I'm still recovering from my Jordan trip and will have a few comments of my own soon. But in the meantime, Daniel Levy has offered up this set of comments on the implications of the latest setback in the Hamas-Fatah talks (which I think predates this morning's report in Haaretz that the U.S. had allegedly warned the Egyptians that it opposed a national unity government agreement which did not meet the Quartet preconditions). I would only add that none of the Jordanians I spoke with -- whether Muslim Brotherhood or regime officials -- thought that a real Hamas-Fatah agreement was likely, even if a piece of paper might at some point be signed. More on that later.
Daniel Levy: The Latest Blow to Palestinian Unity Efforts
Rumors have been circulating in recent weeks of the imminent signing, in Cairo at the end of this month, of an Egyptian-brokered Palestinian reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas. There is even what purports to be an agreed draft document in existence. Over the past week, that unity deal appeared less and less likely, notably against the backdrop of the fallout from the PA’s abandonment of the Goldstone report at the UN Human Rights Council and the dramatic impact that had on the already compromised standing of the Fatah leadership (and the way it strengthened Hamas’s hand).
Well as of yesterday, the reconciliation agreement has been put on indefinite hold. PLO Chair and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas gave a televised speech in Ramallah in which he explained and defended the PA Ramallah’s position and launched a frontal verbal assault on Hamas. Within hours, Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal responded from Damascus with an assertive pushback, a withering critique of Abbas’s leadership and a definitive ‘no’ to any unity under current circumstances. Deposed Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh weighed in today from Gaza in support of Meshaal’s position, and on the flip side, some of Fatah’s leaders have begun to rally around their embattled leader.
It is not clear what Egypt’s next steps will be or how this will unfold in the coming weeks. Marc Lynch has been kind of enough to allow me to post this guest blog with five observations on this latest deterioration in the internal Palestinian political situation.
1. Abbas tries to shore up his base, Hamas overplays its hand
Mahmoud Abbas’s account of the PA/PLO’s management of the Goldstone report and his insistence that it will now be acted upon will do little to sway or convince his domestic political opponents or just about anyone in the NGO/human rights community, or third party/independent political forces in the Palestinian territories or diaspora. But they were apparently not his target audience in yesterday’s speech – rather, he seemed to be appealing to his home base inside Fatah.
To recover from recent setbacks, Abbas has apparently decided he needs to first of all re-establish his standing inside Fatah, and he has started to do that by taking off the gloves and offering lots of red meat in his attacks on the enemy… not Israel, stupid, but Hamas. After a summer of impressive politicking by Abbas with the Fatah conference and filling of vacancies in the PLO’s Executive Committee, everything was beginning to fall apart as key Fatah members joined the unprecedented outpouring of anger expressed over the PLO’s Goldstone decision.
Abbas provided just enough yesterday to give those parts of the Palestinian press that are PA-controlled (and who also found themselves having to join the criticism), and the PA-Fatah nomenklatura a just-about-plausible narrative to fight back with.
Abbas received help from an
unlikely source – Khalid Meshaal, who overplayed his hand by abruptly
saying ‘no’ to reconciliation, thereby allowing some of the blame
in the public debate to shift from Fatah to Hamas. This was picked up
eagerly by the pro-Abbas elements of the PA-Fatah echo chamber, for
instance in today’s editorial in the pro-PA Palestinian al-Quds.
2. The Abbas-Fatah-PA Position
Even though Abbas came out punching in his press conference and has shored up some Fatah support, it is still very unlikely to be enough to reverse the trends of the past weeks which run heavily against his leadership group. Even yesterday’s statement failed to provide a reasonable explanation on the Goldstone affair, to really accept responsibility, or to draw a line under this episode. The criticism of Abbas & Co. in the past fortnight has been dramatic. The handling of the Goldstone report was the latest and by far the most damning of a series of setbacks.
First Abbas attended the New
York trilateral meeting without initially securing an Israeli settlement
freeze, contradicting his own commitments (and the claim that he was
just attending a meeting, not resuming negotiations–while actually
quite logical and diplomatic–was not effective in political terms).
Even prior to New York, a powerful anti-PA narrative existed regarding
its ongoing security and economic cooperation (for the critics, read:
collaboration) with Israel, suggesting the PA was acting for personal
and patronage self-interests, and as a subcontractor of the occupation,
rather than standing up for and defending Palestinian interests. Then
came the release of 20 female Palestinian prisoners in exchange for
Hamas producing video evidence of Gilad Shalit’s well-being (and Abbas
hosting the released prisoners in Ramallah fooled nobody).
The Goldstone debacle was the
straw that broke the camel’s back, and yesterday will do little to
reverse that tide. Abbas continues to be in an unenviable position.
That is likely to remain the case until there is either a shakeup in
Palestinian politics or until Fatah presents and acts on an alternative
to its longstanding strategy of being exclusively negotiations-dependent.
