A refugee family in Goz Amer camp in eastern Chad.
ŠUNHCR/H.Caux
As the Darfur region of Sudan smolders, human rights activists and a growing
number of governments have adopted a new strategy. They are calling for the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to take the lead by investigating and indicting
those responsible for the atrocities. The court, established in 1998 and situated
in The Hague, Netherlands, is designed to prosecute the worst crimes against
humanity. Given the continuing brutality in Sudan, who could object?
But judicial intervention may not be the wisest course—at least not yet.
Those clamoring for the ICC to take the lead want to establish the precedent
that atrocities will be punished. Instead, they may be handing cautious politicians
an excuse for continued inaction while unnecessarily dividing the United States
and Europe.
No one disputes the urgency of the situation in Darfur, where the Sudanese
government has employed Arab militias known as Janjaweed to fight an insurgency
and terrorize the local population. By some estimates, the conflict has killed
as many as 200,000. More than a million people have been forced from their homes.
In September, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly labeled the
campaign in Darfur a genocide. In response, the U.N. Security Council passed
resolutions and helped establish a small African Union peacekeeping force. But
council members have refrained from sending their own troops or even threatening
the Khartoum government with force. Meanwhile, the atrocities continue.
With hopes of a serious military response fading, momentum for a judicial one
is building. Activists have besieged U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and U.S.
President George W. Bush with calls to prosecute those responsible for the massacres.
Earlier this month, the U.N.-appointed International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur recommended referring the crisis to the ICC (although the commission
refrained from calling the atrocities genocide).
But there is little evidence that the threat of prosecution is a meaningful
deterrent to regimes like the one in Sudan. The existence of an international
criminal tribunal for the Balkans—and even explicit threats of prosecution—did
not stop Slobodan Milosevic from cleansing the Albanian population of Kosovo.
The Rwandan government engaged in several bloody reprisals against Hutu civilians
even after the United Nations set up a tribunal to investigate the earlier genocide.
And the existence of a tribunal in Rwanda appears to have done nothing to staunch
the bloodletting in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo.
There is plenty of evidence, however, that Western politicians use international
trials as a way to dodge tough action. It was in large part because the United
States and Europe couldn’t agree on an effective military response that
they created a tribunal for the Balkans. The international court for Rwanda,
too, was as much therapy for a shamed world as it was a meaningful response
to that region’s continuing crisis. Time and again, the West has shown
itself willing to spend millions on lawyers and judges after the fact but far
less inclined to take risks to stop slaughters in progress.
If politicians can deploy pledges of support for trials to deflect pressure
for intervention, the international justice campaign may actually be doing today’s
victims a disservice. Already, the public debate has shifted from how the outside
world should prevent further bloodletting in Sudan to how the crimes there should
be prosecuted. The one question on Sudan that Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice fielded when she visited London recently was whether Sudan’s crimes
should be investigated by the ICC or by a new African court.
American opposition to the court is well known, even notorious. The ICC has
almost no support in the U.S. Senate (which would have to ratify full U.S. participation),
and the Bush administration has pursued a policy of protecting U.S. citizens
from the ICC’s reach. And yet, many human rights groups have decided to
use the Sudan crisis to bludgeon the United States into changing its position.
In a recent press release, the advocacy group Human Rights Watch claimed that
“the Bush administration is creating a deadly delay for the people of
Darfur by attempting to block the U.N. Security Council from referring Darfur
atrocities to the International Criminal Court.” In their eagerness to
establish and legitimize the court, some human rights officials have elided
entirely the distinction between meaningful action to stop ongoing atrocities
and litigation to assign responsibility for blood already shed. It is a particularly
important distinction, given the ICC’s lack of any enforcement capability.
In making the ICC the focus of Sudan activism, the human rights community has
chosen a strategy tailor-made to divide the United States and Europe. Already,
the debate on where Sudan’s crimes should be prosecuted has devolved into
the familiar—but entirely unproductive—morality play that sets the
sovereignty-minded American against the multilateralist European. Former British
Foreign Minister Robin Cook gave voice to the anger many Europeans feel toward
the U.S. position: “This is the time when a candid friend should tell
Bush to put the urgent need of the people of Darfur for justice before his own
dogmatic hostility to the International Criminal Court.” (The needs of
Darfur’s people are all the more acutely felt by some in Europe when the
United States can be cast as the villain.)
The ICC may eventually become an important judicial complement to international
police action. But the world is not there yet. When a crisis is still unfolding,
the human rights community should stay focused on generating the political and
moral will to intervene effectively. As the 60th anniversary of Auschwitz’s
liberation passes, it is worth remembering that the legacy of Nuremberg will
be hollow if it means more trials but no fewer genocides.
David L. Bosco is senior editor at FOREIGN POLICY.
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