Snapshots of Middle East public opinion

I've been busy the last few days with a trip to Iowa -- thanks University of Iowa and Drake University for a gracious welcome!; a panel discussion today on the regional politics of the Syrian crisis (video will be posted soon); a few video interviews for a new series of POMEPS Conversations with Middle East experts (to be launched shortly);  and updates to the POMEPS Arab uprising bibliography (coming soon).  But I wanted to briefly note two intriguing public opinion surveys relevant to Middle East policy debate --- one from the United States, and one from Jordan. Both suggest reasons for doubting popular calls for an activist American policy towards Syria and the broader Middle East.... for better or for worse.  

First:  Jordan.  The University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies, which for the last couple of decades has been the most reliable public opinion survey research unit in the Kingdom, just released a fascinating report on Jordanian attitudes towards Syria. Jordan has been one of the states most directly affected by the escalating flow of refugees from the Syrian catastrophe.  After absorbing refugee waves from Palestine and from Iraq, the Syrian influx is putting extraordinary pressure on the Hashemite Kingdom -- although this is too often used an excuse by a regime causing more than enough problems for itself (see: disastrous new election law or absurd new restrictions on online media).   Opponents of reform have found ample opportunity to argue that the current crisis makes it too dangerous to open up... a perspective which I fear will only exacerbate Jordan's internal crisis, but to which security officials cling.  (I continue to believe that Syrian refugees, while a real problem, barely crack the top ten list of problems confronting Jordan -- more attention should be paid to corruption, economic policy, the useless Parliament, tribal unrest, the crackdown on media and internet freedoms, and so much more). 

The CSS survey found that Jordanians are not in the mood to host yet another wave of refugees. 80% of the Jordanian public wants Syrians confined to refugee camps, and 65% doesn't want Jordan to welcome any more Syrian refugees at all. 74% see Syrian refugees outside of designated camps as a threat to Jordan's stability -- with greater numbers agreeing with that stance in the north where most of the Syrian refugees are concentrated. Syrians and their advocates will be profoundly depressed b these results.  

Jordanians are also sharply divided, according to the survey, about what is even going on in their northern neighbor.  45% say that the events in Syria represent a popular revolution, while 41% describe it as a foreign conspiracy.  57% think that the Syrian opposition is tied to foreign powers, a sharp departure from earlier perceptions.   As to what to do, 54% of Jordanians say they would like to see Bashar al-Assad leave office.  But only 5% express support for foreign military intervention --- worth keeping in mind when you hear people saying that Arabs are calling out for American action in Syria. Such findings are also food for thought for those (such as me) who have argued that al-Jazeera and other transnational Arab media have a key role in shaping Arab public opinion --- after a year of non-stop advocacy for the Syrian opposition, how is it that al-Jazeera has only convinced 45% of Jordanians of its interpretative frame?

Another survey on Jordanian opinion towards Syria was also released recently, this one from the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha (thanks to friends on Twitter for drawing this one to my attention last night).  Its findings were rather dramatically different.  In that survey, 56% of Jordanians described events in Syria as a popular revolution (the narrative preferred by Doha-based al-Jazeera) and only 31% as a foreign conspiracy.  82% wanted Bashar al-Assad to step down,but only 3% supported foreign intervention to accomplish that goal.   

Over in Egypt, al-Ahram reports that 77% of Egyptians approve of President Mohammed el-Morsi's performance in office.  This is the first poll of its kind that I've seen since his electoral victory;  it's done by an organization about which I don't know much, so I can't speak to its credibility.   To the extent that the poll is considered credible -- and there's a long history of doubtful Egyptian opinion polling -- these results would suggest support far beyond either Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood base or the 51% who voted for him in the hotly contested Presidential runoff.  60% of the respondents said they would vote for Morsi if the elections were held tomorrow-- far more than his share of the vote in the actual elections, but considerably below his approval rating. But I would like to see a lot more polling before coming to any conclusions about solid trends in Egyptian opinion on these matters. 

Meanwhile, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has just released its regular survey of American views of the world.   While my FP pal Dan Drezner has already related key results of that suvey relevant to the presidential election, I thought I would just highlight some of the key Middle East related results.  I was struck by the fact that 67% now see the Iraq war as "not worth it" -- the highest result since the Chicago Council started asking that question on 2003, and crucial context for any discussion of U.S. policy options towards Syria. 68% believe (correctly) that the invasion of Iraq has not had a positive effect on the spread of democracy in the Middle East -- neocon fantasies aside, if anything Iraq's horrors provided a cautionary tale to most in the region about what could go wrong and probably helped prop up authoritarian regimes in the region by making them look better in comparison. 

Beyond the retrospective view of Iraq, 71% in the Chicago Council survey say (correctly, in my humble opinion) that the Iraq experience should make the U.S. "more cautious about the use of military force against rogue regimes."  This is consistent with a wide range of other polling, which consistently shows very low support for U.S. military action in Syria.  There is just no appetite out there for U.S. military intervention in Syria, no matter how many Washington Post opeds or John McCain speeches argue for one.  ForeignPolicy had previously reported the key findings of this survey on Syria --  a broad desire to do something, but only 22% supporting bombing Syrian targets and 14% support for U.S. troops on the ground in Syria. 

