant partner without using 19th- or 20th-century instruments that have been tried with such tragic consequences.

FP: Have you seen signs that Moscow is reciprocating these gestures?

RS: We've improved our relations with Russia over the last two years. I've been to Moscow several times. Both the Russian prime minister and foreign minister have been to Poland. We've signed several agreements that couldn't have been signed before.

I find Russia's internal discussion about its own history extremely important and interesting. What President Medvedev has said in the last few days about the crimes of Stalinism is hugely important. With a Russia that recognizes its own history, we can have much better relations than with a Russia that builds on neo-Stalinist interpretations of history. Agreeing on facts is crucial in international relations. Look at France's relationship with Germany. Trust and friendship is possible only on the basis of facts.

FP: Do you think Prime Minister Putin also agrees on these facts? As I remember, there was some controversy over his statements about World War II during his last visit to Poland?

RS: He came to Poland on the first of September, which we regarded as a positive gesture. In Stalin's time, that wasn't regarded as the beginning of the Second World War. Only when Germany attacked its erstwhile ally did it become the Soviet war. So that's a gesture in the direction of the European mainstream. But we feel that it's a conversation that Russia needs to have more.

FP: This year marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of communism in Europe. How close is Poland today to what you would have imagined in 1989?

RS: Well, we are speaking on the second of November. I'd like to remind you that 20 years ago, the Berlin Wall was still standing and nobody expected it to fall anytime soon, while Poland already had a non-communist government.

We had gone ahead and created an atmosphere in which things became possible. I have some personal reminiscences from [that November]. I drove from Warsaw to Berlin with an American journalist to cover the fall of the wall as it happened, and we've been happily married for 17 years now!

To answer your question, I think we've done rather well. If you look at the map of GDP growth, Poland is a green island in the map of Europe. So we must have done something right. On Jan. 1, 1990, we passed 13 laws that introduced capitalism in Poland. It was a very bold move, but it meant that our recession was the shallowest and lasted the briefest time. Today our economy is the 18th in the world. And we are still growing despite the recession. So we feel we have something to offer other countries in terms of a successful economic and political transformation.

FP: Where do you see Poland positioned in Europe 20 years from now?

RS: We want to be for the east of Europe, what Spain is for the south: a country that gives a good example, that can speak up for the interests of its region and draws our neighbors toward the benefits of full integration. We want to have Western neighbors on both sides, and that includes Russia, by the way.

FP: Do you still think it's fair to call Poland a "post-communist state"?

RS: Well it depends how you define it. Poland used to have a communist government, that was imposed on us by the Yalta powers. And we will never escape that. After all, many people in the United States are still obsessed with the Civil War. But we have overcome that horrible legacy in more ways than one. Of course we still have some catching up to do. Infrastructure and highways, for instance. But just look at cell phone coverage: In Warsaw I get 3G everywhere. Here ... [shrugs].

Haleh Esfandiari, an Iranian-American academic who heads the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, returned to Tehran in late 2006 to visit her then 93-year-old mother. As she was heading to the airport to leave Iran, her car was forced off the road by armed men who stole her belongings and her passport. As she attempted to obtain replacement travel documents, she was questioned by Iranian intelligence officials about her work at the Wilson Center. On May 8, 2007, she was formally arrested and transferred to the notorious Evin prison. She was kept in solitary confinement, often blindfolded and totally disconnected from the outside world.

After an international campaign calling for her release, the Iranian authorities freed Esfandiari after 105 days of imprisonment, on Aug. 21, 2007. She recently published My Prison, My Home: One Woman's Story of Captivity in Iran, detailing her experiences leading up to and during her imprisonment. Foreign Policy's David Kenner caught up with Esfandiari this week to discuss her book and to hear her thoughts on the Iranian regime's continuing attempts to cope with the protests that swept the country following June's presidential election.

Foreign Policy: The Iranian government held you in Iran for eight months and in solitary confinement for 105 days. In your book, you wrote that you were sometimes interrogated for six to eight hours at a time. What question did they ask more than any other question? What did they want to know?

Haleh Esfandiari: They were interested, basically, in the nature of my work at the Wilson Center. They would say: OK, who is financing the work of these centers? I would say look, just go on our Web site. And of course, we get funds from different organizations: from the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Soros Foundation. They focused on the Soros Foundation. They said, aha! Soros was involved in promoting a soft revolution in what used to be the Soviet Union. And now they are focusing on Iran.

...

