Talking to the Israelis

 The next stage of the Obama administration's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian front is beginning to come into somewhat sharper focus.  A key part of it can be found in today's New York Times which reports that:

"In coming weeks, senior administration officials said, the White House will begin a public-relations campaign in Israel and Arab countries to better explain Mr. Obama’s plans for a comprehensive peace agreement involving Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab world. The campaign, which will include interviews with Mr. Obama on Israeli and Arab television, amounts to a reframing of a policy that people inside and outside the administration say has become overly defined by the American pressure on Israel to halt settlement construction on the West Bank." 

I'm glad to see this, because this was one of the key recommendations of the report I co-authored with Brian Katulis in mid-July:

The Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts over the settlements are not yet concluded and must be continued in order to revive U.S. credibility in Palestine and the Arab world. But the settlements themselves are only a small portion of the problem. The time has come to pivot to the next step—a broader public outreach and strategic communications effort in the Middle East that builds on the first steps of the Obama administration. This should be supplemented by a tightly focused strategic communications effort directed toward building support for a two-state solution among Palestinians and the broader Arab world. Such a campaign cannot wait for an actual negotiated agreement that can then be “sold.” It must begin now to build the foundations of public support and to prepare public opinion for the likely concessions involved in the likely deal.

It seems that this time has indeed now come.  There's an important difference between this and the whole wave of "Why Won't Obama Talk to Israel" commentary over the last few weeks.  Those commentators basically were urging the Obama administration to stop challenging Israel's settlement policy and battling with the Netanyahu government in public -- i.e. to reassure Israelis and to ease the public pressure to stop settlement activity and (now) unconstructive moves in East Jerusalem.  

This, I suspect, is something very different: a strategic communications campaign designed to build support for a push towards a two-state solution among key Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab constituencies.  Reassurance, yes, but within the context of explaining the  American view of the urgency of the moment for a push towards peace -- and of building support for, and even a demand for, such a push towards peace among those publics.  There are many tools which could be deployed in such a campaign -- not just the television interviews mentioned in the article, but the whole portfolio of campaign outreach tools, including new media, which could be deployed in support of such a strategic objective.   

As I put it to a number of officials and other folks over the last few weeks, don't they think that six months from now -- when they are either trying to sell a final status deal to skeptical Israeli and Palestinian publics, or are digging through the ruins of failed negotiations --  they will wish that six months ago they had begun such a strategic communications campaign?   I'm cheered to see that they agree. That alone won't be enough, obviously, but  it's an important component for any strategy which has any hope of succeeding.  

 By the way, I'm not surprised by Saud al-Faisal's cold response to American calls for confidence building measures towards Israel either.  Here's what I predicted last month:

Having pressured Israel over settlements, the US has already begun to turn to Arabs and demand some gestures in exchange. They will most likely be unreceptive, and are unlikely to offer major new overtures to Israel in the absence of a wider push towards a final status agreement or demonstrable progress on the issue of settlements well beyond what is currently on offer. But if they respond negatively, they will have given the Netanyahu government – and its supporters in the United States – the excuse they need to refuse further concessions.

This does not mean that Arab governments need to make premature offerings on the core issues of normalisation with Israel – opening embassies, extending recognition, and so forth. Such a transformed relationship should come at the end of the peace process, not the beginning. But they should be prepared to enter into a revived round of multilateral negotiations over regional issues with Israel. They should respond to requests to offer increased financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. And it would serve them well to do the Americans an unasked-for favour by combining increased funding with redoubled efforts to achieve a Palestinian national unity government – instead of using Hamas and Fatah as proxies for their own political battles.

 The Saudi response, as a first move, is just as expected, then.  The real question is whether they -- and other Arab leaders -- have mapped out their second move, and prepared for the political maneuvering to come.  

Marc Lynch

Tough times for the Awakenings -- crisis or opportunity?

 Like most people who follow Iraq, I've been watching the mounting tensions surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence with some concern.   I don't think that we're seeing the "great unravelling" quite yet, nor that we're yet seeing a return to higher levels of violence, insurgency and civil war.   But the increased violence and the growing chorus of complaints about the failures of political accommodation should be a cautionary note to the Iraqi government and to the major political players that time is running out to make the crucial political power-sharing agreements necessary before American troop withdrawals pick up their pace.

 The arrest of a leading Awakenings figure by Iraqi Security Forces which led to a highly-publicized military standoff a few weeks ago is only one instance of a wider pattern.  Tensions surrounding that arrest were exacerbated by an inflammatory blizzard of statements by Maliki and others warning that the Awakenings had been infilitrated by Baathists and al-Qaeda.  A series of attacks by unknown groups have added to the tension.  It all adds up to a general sense of apprehension, with members of the Awakenings worried about their future and many others worried that the security situation may be on the brink.