The broader theme is one of humility about what the U.S. can or should attempt to accomplish through military means abroad.  But I was also pleased to see that only 13% of Americans said that the U.S. should not have taken part at all in the Libyan intervention -- and, at the same time, that only 7% said that the U.S. should have played "a leading role."  Apparently leading from behind is just fine with Americans who don't write for the Weekly Standard or the Washington Post, especially when it works.   And it's striking that 70% oppose a U.S. military strike against Iran over its nuclear program without UN authorization. 

Beyond Syria, I was pleased to see that American opinion viewed the Arab uprisings as a positive rather than negative development, with 34% describing the Arab spring as "mostly good" and 24% as "mostly bad."   But a 13 point increase in those saying that the U.S. should end its economic support for Egypt could suggest a broader concern about trends in that transition --- or, perhaps, just a broader inward turn and reluctance to spend scarce money abroad (which I, personally, would find short-sighted).  I think turning our back on the Arab world would be a profound mistake -- but clearly, the case for a continuing American interest in partnering with Arab governments and pushing Arab democracy needs to be made. 

Both the Jordanian and the American surveys discussed here are just snapshots --- but both are revealing of some important trends. I offer them up here more as data points for ongoing discussion than as conclusive evidence.. and only wish there were more such data from the Middle East upon which to draw to credibly assess the views of Arab publics at a time when they matter more than ever.  

P.S. -- I wrote this piece a few years ago on what we can and can't learn from public opinion surveys in the Arab world.  It might still be relevant.  I'm just glad that the surveys aren't still overwhelmingly focused on America-centric questions like "how do you feel about America."

NOTE:  post updated this morning to include the ACPRS survey. 


Marc Lynch

A Reading List for the Arab Uprisings

Have you wondered how Middle East specialists have dealt with the Arab uprisings? Do you want to know how the field has responded to the scathing indictment offered by Gregory Gause in Foreign Affairs last summer that "the vast majority of academic specialists on the Arab world were as surprised as everyone else by the upheavals?" Or are you just looking for new books and articles which might be useful for course syllabi or research projects? 

With the Labor Day weekend marking the traditional launch of a new academic year, I am delighted to share the new POMEPS bibliography of academic books and journal articles about the Arab uprisings. The bibliography includes books and journal articles, and will soon be expanded to include selected policy reports written by academics. We won't try to include the many shorter articles such as those published on the Middle East Channel and other online publications. Over the summer, I edited a collection for the Project on Middle East Political Science of a set of reflections by more than two dozen leading political scientists about new research opportunities presented by the Arab uprisings. This bibliography shows a field beginning to grapple with and hopefully to deliver on those ideas.

The Arab uprisings and the political struggles which have followed should generate rich intellectual opportunities for new thinking, new research, and new ideas. No analytical consensus has emerged, nor should it any time soon. Some scholars claim theoretical vindication that so many authoritarian regimes survived the massive protest wave of 2011. Others have attempted to adapt pre-existing theories which would seem to have been contradicted rather spectacularly by events. Still others have seized the opportunity to develop new research programs around the dynamics of mobilization and contentious politics, international diffusion, information technology, transitional elections, and the role of international and transnational actors.    

The articles and books now appearing show a field of experts from a wide range of analytical and political traditions grappling with both the uprisings and the political aftermath. It's very clear that Middle East scholars did not miss the Arab uprisings because they didn't believe Arabs wanted democracy, or because they failed to observe the signs of escalating mobilization. The literature of the last two decades was full of studies of rising political protest, the transformative impact of new information technologies and a new public sphere, the decaying foundations of Arab regimes, economic deprivations and escalating corruption, succession problems among republics and monarchies alike, the rejection of the regional status quo, and so forth. And there were plenty of studies of Islamist movements, political parties, civil society, and various social movements. 

Indeed, Lisa Anderson acidly noted in a 2006 review essay that the real problem may have been that academics focused too much of their efforts on questions about democratization which manifestly did not exist. It was political scientists sobered by decades of abortive democratization and false promises of change who shifted their focus to explaining the persistence of authoritarianism, and were thus caught off-guard by the massive region-wide popular wave of protest and fall of several long-serving leaders. While I have argued repeatedly that the uprisings are a manifestation of a deep, structural transformation of Arab politics driven in part by the changing information environment, others have good reason to disagree. They point to the survival of so many other regimes and the frustrations of the revolutionaries, to the frightening lessons of Syria's descent to civil war or Bahrain's remorseless crushing of opposition, or to the continuing role of oil rents or U.S. support for helpful dictators to question the extent of real transformative change. These are good debates to have. Indeed, as with my piece last week on the Arab monarchies, questions matter as much as answers at this point, and it would be a pity if a new consensus settled in prematurely.

I hope that scholars and journalists find this resource helpful. Please send us books or articles which we've missed -- we will be constantly updating, and looking to provide a one-stop resource for academics working on the topic. And I will just say again that it would be even more helpful if journal publishers would allow the articles to emerge from behind the paywall (we will link to as many ungated versions of the papers as possible). Thanks!

UPDATE: Some quick responses to comments on Twitter: This is meant to be a comprehensive bibliography of academic books and journal articles, not recommendations or endorsements. We will generally include books when they are published in the United States, which means that we may run behind some of the interesting books which appear elsewhere. Based on one reader's excellent suggestion, we hope to add a section on Arabic publications. Remember -- this will be updated regularly, so if you have ideas about new topics, articles or books just send them along. And finally, a big shout out to GW graduate student Chana Solomon-Schwartz for her assistance in preparing and maintaining the bibliography!