Don't forget: I was arrested under the Bush administration, and they were very suspicious of the administration. There was this loose talk going on in Washington about regime change. And "rogue states," the "axis of evil" -- all these things. Plus, Congress had allocated $75 million to promote democracy in Iran. So there is this sense of paranoia among the Intelligence Ministry and the government of President [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad.

FP: You mentioned the $75 million Congress allocated to democracy programs in Iran. Do you still believe, even after the June protests, that it is counterproductive for the United States to provide money to Iranian NGOs for democracy promotion programs?

HE: Every time we had a representative of NGOs speaking at the Wilson Center, they would say we are not going to touch this money because this would give the regime a reason to limit our activities or close our organization. So, my argument all along has been that [the U.S. government should] get in touch with the civil society people in Iran. If they want to accept it, they'll take it. If they don't want to accept it, don't try and do it through back channels.

If an NGO thinks they can, hypothetically, take $1 million from the U.S. to set up educational workshops, not necessarily to promote democracy but to do vocational training for men and women, why not? Give it to them. The people on the ground always know best, better than the people who are just sitting [in Washington] and judging the situation from afar.

FP: Did your detention change your opinion about the Iranian government?

HE: Sure. I truly was very disappointed in them. I can understand their feeling of being under siege by the United States, but I cannot understand why such a powerful government, who looks at itself as the strongest power in the Persian Gulf, would worry about a soft revolution. ... [A]t the end [of the imprisonment], I wasn't sure why they arrested me. But now, two years later, I can understand. When, now, they have gone after their own people and brought the same accusations against them.

FP: Do you think the Iranian government will begin accusing members of the opposition movement of the same things which they accused you?

HE: They have accused them. They have accused former Vice President [Muhammad Ali] Abtahi. They have accused [Iranian reformer Saeed] Hajjarian. They have accused a number of cabinet ministers and former members of parliament for being part of this effort of bringing about change through soft means.

They look at the Green movement just as they looked at the Orange movement [in Ukraine] and the Rose movement [in Georgia]. Which is shocking to me, because Mr. Karroubi and Mr. Mousavi and the rest all have perfect revolutionary credentials. They didn't want a revolution; they were basically talking about change, and that was that. They didn't want to overthrow the regime.

FP: Reformist presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi has charged that some of his supporters who were arrested after the June election protests were tortured and raped in prison. This week, Iranian state media reported that the government might prosecute Karroubi for his statements. You said you were not abused in Evin prison, but are you confident other people were treated humanely?

HE: No. I'm not at all confident. I believe what Mr. Karroubi says, and there are enough documents and there is a history of Evin pre- and post-revolution, where people were arrested, beaten, and tortured. You have the example of the Canadian journalist [Zahra Kazemi] [six] years ago. She was arrested outside Evin prison, taken in, and beaten to death. I was terribly frightened when they took me to jail because I thought that this could happen to me, too. I mean, when I say I was well-treated, I mean that I was not tortured and beaten, but I was in solitary confinement, blindfolded, and facing the wall in interrogations, not knowing whether it was day or night, not knowing the time, cut off from the rest of the world. I just had one visit in those three months.

They have gone after the opposition leaders ... [but so far] they haven't touched Karroubi, [presidential candidate Mir Hossein] Mousavi, and [former President Mohammad] Khatami. I don't believe that they will go after them. Why turn them into martyrs? Karroubi is a cleric, and it seldom happens that you go after a cleric. There is a lot of talk that he should go in front of a clerical court and explain the allegations of rape and torture. But then on the other hand, something must have been going on in Kahrizak [prison], or else why did Mr. [Ali] Khamenei order the closure of Kahrizak?

FP: Do you see any sea change among Iranian-American intellectuals regarding engaging with Iran?

HE: I'll talk about myself because each of us has a different opinion on this issue. I still believe in engagement. But in Geneva two weeks ago and next week in Vienna, when [the Western powers and Iran] sit and talk, the human rights issues must also be on the table. They should not just focus on the nuclear issue. That's what the Iranians would love to do. But no, they should also talk about the human rights issue, because it's very important.

Look, we have three American hikers sitting in jail somewhere in Iran. You have an Iranian-American, Kian Tajbakhsh, sitting in jail. You have Maziar Bahari, the Canadian-American who worked for Newsweek, sitting in jail. Plus, there are thousands of Iranian activists who are sitting in jail. Talk about them -- talk about them all the time! What really helped me get out was this international pressure, day in and day out. ...You have to bring pressure.

FP: Do you think the government effectively squashed the movement that arose during last June's election, or will the protesters be back?

