Did the "surge" work in Afghanistan? The Obama administration would like you to think that it did, mostly so that it can declare victory and get out. I'm all in favor of the latter option, but let's not deceive ourselves about the wisdom of the Afghan surge itself.
Courtesy of Belfer Center fellow Matt Waldman, the chart above nicely captures why escalating was a bad idea in 2009. Contrary to claims that we've "broken the back" of the Taliban, this chart (based on official ISAF figures) shows that the Taliban remains a potent force. U.S. casualties increased significantly as the surge proceeded, and the pace in 2012 is roughly similar to the toll the previous two years. Whatever else we may have accomplished, we don't seem to have retarded the Taliban's ability to kill and wound our soldiers very much.
Equally important, the final column (based on figures reported by Simon Klingert) suggests that the Taliban's ability to inflict casualties on Afghan security forces (ANSF) remains undiminished. Given that U.S. hopes of a "soft landing" following withdrawal depend on the ANSF taking up the fight themselves, this does not augur well for Afghanistan's post-American future.
And not to beat a dead horse, but if four more years of effort haven't altered the basic strategic realities, then what does that tell you about the people who lobbied forcefully for the surge back in 2009?