Voice

The U.S. is too secure for its own good

You know the old line: "you can't be too thin or too rich?" The foreign policy equivalent would be "you can't be too secure."  Because there is no agency or institution that can protect states from each other, realists generally view security as the highest aim of states. The need for security encourages governments to remain watchful about emerging dangers and to avoid squandering resources unnecessarily on fanciful projects or special indulgences. The need to compete effectively in the harsh world of international politics imposes a certain discipline on domestic political quarrels, and encourages competing parties to limit partisan backbiting for the good of the country.  When people say that "politics stops at the water's edge," that's what they are talking about.

Nonetheless, being too secure has a downside: It allows U.S. politicians to do and say a lot of stupid things without thinking that they might actually be putting the country at risk. Case in point: the Republican Party's absurd objections to the New Start treaty with Russia, which seem to be based solely on the desire to prevent the Obama administration from logging even a modest political success.

The New Start treaty is not a major strategic breakthrough, but that's just the point. It's a modest agreement that will save us some money in the long-term, reduce strategic uncertainty, make it easier to enlist Russian cooperation on other issues, and make the United States look a bit less hypocritical when we try to convince other states to forego nuclear weapons themselves. But none of that matters to today's Grand Obstructionist Party (GOP) leaders, in sharp contrast to isolated Republic moderates like Richard Lugar (R-IN) or veteran officials like Henry Kissinger or James Baker, all of whom support the treaty.

But the taproot of this foolishness isn't just the poisonous know-nothingism of today's Republican Party. The underlying permissive condition for this behavior is America's extraordinarily secure international position. Although we are constantly bombarded with alarmist reports about grave dangers facing the nation from outside, the United States remains remarkably secure compared with other states. The U.S. economy is still the world's largest and most diverse, despite its recent woes, and it is still more than twice as large as the number 2 and number 3 economic powers (China and Japan). We spend more on national security than the rest of the world put together, are the only state with global power projection capabilities, and have the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Many of the world's significant military powers are our allies, so our actual lead is even greater. There are no major powers near to our shores, and we are insulated from many global problems by two enormous oceanic moats.

The United States does face a modest problem from terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, but that is due in good part to our own ill-advised meddling in the Middle East and elsewhere. And assuming it never acquires a nuclear weapon (which we can prevent by working with others to enhance nuclear security around the world), Al Qaeda is not an existential threat to our prosperity or way of life. Even if all their thwarted plots had succeeded--and I'm very glad they didn't--the damage would pale in comparison to the costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Indeed, if history is any guide, international terrorism at its worst poses less threat to American life than auto accidents, nut allergies, or falling in a bathtub.

In short, although perfect security is beyond anyone's grasp, the United States is as secure as any state could ever expect to be. That's a wonderful thing for us Americans, but it has at least two negative consequences. First, because the United States doesn't have to worry very much about protecting its own shores from a serious military challenge, it is free to run around the world getting involved in various problems, even when it has lost sight of any underlying strategic rationale and has no clear idea why it is doing these things. For example, when you are really secure, very powerful, and have a lot of wealth to draw upon, you can keep extending the deadline in places like Afghanistan almost indefinitely, even when the costs of doing so far outweigh any likely benefits.

The second problem with being too secure is that it allows politicians to use foreign policy as a partisan political football, and to indulge special interests and other ideological fixations. When a state faces real dangers -- as the United States did during World War II or the Cold War -- it has to set priorities carefully and avoid squandering resources on whims. But when a state is as secure as America is today, then partisan politics will loom larger and become nastier. Without a "clear and present danger" to focus the national mind, presidents find it harder to face down pressure from groups with strong but focused agendas, whether the issue on the table is defense spending, Middle East policy, or trade. Moreover, exploiting foreign policy issues in order to bash the president doesn't seem to place the country in immediate danger, so members of the opposition can do so without being accused of compromising national security.

Don't get me wrong: I'm not arguing that the United States would be better off if we faced a really serious external threat again. On balance, I'd rather be strong, wealthy, and insulated from major dangers. But there is a real cost to our present condition: we end up doing a lot of things we shouldn't, and we don't do a lot of things we should. The end result is that our position in the world will gradually erode, and then we'll have to start taking this stuff seriously again.

Stephen M. Walt

Keep America strong: Make cuts at the Defense Department

I'm off to Brown University today to participate in a public lecture on "Nation-Building in Afghanistan" with Ambassador James Dobbins, so I've no time to write a lengthy post. Instead, I'm going to paste in the text of an open letter to the Bowles/Simpson commission on deficit reduction, which was signed by a number of well-known national security scholars. I was pleased to be among their ranks, and our central point is that any serious effort at deficit reduction has to include defense cuts, and that it is possible to do that without endangering U.S. national security.  You can find an official link to the text here, and the letter reads as follows:

Dear Co-chairman Bowles and Co-chairman Simpson:

We are writing to you as experts in national security and defense economics to convey our views on the national security implications of the Commission's work and especially the need for achieving responsible reductions in military spending. In this regard, we appreciate the initiative you have taken in your 10 November 2010 draft proposal to the Commission. It begins a necessary process of serious reflection, debate, and action.

The vitality of our economy is the cornerstone of our nation's strength. We share the Commission's desire to bring our financial house into order. Doing so is not merely a question of economics. Reducing the national debt is also a national security imperative.