HE: Oh sure, they will still be around. This has been the story of the younger Iranian generation in the last 30 years. They come out into the street, they protest, they are sent home, the universities are attacked, they keep quiet for a year -- and then they come out again. The people who were in the streets 30 years ago are now in the government; the people who were in the streets 20 years ago are also in there. You have one generation after another coming out in the streets and protesting.

On Sept. 27, Palestinians hurled rocks at a group of visitors at the Al-Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem; they thought the visitors were Jewish fundamentalists and wanted to ward them away from the holy site. Clashes escalated over the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, and Israel barred all male worshipers under 50 from entering the mosque. As happened during the first and second intifadas, violence spread throughout East Jerusalem, with Israeli police arresting dozens of Palestinian protesters. The paralysis over the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and continuing tension over Jewish settlement expansion in East Jerusalem added fuel to the flames.

As this tense situation unfolded, Foreign Policy interviewed Rafiq H. Husseini, chief of staff for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. They discussed how the conflict started -- and where it might lead.

Foreign Policy: Could you describe the series of events that have resulted in the recent tensions in Jerusalem and how the situation has gotten as bad as it is today?

Rafiq Husseini: The tensions did not start last week. The tensions have been ongoing since this new Israeli government [took] over, with its aim to fulfill its objective of ensuring that East Jerusalem is never returned to Palestinian sovereignty. An active program of putting Jewish settlements in Arab East Jerusalem has been progressing, including evictions of Palestinians.

But the tensions have now increased. ... [N]ow groups of fundamentalists want to go inside the al-Aqsa mosque and the al-Haram al-Sharif, which is an Islamic holy shrine. Every day we fear that Israeli fundamentalist groups [will] declare that this area is the Temple Mount and that they want to build the third temple on the ruins of the existing Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock.

FP: Last week, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Shalom said, "[T]he battle is underway for sovereignty of Jerusalem and particularly over the Temple Mount." Do you see this as part of a struggle for Jerusalem between the Israelis and the Palestinians?

RH: Well, [the al-Aqsa mosque] is a Palestinian holy shrine. Why should there be a battle for it, or its sovereignty? This is a Palestinian, Arab, Islamic holy shrine that has been there for almost 1,500 years. Therefore, the battle is unfortunately not between the Palestinians and the Israelis over sovereignty. It is a battle by extremist Israeli groups backed by a government of extremists to try to re-create 2,000 years of history.

This is not acceptable. The issue has been turned by this Israeli government into a religious battle ... not only a clash of nationalistic viewpoints.

FP: Can you describe the difference, from your perspective, between the current Benjamin Netanyahu government and the Kadima government which preceded it?

RH: First of all, I think the Kadima government ... accepted that they want to put all the issues for discussion between us on the table, including Jerusalem. They also understood the sensitivity of the subject. Although they involved themselves in some settlement plans in East Jerusalem, they were much more receptive and understood the tensions and what these issues can bring -- how they can damage both peoples.

Also, there were channels of communication between the two leaderships, so when an issue like what is happening in Jerusalem was about to take place, these issues were talked about and solved, most of the time. Today, these channels are completely blocked and closed.

FP: President Mahmoud Abbas called for a general strike to occur last Friday. What does the strike hope to accomplish?

RH: Well, it hopes to ensure that the message is heard by the world. Because [this tension] is now bringing us back to square one. It is bringing us away from a supposedly negotiated settlement over issues that are related to the two peoples, two nations. ... Therefore, what we need to do is try to make sure that the world understands and the world then stops Israel from doing what it's doing.

Because Israel, as you know, is the power on the ground. It is the one with the guns, the police, and the soldiers. It is the one that is allowing settlers and fundamentalist Jewish groups to claim East Jerusalem and especially the Muslim holy shrines of al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock. [They] continue to say that there is no al-Aqsa mosque and that there is no Dome of the Rock, that there is only Solomon's Temple. Unfortunately, this is what the Israeli municipality is saying officially in all its publications.

FP: Do you see a risk of this clashing getting much worse in the coming days?

RH: Well, I am not sure how bad [the situation will get]. We do not want these clashes to get any worse. All the intifadas in the later years have started with a clash around the mosque and around al-Haram al-Sharif. And we don't want this to happen.

[W]e are asking the Israelis to restrain these people, to keep them away, so that we do not go into another cycle of violence and then there is the total collapse of the peace process. Today, the peace process is in intensive care, and it is struggling.

FP: Do you accuse the Netanyahu government of wanting the destruction of the al-Aqsa mosque, like you accuse some of these "fundamentalist groups" of trying to do?

RH: The Netanyahu government is a weak government based, unfortunately, on fundamentalist groups. And therefore, they are taking the counsel of these groups, and this is why these groups can do anything they like and not fear any restrictions by the weak and incapable Israeli government of today.

