A dark specter looms over Lebanon as the democratic momentum grows to oust Syrian forces: the risk of civil war. From 1975 to 1990, a bloody civil conflict claimed about 150,000 Lebanese lives. Many of the problems that plagued Lebanon in the past may recur in different forms or, worse yet, new forms should Syrian troops withdraw. This fear should not stop the international community from pressing Damascus to end its brutal occupation, but steps must be taken to ensure that freedom and peace remain long after Syria is gone.

Lebanon was an island of democracy in the Middle East until its civil war began in 1975. The war had many causes, including political meddling by Iraq, Syria, and other neighbors; the Israeli-Palestinian border war; a frozen political system that gave disproportionate power to the country’s Christian minority; and a weak government that could not prevent minor spats from escalating into violence. The war ended only when Syria forcibly intervened, crushing dissent and imposing a brutal peace by deploying tens of thousands of troops and intelligence agents. Many Lebanese accepted Syria’s presence as the price of stability. But today, their patience is at an end.

The good news is that most Lebanese recognize that a return to civil war would be disastrous. The bad news is that few steps are being taken to prevent it. Lebanon lacks an effective army capable of quelling violence between even small groups of fighters. The most effective fighting force in Lebanon is the terrorist organization Hezbollah, a force so powerful the Lebanese army could not hope to quash it. Indeed, Hezbollah is popular as well as powerful, making it doubtful that any Lebanese government would try to crush it even if it could. If Syrian troops pull out, those who stand to lose from a Syrian withdrawal may mobilize and arm themselves in self-defense, and Lebanon’s various ethnic and sectarian communities may rearm their dormant militias, spinning the situation out of control. For example, to counterbalance Hezbollah, Damascus propped up its rival, a Shia militia known as Amal. But Amal would almost certainly be forced to cede its influence to Hezbollah in a system free of Syrian influence, encouraging the militia to turn to arms to preserve its power.

Politically, the 1989 Taif agreement corrected an imbalance that favored Lebanon’s Christians by setting up a power-sharing system. But it also imposed a new bias. Sunni Muslims hold a preponderance of political power, even though the majority of Lebanon’s Muslims are Shia. With neighboring Shiites assuming power in Iraq’s January elections, Lebanon’s Shia community may eventually come to resent their own limited influence. The stance of other critical political actors would also be put in flux. Hezbollah sponsored huge pro-Syrian demonstrations this week, but it would adapt quickly if Syrian forces left, continuing its anti-Israel activities and playing a more active role within Lebanon. The 350,000 or so Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon—one tenth of the population—are largely quiescent due to Syria’s heavy hand. Absent Syrian influence, they could easily become a player in Lebanese politics.

Israel itself is an uncertainty. After its 1982 intervention in Lebanon, which led to an 18-year war that costs the lives of hundreds of Israelis, many in Israel are loath to get involved once more. However, the possibility of an unfettered Hezbollah or a renewed Palestinian threat may prompt Israel to intervene again or otherwise meddle indirectly by supporting proxies that are hostile to these forces.

This is to say nothing of Syria itself, the biggest threat to Lebanon’s stability. Syrian leaders have laid claim to Lebanon from the very beginning, and many have exploited their dominance of the country for financial gain. Absent outside pressure, Syria would not hesitate to assassinate political rivals, as it has repeatedly in the past (many suspect Syria assassinated former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri just weeks ago). Nor would it hesitate to encourage violence as a way of convincing Lebanon of the necessity of continuing pax Syriana.

Watching freedom on the march in Lebanon gives us a heady feeling. But removing Syrian influence is only the first step in Lebanon’s renewal. To prevent a recurrence of civil war, the United States, together with its European and Arab allies, must ensure that Lebanon’s neighbors refrain from meddling in the country. Damascus in particular must be watched like a hawk. Even a complete withdrawal of Syria’s troops and intelligence presence (the latter being almost impossible to verify) would not stop it from instigating violence. The international community must make the price of Syrian meddling prohibitive. Inevitable disputes about the distribution of power must be managed peacefully, with U.S. and international assistance.

A free Lebanon would likely be a democratic Lebanon, which, even if the resulting democracy is muddled, is better than allowing Syria to carry on as a harsh overlord. But the new democracy would be weak at first. Because it cannot crack down on groups like Hezbollah, that weakness is dangerous for Lebanon, the region, and the United States. Concerned states must build up the Lebanese government’s strength first, with the expectation that it will exercise full sovereignty later. Otherwise, freedom will merely be a prologue to violence.