To date, the Obama administration has exempted the Defense Department from any budget reductions. This is short-sighted: It makes it more difficult to accomplish the task of restoring our economic strength, which is the underpinning of our military power.

As the rest of the nation labors to reduce its debt burden, the current plan is to boost the base DOD budget by 10 percent in real terms over the next decade. This would come on top of the nearly 52 percent real increase in base military spending since 1998. (When war costs are included the increase has been much greater: 95 percent.)

We appreciate Secretary Gates' efforts to reform the Pentagon's business and acquisition practices. However, even if his reforms fulfill their promise, the current plan does not translate them into budgetary savings that contribute to solving our deficit problem. Their explicit aim is to free funds for other uses inside the Pentagon. This is not good enough.

Granting defense a special dispensation puts at risk the entire deficit reduction effort. Defense spending today constitutes over 55 percent of discretionary spending and 23 percent of the federal budget. An exemption for defense not only undermines the broader call for fiscal responsibility, but also makes overall budget restraint much harder as a practical economic and political matter.

We need not put our economic power at risk in this way. Today the United States possesses a wide margin of global military superiority. The defense budget can bear significant reduction without compromising our essential security.

We recognize that larger military adversaries may rise to face us in the future. But the best hedge against this possibility is vigilance and a vibrant economy supporting a military able to adapt to new challenges as they emerge.

We can achieve greater defense economy today in several ways, all of which we urge you to consider seriously. We need to be more realistic in the goals we set for our armed forces and more selective in our choices regarding their use abroad. We should focus our military on core security goals and on those current and emerging threats that most directly affect us.

We also need to be more judicious in our choice of security instruments when dealing with international challenges. Our armed forces are a uniquely expensive asset and for some tasks no other instrument will do. For many challenges, however, the military is not the most cost-effective choice. We can achieve greater efficiency today without diminishing our security by better discriminating between vital, desirable, and unnecessary military missions and capabilities.

There is a variety of specific options that would produce savings, some of which we describe below. The important point, however, is a firm commitment to seek savings through a reassessment of our defense strategy, our global posture, and our means of producing and managing military power.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have required our military to prepare for and conduct more types of missions in more places around the world. The Pentagon's task list now includes not only preventive war, regime change, and nation building, but also vague efforts to "shape the strategic environment" and stem the emergence of threats. It is time to prune some of these missions and restore an emphasis on defense and deterrence.

U.S. combat power dramatically exceeds that of any plausible combination of conventional adversaries. To cite just one example, Secretary Gates has observed that the U.S. Navy is today as capable as the next 13 navies combined, most of which are operated by our allies. We can safely save by trimming our current margin of superiority.

America's permanent peacetime military presence abroad is largely a legacy of the Cold War. It can be reduced without undermining the essential security of the United States or its allies.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limits of military power. Avoiding these types of operation globally would allow us to roll back the recent increase in the size of our Army and Marine Corps.

The Pentagon's acquisition process has repeatedly failed, routinely delivering weapons and equipment late, over cost, and less capable than promised. Some of the most expensive systems correspond to threats that are least prominent today and unlikely to regain prominence soon. In these cases, savings can be safely realized by cancelling, delaying, or reducing procurement or by seeking less costly alternatives.

Recent efforts to reform Defense Department financial management and acquisition practices must be strengthened. And we must impose budget discipline to trim service redundancies and streamline command, support systems, and infrastructure.

Change along these lines is bound to be controversial. Budget reductions are never easy - no less for defense than in any area of government. However, fiscal realities call on us to strike a new balance between investing in military power and attending to the fundamentals of national strength on which our true power rests. We can achieve safe savings in defense if we are willing to rethink how we produce military power and how, why, and where we put it to use.

Sincerely,

Gordon Adams, American University
Robert Art, Brandeis University
Deborah Avant, UC Irvine
Andrew Bacevich, Boston University
Richard Betts, Columbia University
Linda Bilmes, Kennedy School, Harvard University
Steven Clemons, New America Foundation
Joshua Cohen, Stanford University and Boston Review
Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives
Owen R. Cote Jr., Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Michael Desch, University of Notre Dame
Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University
Benjamin H. Friedman, Cato Institute
Lt. Gen. (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
David Gold, Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School
William Hartung, Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation
David Hendrickson, Colorado College
Michael Intriligator, UCLA and Milken Institute
Robert Jervis, Columbia University
Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University
Elizabeth Kier, University of Washington
Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress
Peter Krogh, Georgetown University
Walter LaFeber, Cornell University
Richard Ned Lebow, Dartmouth College
Col. (USA, Ret.) Douglas Macgregor
Scott McConnell, The American Conservative
John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
Steven Metz, national security analyst and writer
Janne Nolan, American Security Project
Robert Paarlberg, Wellesley College and Harvard University
Paul Pillar, Georgetown University
Barry Posen, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
Daryl Press, Dartmouth College
David Rieff, author
Thomas Schelling, University of Maryland
Jack Snyder, Columbia University
J. Ann Tickner, University of Southern California
Robert Tucker, Johns Hopkins University
Stephen Van Evera, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Stephen Walt, Harvard University
Kenneth Waltz, Columbia University
Cindy Williams, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**This letter reflects the opinions of the individual signatories. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only.**