FP: Is there any difference between the position of Hamas and the position of the PLO on the al-Aqsa issue?

RH: Well, I don't know if there is any difference on the al-Aqsa issue. But I can tell you that there is a big difference between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas on all the political and social issues concerning the Palestinian-Israeli question. And therefore, whereas there could be similar positions [on this issue], that does not mean that we agree on how to resolve the difference. We want peace, we want coexistence, and we want a two-state solution. We want Jerusalem to be the capital of two states and three religions. This is what we want. And we are advocating diversity and tolerance. I am not sure that Hamas is advocating the same thing.

Rafiq H. Husseini is chief of staff of the office of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Before American missionaries came to the small Ecuadorian village of Lago Agrio in the 1950s, it was a place virtually unknown to the outside world. Now, 37 years after the U.S. company Texaco came to drill for oil, the village and the surrounding area is a festering site of contamination, a literal "death zone" at the center of a $27 billion legal battle with one of the world's largest oil companies.

The lawsuit is still in flux, and the stakes are high: The plaintiffs -- 30,000 indigenous Amazonians -- are suing for the environmental cleanup of a polluted area roughly the size of Rhode Island. They think the oil contamination has led to mass death and disease. Lawyers for the defense argue that Chevron, which acquired Texaco in 2001, no longer operates oil wells in Ecuador and that the cleanup of its drilling sites met with the requirements of Ecuadorean law. The case, they say, is nothing more than a ploy by the plaintiffs' "Manhattan lawyers" to cash in on big "juicy checks." Chevron also maintains that the increase in cancer and various skin diseases in the area is the result of "poor sanitation" and "has nothing to do with oil."

This David and Goliath tale is the subject of director Joe Berlinger's newly released film, Crude, in which he explores this epic 16-year-old legal battle with all the excitement and flair of a John Grisham thriller. Berlinger, whose other works include Brother's Keeper, Paradise Lost, Metallica: Some Kind of Monster, was approached by Steven Donziger, the lead American attorney for the plaintiffs, who eventually convinced Berlinger to visit the site and meet the people there. The filmmaker saw a chance to tell a story he thinks addresses a "moral responsibility" that transcends even the best legal argument.

FP: Have the people of Lago Agrio seen Crude?

JB: I have not gone to show it to them, but I have [given permission to] community leaders to screen the movie ... free of charge all over Ecuador. We had a really wonderful screening [at the] Ecuadorean film festival. There was a line around the block. They jammed 1,400 people into the theater.

It was the best screening -- in terms of emotional response -- I have ever had anywhere, anytime. Pablo [Fajardo, the leading attorney for the plaintiffs] received a 15-minute standing ovation. People kept coming up to me to express their gratitude. The vast majority of them -- Quito [residents who live] middle -class lives -- had no idea that [the devastation] was taking place. It took an American filmmaker for them to become aware about what was going on in their own jungle.

FP: In Crude we see then-newly elected President Rafael Correa visit Lago Agri0. He is outraged and champions the plaintiffs' cause. Has his support continued?

JB: It is an interesting turn of events for the plaintiffs. [Correa was the] first president of the region to visit the affected area and to show sympathy for the plaintiffs. Correa is a controversial figure in [Ecuador], written off as a left-wing Chávez protégé, anti-American, anti-American big business. Some of this is true, but it is precisely [the] cozy relationship between right-wing Latin American governments and big business that has been responsible for a lot of environmental abuse in extractive industries, and that is kind of the larger theme of the film.

Correa continues to support the case, in that he is aware of it. He is pro-plaintiff, [but] he is not meddling in the case, as Chevron has accused him of. Correa is trying to walk a more environmentally aware line. [He] is trying to, with mixed results, [to] inaugurate [a new] program where instead of drilling and extracting the oil from the ground, he will sell [the oil] to people who want to keep it in the ground. [It's] a novel way of dealing with having a resource that has economic value [while] trying to preserve the environment.

­­­­FP: What was your relationship with Chevron like while you were making the film?

JB: The first two years of the film I did not reach out to them. I did not disclose who I was simply for safety reasons. We were in a dangerous, somewhat lawless part of the world. These oil towns are like Wild West towns with a lot of crime. We were at times a mile and a half from the Colombian border, where the FARC guerrillas are very active, where drug runners are very active.

I am not saying that Chevron executives in the United States would ever order a "hit" on a filmmaker; I am not that jaded or cynical. However, there is a history of these cases in places like Nigeria where people, who care about the chain of employment based on the local interest of the larger multinationals' interests, take actions into their own hands and things happen. .... Our hotel was ransacked on one occasion; we thought we were being followed. I am not making accusations -- that could [have been] drug runners.

