Voice

Can the Cairo location be overcome?

 I am unequivocally enthusiastic about the Obama administration's plans to deliver a major address to the Muslim world -- a speech I expect will be modeled along the Philadelphia speech on race, and which will hopefully present a constructive challenge to all involved.   I'm less thrilled by the choice of Cairo to deliver the speech.  But hopefully Obama and his team can turn the challenges posed by the location to their advantage.

I imagine that the choice of Cairo came about by process of elimination. They probably wanted it to be a core Arab country, since he already spoke in Turkey and presumably will go on a homecoming trip to Indonesia down the road. Saudi Arabia is a non-starter, the other Gulf states are too small to carry the weight, and no North African states really fit the bill. Lebanon has an election coming up and a host of its own issues. Tehran... wouldn't that be a corker, but no.   I had been hoping for Jerusalem -- talk about high impact -- but that would have been a security nightmare, a political football, and at any rate would have turned it into an "Israeli-Palestinian" event instead of a Muslim world event.  Ditto for Baghdad -- security, plus it would become an "Iraq" event.  Jordan would have been good, I think, but Egypt is a weightier and richer location in Arab political and cultural terms.  So there you go. 

So what's wrong with Cairo?  Let me count the ways...  The main problem, of course, is Mubarak's repressive regime.  It's difficult to stomach rewarding a regime which has been systematically rolling back its limited democratic opening of a few years ago.  The choice of Cairo is already being interpreted by many Arabs and Egyptians as proof that Obama has abandoned democracy and human rights promotion.   A Presidential speech in Cairo will inevitably be compared to the 2005 speech by Condoleeza Rice calling for democracy in the Arab world.  Never mind that the Bush administration did very little to actually advance the cause of democracy in the region, barely objected to Mubarak's crackdown midway through the 2005 Parliamentary elections and the escalating repression which followed, and by the January 2006 Hamas electoral victory had abandoned even its democratizing pretensions. The rhetoric will be compared and contrasted.

A secondary but equally serious problem is Mubarak's foreign policy.  The Egyptians have been pushing hard on precisely the "moderate vs. radical" framing which I think Obama hopes to and needs to overcome.  Egypt has over the last few months embodied the old school approach to regional politics, even more than the Saudis -- recall that it was Mubarak who tried hardest to wreck the Doha Arab Summit.  Mubarak is deeply skeptical of the outreach to Iran and has been waging an over-the-top public campaign against Hezbollah and Iran.  It earned great Arab popular outrage for its policing of the tunnels into Gaza, to the point that the Egyptians are now widely seen as Israel's policemen.  And it seems to have badly mismanaged the Palestinian unity talks.   Choosing Cairo could therefore reinforce the Bush-era Arab divisions and undermine the hope for a genuinely new approach. 

So how to turn these challenges into opportunities?  Not by ignoring them.  Instead, they could be defused simply by acknowledging them and taking them head-on.  Obama could take advantage of the location to forcefully speak out in favor of democratization and human rights.  He could point out and favorably cite Rice's remarks, acknowledge the weak follow-through, and vow to do better by being more pragmatic and cooperative.  If he wanted to be really bold, he could reach out to the Muslim Brotherhood as an example of an organization facing a choice between "resistance" and "constructive partnership", and criticize the Egyptian regime's repression of the Brotherhood at a time when it was trying to play the democratic game.   He could do the same on the foreign policy front, reframing the moderate/radical divide into something more constructive. 

If he does some of that with his usual dexterity, then the Cairo location could go from a negative to a net positive -- and set the stage for the real purpose of the address, which I assume will be to fundamentally reframe America's approach to its relations with the Islamic world.  As to what that should look like, I'll save more thoughts for another day. 

Marc Lynch

Tough times for the Awakenings -- crisis or opportunity?

 Like most people who follow Iraq, I've been watching the mounting tensions surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence with some concern.   I don't think that we're seeing the "great unravelling" quite yet, nor that we're yet seeing a return to higher levels of violence, insurgency and civil war.   But the increased violence and the growing chorus of complaints about the failures of political accommodation should be a cautionary note to the Iraqi government and to the major political players that time is running out to make the crucial political power-sharing agreements necessary before American troop withdrawals pick up their pace.

 The arrest of a leading Awakenings figure by Iraqi Security Forces which led to a highly-publicized military standoff a few weeks ago is only one instance of a wider pattern.  Tensions surrounding that arrest were exacerbated by an inflammatory blizzard of statements by Maliki and others warning that the Awakenings had been infilitrated by Baathists and al-Qaeda.  A series of attacks by unknown groups have added to the tension.  It all adds up to a general sense of apprehension, with members of the Awakenings worried about their future and many others worried that the security situation may be on the brink.

