Should there be Palestinian elections?

Abu Mazen calling for elections (screen capture: al-Arabiya)

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas called in an interview with al-Arabiya TV for Palestinian elections to be held under international and Arab supervision. He further called for the results of the election to be honored, and promised to surrender power in the event that Hamas should win. This could represent a breakthrough in the stalled and deteriorating intra-Palestinian political scene, and an opportunity to create a formula for all sides to agree on a way to overcome their growing differences. As my colleague Brian Katulis recently noted in a guest post here, Prime Minister Salam al-Fayyad had been one of the only major Palestinian politicians supporting holding the elections. If Abu Mazen is now on board, then the ball will go into the courts of both Hamas and Fatah.

Let's hope so, because intra-Palestinian politics have been getting worse recently. Tension between Hamas and the PA is particularly high over a series of mutual accusations of alleged armed groups operating in their respective territories. Palestinian Authority security forces have been rounding up alleged Hamas operatives in the West Bank, seizing cash and making arrests. Hamas officials in Gaza, including Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, have countered with allegations that the PA has been setting up a network of saboteurs to cause trouble in Gaza (reminiscent of the unfortunate Dahlan episodes of a few years ago). 

Meanwhile, the talks in Cairo seem endlessly stalled over the deep, fundamental disagreements between Hamas, Fatah, and the PA (and don't assume that Fatah and the PA represent the same interests these days). The last round of talks broke up after less than a day, with yet another round scheduled for the end of this month. But with insults and verbal attacks steadily escalating, along with the reciprocal arrests and accusations of subversion, the atmosphere is hardly improving. It's leading commentators to almost literally throw up their hands -- the leading Saudi journalist Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed today suggests boycotting the selfish, bickering Palestinian leadership on both sides, while the Jordanian liberal Jamil al-Nimri suggests simply that the Arabs impose a reconciliation deal on the dueling Palestinian factions since they can't achieve one themselves. 

Abu Mazen's interview may signal the possibility of achieving a minimal agreement on a caretaker government charged with preparing for new elections -- an idea which has been around for a while. That may be the only way to move forward, at this point, since the two sides simply disagree so fundamentally about the real balance of power on the ground and on core political issues. The elections are supposed to be held in January 2010, at which point Abbas loses his tenuous legal mandate (the Palestinians are already operating without a functional Parliament, and Salam al-Fayyad's government is technically illegitimate). Such a government could then facilitate reconstruction aid into Gaza regardless of whether or not it meets the standards of the U.S. Congress (there's a lot of other money out there which has been pledged, after all, especially if the U.S. doesn't actively try and block its distribution). 

But this in turn would only work in the context of clear progress towards a two-state solution. Suggestions to postpone Israeli-Palestinian talks until after the Palestinian elections should be absolutely rejected. Without clear evidence of progress, Hamas would likely be in a position to score much greater gains... which would frankly be a useful point of leverage in the negotiations, just as impending elections strengthened the hand of Iraqi negotiators in dealing with the U.S. during the SOFA talks.   

Holding such elections wouldn't be easy, as this new paper from IFES makes clear. And it would carry serious risks for all sides, including of course the possibility that Hamas would win again. But without them, I fear we are drifting towards a bloody civil war and endless political stalemate. Such elections may be the only way to translate recent improvements in security and internal movement into greater political legitimacy and more stable political institutions -- and to get past the destructive cycle of recrimination, self-interest, and hostility in which the current batch of Palestinian leaders are trapped.

Marc Lynch

Tough times for the Awakenings -- crisis or opportunity?

 Like most people who follow Iraq, I've been watching the mounting tensions surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence with some concern.   I don't think that we're seeing the "great unravelling" quite yet, nor that we're yet seeing a return to higher levels of violence, insurgency and civil war.   But the increased violence and the growing chorus of complaints about the failures of political accommodation should be a cautionary note to the Iraqi government and to the major political players that time is running out to make the crucial political power-sharing agreements necessary before American troop withdrawals pick up their pace.

 The arrest of a leading Awakenings figure by Iraqi Security Forces which led to a highly-publicized military standoff a few weeks ago is only one instance of a wider pattern.  Tensions surrounding that arrest were exacerbated by an inflammatory blizzard of statements by Maliki and others warning that the Awakenings had been infilitrated by Baathists and al-Qaeda.  A series of attacks by unknown groups have added to the tension.  It all adds up to a general sense of apprehension, with members of the Awakenings worried about their future and many others worried that the security situation may be on the brink.