[Since I contacted Chevron,] our relationship has been interesting. Initially, they did not believe [I was trying] to do a fair and balanced film.   

I tried to get them to let me do other things like sit in on their meetings.  I said, "Hey, take me on the toxi-tour" --  everyone calls it the toxi-tour, including Chevron -- "from the Chevron perspective and I would love to be on the ground with you at these sites, and you explain to me whose responsibility this is and how this happened." They denied that. Literally up until the [eleventh] hour they were friendly but not granting any interviews.

[The Sundance Film Festival deadline] motivated them, and [Chevron] agreed to do interviews. It was their idea to provide me with Ricardo Raez Vega, the legal architect of this case, and provide me with Sarah MacMillan [Chevron's chief environmental scientist].

When I was setting up my shot, another crew arrived and started setting up gear. [Chevron] had booked another crew to film me filming the interviews so they would have a record. They did not mention it beforehand. They said they would like to have a record of the interview. It was not necessarily an intimidation [tactic], but their way of saying, "We have a record of this; do not manipulate this." I have filmed all sorts of people in all walks of life, but I have never been filmed doing my interviews before.

FP: What has the film taught you about this sort of lawsuit?

JB: I think the legal structures we have are inadequate for addressing these large-scale environmental and humanitarian crises. It has taken 17 years to get to this point and it's probably going to take another 10 or 15 years before there is a resolution. There has to be better ways of resolving these conflicts. In the Exxon Valdez situation, it took almost 20 years for the fine to be paid by them; they delayed and delayed and it only got paid off late last year to people who were waiting for compensation for lost livelihood. They waited 20 years for that payment, and then in the [eleventh] hour it was reduced by 80 percent. So there has to be a better way to resolve these conflicts. The people who are the alleged or supposed beneficiaries wait a lifetime for relief. And in this instance, in the Amazon, there is poisoned water and massive pollution, which is unacceptable.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan who now runs a private consulting business and is affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Monday that the Obama administration, and the Bush administration before it, had made "mistakes" in dealing with incumbent Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who is now facing widespread allegations of electoral fraud.

In a talk at the Foreign Policy Initiative's 2009 Forum on democracy, Khalilzad said he supported Gen. Stanley McChrystal's call for more U.S. troops in Afghanistan and said that "leaving and cutting our losses would be a huge victory for al Qaeda and the Taliban." Afghanistan, he said, would go back to the way it was before the September 11 attacks. He called instead for a counterinsurgency approach focused on protecting the Afghan people.

In a follow-up interview, I asked him if he thought, given how Karzai seems to have tilted away from the United States in recent years and allied himself with a number of unsavory characters such as Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, that the U.S. had made mistake in moving away from the Afghan leader, and whether the Obama administration had compounded that mistake.

"Karzai understands, I am sure, that he needs the United States," Khalilzad responded. "Afghanistan cannot succeed without the United States. I think that he would be making a mistake if he believed no matter what, the United States will be there forever."

But "we have made mistakes in dealing with him," he admitted. "So much so that now it looks like we have very limited ability to do even the things we think are right for his own country."

"I don't want to say anything I am saying as a partisan comment," he stressed. "We have one government at one time. But I believe that there was a mistake in terms of dealing with Karzai. Clear indications were given as least as Karzai saw it that the administration, some key members of the administration, did not like him and wanted to get rid of him and was encouraging others to run against him. And the meetings with him were quite contentious."

"At the same time the administration did not have a realistic plan about how to get another leader elected by the Afghan people. And so that in turn has been a factor in getting Karzai to hedge against the U.S. being administratively against him by assuring his prospects by making deals with others."

"I think that at the end of the day if he is reelected as president then the United States has no choice but to work with him as the leader of Afghanistan if we want to help Afghanistan succeed," Khalilzad said, "and I think that Karazi has no choice but to work with the United States because without the United States his country cannot succeed."

Asked about the growing concerns over Karzai's legitimacy, Khalilzad said, "I think that there is no question that the election has done damage." But he emphasized that the best way forward was to address the complaints of fraud, which are quite widespread, within the context of Afghan law and procedures.

"At the end of the day, if that council decides that Karzai has won," he said, referring to the independent Afghan commission that was set up to review election-related grievances, "I think that would bestow legitimacy in a fundamental way. If not, then there would be another round perhaps."

Could Karzai turn his government, which is widely described as corrupt and incapable of providing basic services to the Afghan people, into something more effective?