 The situation is extremely murky, and it's hard to really know anything with confidence.  What I've been seeing in the Iraqi and Arab media, and hearing from the people I've spoken with, is a wide range of competing interpretations and arguments over everything from the identity of the attackers (al-Qaeda? rival Awakenings groups? Shi'a militias looking to stir things up?) to the intentions of the Iraqi government (eliminate the Awakenings?  weed out the 'bad elements' within them? force the U.S. to take sides, and test the U.S. implementation of the SOFA?).  The high level of uncertainty and confusion is itself a significant point -- the impact of fear and uncertainty on strategic calculations should never be underestimated.

 Given all that uncertainty, it would be unwise to offer a confident assessment of what's really going on.  But the emerging crisis surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence do both seem to be primarily driven by the continuing refusal of Maliki and the Iraqi government to make meaningful political accommodations and their decision to move against at least some of the Awakenings groups at a convenient moment.  

 The official moves against the Awakenings look like salami tactics, divide and rule rather than a full-scale assault. Maliki, as in the past, seems quite happy to work with parts of the Anbar Awakenings (talk of a political deal with Ahmed Abu Risha is in the air again) even as he moves against Awakenings elsewhere.  Maliki's government sees very clearly how fragmented, mutually mistrustful and competitive the Awakenings are.  They are likely gambling that this fragmentation creates such intense coordination problems that they can take out a few of their most dangerous potential enemies here and there without triggering a widespread Sunni uprising.  Watching the reaction of the various Awakenings thus far -- as some protested angrily but others cheered -- suggests that they are right.  It's a dangerous game, though.  The question would be whether there is some tipping point, at which a large number of uncoordinated and self-interested small groups suddenly switch sides (as arguably happened in the other direction in the spring of 2007).

 It would not take a revolt en masse for a change in the status of the Awakenings to have an effect on security.  In a recent interview with al-Arabiya, Salah al-Mutlaq warned that the government's failure to deliver on its promises of security and civil jobs to the Awakenings and the arrest of a number of Awakenings leaders were spreading fear and uncertainty through their ranks. Members who aren't getting paid, see their leaders targeted, and see diminishing prospects of future payoffs could begin to fade away. They could stop performing their local security functions, allowing violent groups easier access to areas which had been off-limits for the last year or two.   Or some could return to violent action in an individual capacity -- and even if only 10% went that route, that could put 10,000 hardened fighters back into play (in addition to people recently released from the prisons, another issue which factors in here).

 The crackdown on the Awakenings has regional implications as well, particularly with the ever-skeptical Saudis who have generally supported the Awakenings movements.  The Arab press has taken careful note of their reversal of fortunes, which Adel al-Bayati in al-Quds al-Arabi calls Maliki's coup against the Awakenings.  Tareq al-Homayed, editor of the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat (which usually reflects official Saudi thinking), complains bitterly today that recent events have made his warnings from last August about the coming betrayal of the Awakenings come true.  The Awakenings were not bearing arms against the Iraqi state, argues Homayed, but rather were protecting the Iraqi state against al-Qaeda and assisting its stabilization ahead of the American withdrawal. But, he warns, narrow, sectarian perspectives in Baghdad are winning out over the Iraqi national interest with potentially devastating consequences. 

 This reflects a theme which extends beyond the Saudi sphere. Most Arab writers (for example, the Kuwaiti Shamlan Issa in al-Ittihad yesterday) point the finger at the continuing lack of progress on political accommodation and national unity -- which for them, generally means the accommodation of Sunni interests and the integration of the Awakenings.  The "resistance camp" paper al-Quds al-Arabi has been covering the "coup against the Awakenings" as closely as have the Saudi-owned media (though with a bit more schadenfreude). Many of them are reading the crackdown on the Awakenings through as unmasking the "true Shia sectarianism" of Maliki's government -- reinforcing their pre-existing, deep skepticism about the new Iraq.  

 I'm obviously worried about all of this.  I've been warning about the potential for trouble with the Awakenings project for a long time, and it would be easy to say that those predictions are now coming due.  But I think it's way too early for that -- there is still time for these troubles to demonstrate the costs of political failure and to become the spur to the needed political action. 

 That's why it's really important that the United States not now begin to hedge on its commitment to the drawdown of its forces in the face of this uptick in violence.  It is in moments like this that the credibility of commitments is made or broken.  Thus far, the signals have been very good -- consistent, clear, and tightly linked to continuing pressure on political progress.  President Obama reportedly pushed hard on the political accommodation front during his stopover in Baghdad last week, and General Odierno did very well to emphasize on CNN yesterday that the U.S. is firmly committed to removing its troops by the end of 2011.    Maliki and everyone need to take deep breath and strike power sharing deals before things go south, and understand that they will pay consequences if they don't.