 The situation is extremely murky, and it's hard to really know anything with confidence.  What I've been seeing in the Iraqi and Arab media, and hearing from the people I've spoken with, is a wide range of competing interpretations and arguments over everything from the identity of the attackers (al-Qaeda? rival Awakenings groups? Shi'a militias looking to stir things up?) to the intentions of the Iraqi government (eliminate the Awakenings?  weed out the 'bad elements' within them? force the U.S. to take sides, and test the U.S. implementation of the SOFA?).  The high level of uncertainty and confusion is itself a significant point -- the impact of fear and uncertainty on strategic calculations should never be underestimated.

 Given all that uncertainty, it would be unwise to offer a confident assessment of what's really going on.  But the emerging crisis surrounding the Awakenings and the uptick in violence do both seem to be primarily driven by the continuing refusal of Maliki and the Iraqi government to make meaningful political accommodations and their decision to move against at least some of the Awakenings groups at a convenient moment.  

 The official moves against the Awakenings look like salami tactics, divide and rule rather than a full-scale assault. Maliki, as in the past, seems quite happy to work with parts of the Anbar Awakenings (talk of a political deal with Ahmed Abu Risha is in the air again) even as he moves against Awakenings elsewhere.  Maliki's government sees very clearly how fragmented, mutually mistrustful and competitive the Awakenings are.  They are likely gambling that this fragmentation creates such intense coordination problems that they can take out a few of their most dangerous potential enemies here and there without triggering a widespread Sunni uprising.  Watching the reaction of the various Awakenings thus far -- as some protested angrily but others cheered -- suggests that they are right.  It's a dangerous game, though.  The question would be whether there is some tipping point, at which a large number of uncoordinated and self-interested small groups suddenly switch sides (as arguably happened in the other direction in the spring of 2007).

 It would not take a revolt en masse for a change in the status of the Awakenings to have an effect on security.  In a recent interview with al-Arabiya, Salah al-Mutlaq warned that the government's failure to deliver on its promises of security and civil jobs to the Awakenings and the arrest of a number of Awakenings leaders were spreading fear and uncertainty through their ranks. Members who aren't getting paid, see their leaders targeted, and see diminishing prospects of future payoffs could begin to fade away. They could stop performing their local security functions, allowing violent groups easier access to areas which had been off-limits for the last year or two.   Or some could return to violent action in an individual capacity -- and even if only 10% went that route, that could put 10,000 hardened fighters back into play (in addition to people recently released from the prisons, another issue which factors in here).

 The crackdown on the Awakenings has regional implications as well, particularly with the ever-skeptical Saudis who have generally supported the Awakenings movements.  The Arab press has taken careful note of their reversal of fortunes, which Adel al-Bayati in al-Quds al-Arabi calls Maliki's coup against the Awakenings.  Tareq al-Homayed, editor of the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat (which usually reflects official Saudi thinking), complains bitterly today that recent events have made his warnings from last August about the coming betrayal of the Awakenings come true.  The Awakenings were not bearing arms against the Iraqi state, argues Homayed, but rather were protecting the Iraqi state against al-Qaeda and assisting its stabilization ahead of the American withdrawal. But, he warns, narrow, sectarian perspectives in Baghdad are winning out over the Iraqi national interest with potentially devastating consequences. 

 This reflects a theme which extends beyond the Saudi sphere. Most Arab writers (for example, the Kuwaiti Shamlan Issa in al-Ittihad yesterday) point the finger at the continuing lack of progress on political accommodation and national unity -- which for them, generally means the accommodation of Sunni interests and the integration of the Awakenings.  The "resistance camp" paper al-Quds al-Arabi has been covering the "coup against the Awakenings" as closely as have the Saudi-owned media (though with a bit more schadenfreude). Many of them are reading the crackdown on the Awakenings through as unmasking the "true Shia sectarianism" of Maliki's government -- reinforcing their pre-existing, deep skepticism about the new Iraq.  

 I'm obviously worried about all of this.  I've been warning about the potential for trouble with the Awakenings project for a long time, and it would be easy to say that those predictions are now coming due.  But I think it's way too early for that -- there is still time for these troubles to demonstrate the costs of political failure and to become the spur to the needed political action. 

 That's why it's really important that the United States not now begin to hedge on its commitment to the drawdown of its forces in the face of this uptick in violence.  It is in moments like this that the credibility of commitments is made or broken.  Thus far, the signals have been very good -- consistent, clear, and tightly linked to continuing pressure on political progress.  President Obama reportedly pushed hard on the political accommodation front during his stopover in Baghdad last week, and General Odierno did very well to emphasize on CNN yesterday that the U.S. is firmly committed to removing its troops by the end of 2011.    Maliki and everyone need to take deep breath and strike power sharing deals before things go south, and understand that they will pay consequences if they don't.