"I think he has got to do it if the international assistance is to be sustained," Khalilzad said. "This is sort of his last chance if he gets elected to be president."

There are few who can say they have been as close to stopping genocide as retired Lt. Gen Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Rwanda in 1994. Long before the killing began, Dallaire sounded a warning call. Then, he begged for reinforcements and a mandate to use force -- neither of which he got -- as his troops fatefully watched hundreds of thousands of Rwandans slaughtered. "You should spit in my face," says the character based on Dallaire in the 2004 film Hotel Rwanda. "[The West is] not going to stop the slaughter." The world did little then, and so in real life, Dallaire has spent much of his last decade and a half reminding the world not to let the same happen again.

Now more than ever, Dallaire tells Foreign Policy's Elizabeth Dickinson, such distant conflicts should strike world leaders as imminently close. Where unrest simmers, so does the possibility for terrorist havens, global pandemics, and massive human suffering. Preventing and abating those conflicts is not a matter of humanitarianism alone; it's a matter of realpolitik. In a world where no contagion stays local for long, Dallaire challenges leaders to weigh the consequences of conflict accordingly. That calls for a new kind of military force -- one that blurs the distinctions between traditional military efforts, counterinsurgency, and even peacekeeping. In short, there is no fine line between Rwanda and Afghanistan, only a plethora of civilian lives.

Foreign Policy: You're releasing a report today about galvanizing political will toward intervention in crisis situations. What's the secret to getting real action?

Roméo Dallaire: In this era, which began in the 1990s but is much more acute now, we are now significantly at risk -- in terms of our health and security -- from catastrophes that happen in foreign lands. We simply can't use the parameters of whether there is a moral reason for intervention; [this] has not worked. [Politicians] can bring [the reasons for intervention] a lot closer to home. The influence of catastrophic failure in these [troubled] states can reach your borders and your national security. In fact, the well-being of your nation is now linked to places that seemed far away before, [because] now, they are just next door. [The goal is to determine] how we can make the leaders much more aware of the fact that they are going to be held accountable [for responding to conflicts elsewhere], because there are people in their own countries who are going to ultimately suffer.

FP: What kind of response have you received from governments? Do you think that the administration of Barack Obama, in particular, is poised to step up in tough cases?

RD: Obama sees a global scenario in which all of humanity is interfacing. He acknowledges that some regions are putting the rest of humanity at risk. So we think that there's going to be a more interested reading, at least, of looking at intervention -- not only in a reactive way but in a preventative way. That's the "soft power" side -- international development, focusing on preventing failing states from actually going south.

It is my personal position that the NGO community, if it gets rid of some of the fringe gang and coalesces more and more, instead of being so interfighting at times, will become the voice of humanity with a massive impact on foreign policy and public opinion.

FP: Once you get to that point where prevention is no longer possible, when is it appropriate to intervene -- to send in peacekeepers?

RD: You're looking at a person who has seen, in 1994, all the ineptness of actually doing that [intervention]. All the wrong decisions were taken, right from the highest level, right from the start.

[We are] not skilled, we the military, the security, and the diplomatic [sectors], in the protection of civilians. It's not in the dogma yet; it's a side element. Leaders don't seem to be getting those tripwires, those red lines [that point to genocide]. [In Rwanda,] when the hate radio came online and got a license from the government, was that a tripwire?

In 2004 when I was at the Kennedy School and we looked at Darfur, I was on a forum, and I said, "We have got to deploy now 44,000 troops to Darfur, in order to protect civilians." There were chuckles in the crowd. I said, "Why is it that we can't put 44,000 troops in Darfur, when we put 67,000 in Yugoslavia? What's the difference? Is it because we're in Iraq and Afghanistan? We had millions [of troops] in Europe, protecting us." Africa used to be far away. But to North American youth [today], Africa is just a sophisticated bus ride away. I still take the plane with a shirt and tie. To them, getting to Accra, you get a direct flight, it's 400 bucks, and bingo, you're in Africa.

FP: It sounds like what you're talking about is almost a fundamental retooling of the world's militaries. What would that look like?

RD: The big players are still basing a lot of their security on the classic use of force. And in the last two decades, except for twice in Iraq or in Kuwait, we haven't been using the classic use of force. We're still learning how to handle Afghanistan -- we haven't got that thing solved. We're still trying to work out how humanitarians, the diplomats, the nation-builders, the security people, police, and military -- how are all of them working at the same time to bring about [peace] instead of blowing the place up and then throwing in a bunch to rebuild it.