The Fatah leadership is simply still bought-in to a political strategy
that has been fatally undermined and flawed, namely that with US support
it will negotiate with Israel a way out of occupation and to independence,
and will do so without a serious effort to mobilize international pressure
or domestic resistance whether of the non-violent or violent kind (I’m
not advocating any of the above, just setting out the debate).
The US, put simply, has not
delivered Israel. The Israelis are not dismantling the occupation of
their own free will, and the PA-Fatah strategy has precious little traction
with its own people.
3. Can any good come out of this latest spat?
In actual fact, the collapse
of the latest Cairo effort may not be such a bad thing. The draft document
under discussion raised more questions than it answered, and a unity
effort based on such a document would likely have collapsed in very
short order. One of Abu Mazen’s closest confidants was heard recently
to say that if the previous unity agreement lasted three months, this
one would have barely lasted three days. Partly this reflects the state
of play and more deepened animosity between the key actors in Fatah
and Hamas. But it also has something to do with the mediation effort.
The Egyptian monopoly in leading
the reconciliation effort is just not helpful or conducive to success.
Egypt has a role to play but it cannot be the exclusive mediator. Following
the visit of Saudi King Abdullah to Damascus last week and the ongoing
rapprochement between the Syrians and the Saudis, there is a strong
case to be made for broadening the mediation effort to include these
two key actors and perhaps others in addition, notably Turkey, Qatar,
and if they were willing to play a role, Jordan too.
A reconstituted Palestinian polity and national movement is likely to be crucial to any successful peace effort, and an optimistic take on the latest set-back to unity is that it could presage a redoubled effort in the future that is more effectively and solidly structured.
4. A Pyrrhic victory for Israel
The Israeli government has
largely refrained from commenting thus far on these developments. If
previous positions are anything to go by (and in this case, they most
certainly are), then Israel’s political leadership will be encouraging
further Palestinian division and enjoying every moment of it. At first
glance, it would seem to make sense for Israel to favor a divided, and
thereby weakened, Palestinian interlocutor/adversary.
For any Israeli government
seeking to maintain the status quo and avoid any hard choices on peace,
a logic of win-win may even apply here. If the Palestinians remain divided
then Israel can bemoan the lack of domestic legitimacy or capacity to
implement of its Palestinian partner (“What’s the point of cutting
a deal with Abbas? He can’t deliver anyway,” they would say).
If there is a unity agreement, then Israel can claim that the Palestinian interlocutor has done a deal with the devil (as in Hamas), is now tainted with terrorism, and is therefore no longer a legitimate negotiating partner. In today’s circumstance, one can even throw a further ‘win’ into the mix – the Palestinian political standoff will make it even more difficult for Abbas to begin negotiations without a settlement freeze, Israel ain’t doing a settlement freeze, and the Palestinian can be blamed for the lack of progress!
The Israeli government’s
standard modus operandi would now be to very publicly declare the need
to strengthen its Palestinian partner, throw them a few economic bones,
maybe a new frequency for a second mobile phone operator, or even a
minor and highly sectarian prisoner release. The entirely predictable
effect of this is, of course, to further stigmatize and delegitimize
the Palestinian recipient of this faux largesse.
Such a strategy may all seem
terribly smart to its Israeli designers but I would suggest that this
is an enormously costly and tragic pyrrhic victory. The net effect of
this ongoing approach is to render ever less viable and likely a two-state
solution. That in itself is far more threatening to Israel’s future
than to the Palestinians (who, unlike any adherent to Zionism, can accept
or even prefer a one state outcome).
5. What does it all mean for America’s peace efforts?
I’ll keep this brief. Abbas is now in an even worse position to sign up for the new formula of resuming negotiations sans settlement freeze. Such bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would anyway now be rendered even less likely to produce a groundbreaking or even constructive outcome.
I’ve argued elsewhere that for all the criticism that it has encountered, the Mitchell approach actually has its advantages and has created some useful potential pivots for the US peace effort. The diplomatic shuttling of Special Envoy Senator George Mitchell between the parties is likely to prove more productive at this stage than getting the parties to sit together. The most important conversations will anyway need to take place between America and each of its interlocutors – the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Arab states. Those conversations should now be shifting to a more sustained focus on the nature and details of a post-occupation two-state reality.
The US needs to continue to work towards an appropriate moment, in the not too distant future, for presenting an internationally backed American implementation proposal for a viable and dignified two-state outcome.
In that effort, the lack of
a resumption of direct talks does not represent a setback, but the deepening
division inside the Palestinian polity does. The Obama Administration
cannot continue for much longer to sit this one out (de facto encouraging
the split). A public U-turn is unnecessary; rather, the US should be
quietly encouraging its allies and non-allies in the region to step
into the breech (the aforementioned Saudis, Syrians, Turks, Qataris
…etc) to supplement Egyptian efforts, and to help restructure a Palestinian
national movement that can carry forward a serious peace effort.
Daniel Levy is a Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Middle East Task Force at the New America Foundation and Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation. He blogs at Prospects for Peace.