 The situation is extremely murky, and it's hard to really know anything with confidence.  What I've been seeing in the Iraqi and Arab media, and hearing from the people I've spoken with, is a wide range of competing interpretations and arguments over everything from the identity of the attackers (al-Qaeda? rival Awakenings groups? Shi'a militias looking to stir things up?) to the intentions of the Iraqi government (eliminate the Awakenings?  weed out the 'bad elements' within them? force the U.S. to take sides, and test the U.S. implementation of the SOFA?).  The high level of uncertainty and confusion is itself a significant point -- the impact of fear and uncertainty on strategic calculations should never be underestimated.

 Given all that uncertainty, it would be unwise to offer a confident assessment of what's really going on.  But the emerging crisis surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence do both seem to be primarily driven by the continuing refusal of Maliki and the Iraqi government to make meaningful political accommodations and their decision to move against at least some of the Awakenings groups at a convenient moment.  

 The official moves against the Awakenings look like salami tactics, divide and rule rather than a full-scale assault. Maliki, as in the past, seems quite happy to work with parts of the Anbar Awakenings (talk of a political deal with Ahmed Abu Risha is in the air again) even as he moves against Awakenings elsewhere.  Maliki's government sees very clearly how fragmented, mutually mistrustful and competitive the Awakenings are.  They are likely gambling that this fragmentation creates such intense coordination problems that they can take out a few of their most dangerous potential enemies here and there without triggering a widespread Sunni uprising.  Watching the reaction of the various Awakenings thus far -- as some protested angrily but others cheered -- suggests that they are right.  It's a dangerous game, though.  The question would be whether there is some tipping point, at which a large number of uncoordinated and self-interested small groups suddenly switch sides (as arguably happened in the other direction in the spring of 2007).

 It would not take a revolt en masse for a change in the status of the Awakenings to have an effect on security.  In a recent interview with al-Arabiya, Salah al-Mutlaq warned that the government's failure to deliver on its promises of security and civil jobs to the Awakenings and the arrest of a number of Awakenings leaders were spreading fear and uncertainty through their ranks. Members who aren't getting paid, see their leaders targeted, and see diminishing prospects of future payoffs could begin to fade away. They could stop performing their local security functions, allowing violent groups easier access to areas which had been off-limits for the last year or two.   Or some could return to violent action in an individual capacity -- and even if only 10% went that route, that could put 10,000 hardened fighters back into play (in addition to people recently released from the prisons, another issue which factors in here).

 The crackdown on the Awakenings has regional implications as well, particularly with the ever-skeptical Saudis who have generally supported the Awakenings movements.  The Arab press has taken careful note of their reversal of fortunes, which Adel al-Bayati in al-Quds al-Arabi calls Maliki's coup against the Awakenings.  Tareq al-Homayed, editor of the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat (which usually reflects official Saudi thinking), complains bitterly today that recent events have made his warnings from last August about the coming betrayal of the Awakenings come true.  The Awakenings were not bearing arms against the Iraqi state, argues Homayed, but rather were protecting the Iraqi state against al-Qaeda and assisting its stabilization ahead of the American withdrawal. But, he warns, narrow, sectarian perspectives in Baghdad are winning out over the Iraqi national interest with potentially devastating consequences. 

 This reflects a theme which extends beyond the Saudi sphere. Most Arab writers (for example, the Kuwaiti Shamlan Issa in al-Ittihad yesterday) point the finger at the continuing lack of progress on political accommodation and national unity -- which for them, generally means the accommodation of Sunni interests and the integration of the Awakenings.  The "resistance camp" paper al-Quds al-Arabi has been covering the "coup against the Awakenings" as closely as have the Saudi-owned media (though with a bit more schadenfreude). Many of them are reading the crackdown on the Awakenings through as unmasking the "true Shia sectarianism" of Maliki's government -- reinforcing their pre-existing, deep skepticism about the new Iraq.  

 I'm obviously worried about all of this.  I've been warning about the potential for trouble with the Awakenings project for a long time, and it would be easy to say that those predictions are now coming due.  But I think it's way too early for that -- there is still time for these troubles to demonstrate the costs of political failure and to become the spur to the needed political action. 

 That's why it's really important that the United States not now begin to hedge on its commitment to the drawdown of its forces in the face of this uptick in violence.  It is in moments like this that the credibility of commitments is made or broken.  Thus far, the signals have been very good -- consistent, clear, and tightly linked to continuing pressure on political progress.  President Obama reportedly pushed hard on the political accommodation front during his stopover in Baghdad last week, and General Odierno did very well to emphasize on CNN yesterday that the U.S. is firmly committed to removing its troops by the end of 2011.    Maliki and everyone need to take deep breath and strike power sharing deals before things go south, and understand that they will pay consequences if they don't.