There is a need for a new doctrinal basis and new structures for the protection of civilians. [It's about] using that force as part of your prevention tools. We're not going in guns blazing. There's a whole bunch of stuff that you can do before you use that force. But it's important to make sure that people know that as you're going through these stages, if it doesn't work, ultimately, we'll use the hammer. That makes [the use of force] much more powerful.

FP: Here in Washington, it seems like there is a perception that there are two realms of conflict out there: peacekeeping missions, for example in Darfur or Congo, and Afghanistan and Iraq, which are seen as "hard" military operations. Are we now seeing a blurring of the lines?

RD: We still have people who are "war fighters" and people who are peacekeepers, and they're trying to stay in those two areas. But now, [instead of just those two extreme types of conflict,] what you have is everything in between. [That calls for] a military that's far more adaptable to the different levels of use of force, within a context. Petraeus and his movement are the first signs of realizing this.

I was involved in the reform of the Canadian officer corps in the late 1990s where we said, "We've got to produce the leaders who know sociology, anthropology, [and] philosophy, so they can understand the complexity of the problem, and be able to participate with the other players in resolving of the conflict and diffusing of the conflict before you have to use your rifle."

FP: What's your diagnosis of some of the recent peacekeeping missions that have been criticized for ineffectiveness? Is their failure because they're under-resourced, understaffed, undermandated, or all of the above?

RD: The greatest deficiency in the capabilities comes from two levels: One level is mandate, and the maneuvering and watering down and limiting of mandates, even under Chapter 7. The other side is that developed countries are staying out. Those that sit around the Security Council in their veto positions -- they are staying out of the field. So there are just no capabilities in the field to implement the mandates as such. MONUC [the U.N. mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo] had the [mandate] to conduct far more offensive operations. But the troops they had, the equipment they had, the command and control they had simply could not meet that task. [The big powers are] still living in this sort of semi-isolationism -- they say, "That's a problem between those guys; we'll let it run its course and then we'll pick up pieces after." Well, sorry, in this era, that stuff moves, and it will affect us.

I recently was able to put a couple dollars aside to buy a diamond ring for my wife, which I never did. My work with child soldiers was such that I categorically insisted on a Canadian diamond, because I don't trust DeBeers. No matter with the Kimberly Process [to prevent conflict diamonds], there's just a smell out there. Well those things, more of our younger people are conscious of them. They read it, they see it, they know all about it. Politicians will be held accountable for allowing [atrocities] to happen.

This January, Nir Barkat became mayor of Jerusalem.

Barkat, a conservative-leaning Netanyahu confidant who ran as an independent, made two major campaign promises. First, the self-made tech millionaire vowed to revitalize Jerusalem's economy; plagued by a shrinking tax base, the city is now the poorest in Israel. Second, he vowed to keep Jerusalem undivided, its government secular, and its administration fair.

But Jerusalem is an unusually difficult city to govern. Its land is holy to Christians, Jews, and Muslims; its affairs an unusually international concern. Barkat answers to a fractured populace that is about a third Arab and a third ultra-Orthodox. No wonder Jerusalem's mayors historically struggle for little better than to preserve the status quo.

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As Barkat pushes forward with a multi-million dollar revitalization plan -- which involves refurbishing the Old City and building in Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem -- he has been hit from all sides. Arab Israelis and Palestinians have harshly criticized an uptick in home destruction and a series of controversial building decisions in their neighborhoods -- as have American and European authorities and the United Nations. This summer, protests by ultra-Orthodox haredim became violent when Barkat pushed to keep a parking lot open on the Sabbath.

In the midst of these struggles, Barkat spoke with Foreign Policy about his plans for Jerusalem, the sensitive issue of settlement building, and what it means to govern the most contested 44 square miles on Earth. Excerpts:

Foreign Policy: To an international observer, it seems that preserving the status quo has been difficult in the first six months. Earlier this week, you were actually the subject of physical attacks. What actions are you taking to preserve the status quo? What is the importance of doing so?

Nir Barkat: I do think the status quo is important in the city. And the status quo is defined by certain categories. That there is no public transportation, there is no commerce on Shabbat [the Jewish day of rest, observed on Saturday]. But there are open places, restaurants, and places of leisure.

Discussing parking and traffic is not part of the status quo, and it never was. Indeed, you have a lot of parking lots open on Shabbat. All the hospitals, all the hotels, and a few public places.

From my perspective, there's been no change in the status quo. It's important to maintain the status quo, and it is part of my coalition agreement with my fellows in the municipality, where 30 out of 31 members of the council are part of the coalition. Orthodox and non-Orthodox, we stick together. The people that are now protesting, the protesters are 2 percent of the population. Any decision a mayor may take in the city of Jerusalem, sometimes a few percentages, the people do not like. As long as they demonstrate legally, I have no problem. But, if they break the law and become violent, they become a problem with the police.

FP: You're a businessman. A lot of your promise coming in to lead the municipal government was to revitalize the economy in a Jerusalem with a shrinking tax base, among the poorest cities in Israel. What's your plan to revitalize and rebuild?

NB: My vision is to exploit the potential of the Old City of Jerusalem. We have a huge, huge potential.

I worked with Professor Michael Porter, from Harvard Business School, in developing an economic model. Jerusalem has to play the role it did two or three thousand years ago, as a destination for pilgrims and tourists and people who want to taste the values and the experience and the culture and the religious and the historical competitive advantages we have. We have the best location in the world. The best brand in the world. Amazingly enough, if you compare where we are today to the potential of other cities -- Rome has 40 million tourists a year, New York has 47 million tourists a year, Paris and London have over 40. Jerusalem has 2 million tourists. I set a goal of 10 million tourists [by] the next decade. ... That's our goal.

FP: But much of the conflict that has emerged during the time you've been mayor has been over building. It has been with the ultra-Orthodox community and also with the Palestinians. I wonder if you can contextualize the incidents, the car park and the Shepherd Hotel [in which the municipal government approved renovating the building, located in a Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem, for Jewish settlers], within the broader goal of economic revitalization? And preserving the city's balance?

NB: It's not even rounding errors, relative to what we have on the table.

This summer, we broke records in terms of the number of people coming to cultural events in the city of Jerusalem; we had hundreds of thousands of people, more than we had in prior years, enjoying the city of Jerusalem. We had festivals, we had street parties, and new products -- a dramatic increase in the number of people coming to the city of Jerusalem.

That's the real news. And I'm very happy with the progress we've been making.

FP: Recently Israeli police shut down cultural events that Palestinians were having when Jerusalem was named city of the year for culture by an Arab group. Do you think that was a mistake?

NB: It was illegal, and the police didn't allow it to happen.

FP: Why was it illegal?

NB: Because if somebody wants to do something, they must get the proper licenses. Any event happening in Jerusalem has to get proper licenses from the municipality, the police, to make sure it's appropriate. It's common practice in every city in the world. And people want to take their liberty to do things illegally and independently of the municipality and the government -- every country in the world will not allow that to happen.

FP: In the 2003 road map for peace it says one of Israel's obligations is to build and reopen Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. Do you have any plans for that? Is that a concern?

NB: What kind of institutions are you referring to?

FP: I believe in the road map it refers to a Palestinian chamber of commerce and other closed and shuttered institutions in Israel.

NB: Well, when we get to that phase, let's discuss it.

But right now in Jerusalem, we're developing our economy, our services to different residents. My charter is first to help my residents and help the tourists and open up Jerusalem to the world. We've got all kinds of embassies in Jerusalem -- not embassies, consulates -- and those we want to bring to Jerusalem that aren't here yet.

So we assume that when there's peace, when it comes, we'll be friendly with all our allies. So we'll leave that for the right time and [for] negotiations. Jerusalem will always stay united. And Jerusalem welcomes friends to enjoy Jerusalem.

FP: You pushed back against U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's criticism of the demolition of the Palestinian homes. Do you agree with that criticism, and how do you see yourself as a player in Israeli foreign relations?

NB: Well, it's not about Hillary!

Let's get our facts right! Jerusalem has to be managed as a city. We have to build schools; we have to build roads. We have to make sure people properly get their licenses and that people obey the law. And in many of the cases, when people build illegally, and it's on the account of their neighbors, and it's the account of the vision, they have a problem not with me; they have a problem with the law. And the planning process that we're now expanding.

And so, the city doesn't stand still. Especially not Jerusalem. In the last 50 years, the Arab population grew dramatically, even more than the Jewish population, and it's still growing. And that's fine. And my role is to serve them.

However, things have to be done under law, and the same way that [New York] Mayor [Michael] Bloomberg would treat illegal buildings in Central Park, I am obliged as mayor to manage the city day to day, with no political agenda. I'm looking at this in the eyes of the law and in the eyes of a mayor who is committed! Committed to serve all my residents honestly and fairly, according to the law. And my point is you can't freeze the world. You have to make sure things are built legally and properly. And the fact of the matter is, we are dramatically improving the planning process and the licenses for West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem because I want the city to become successful. And I do not accept any criticism that we're not obliged to work under the law. We have to work under the law. And that's proper law. No politics.