Don’t turn France into the black sheep of Europe. That was French President Jacques Chirac’s plea to his fellow citizens in a primetime television appearance on April 14. The message was designed to salvage a oui vote in France’s referendum on the European Union (EU) constitution scheduled for May 29. Fifteen successive polls have shown the “No” camp to have the upper hand. So Chirac is pulling out all the stops to turn the polls around. In the same April television appearance, he played off French anti-American sentiment by declaring that a no vote would help the “Anglo-Saxon countries and particularly the U[nited] S[tates].” But it is not the perfidious Anglo-Saxons who are giving Chirac a headache. Rather, the very success of European integration is the root of his—and many pro-integrationists'—troubles.

At first blush, France’s cool attitude toward the constitution appears to be paying dividends: European officials are so desperate for France to vote yes that, at the moment, whatever France wants in the EU, France gets. Following the first polls that showed Gallic support for the constitution wavering, the rules of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, which governs fiscal policies in eurozone countries, were rewritten to be more to France’s liking. Then France was given a special dispensation to write off military and foreign aid expenditures when calculating its budget deficit. Next, with public opinion showing no sign of backing down, Chirac persuaded fellow EU leaders to dilute the Services Directive, which aimed to create a single market in services as well as goods. Opposition to the directive is a rallying cry for the non campaigners, who claim that it would eviscerate labor standards across Europe.

These concessions haven’t placated French voters—opposition to the constitution now runs as high as 55 percent—but they may well alienate the Dutch, who vote in their own referendum three days after the French. The Dutch already maintain that big EU member states get away with more than they should. One poll, taken shortly after the French concessions were made, put the Dutch no campaign ahead by 29 points. Will Brussels now desperately try to appease the Dutch public? Maybe. But any further concessions will only fuel British Euroskepticism, forcing the game of Whack-a-Mole to start all over again.

In the past, it’s doubtful that such silliness would have persisted. Each EU member state had its own distinct debate on Europe that left national governments free to tout what they liked about the EU and ignore what they didn’t. But with the transfer of genuine power to Brussels in recent years, media organizations across the EU are covering the bureaucracy more closely. This continental debate should be a Europhile’s dream come true. Yet, granting Brussels real power has only bolstered Euroskepticism. In France, for instance, the technical details of the Services Directives became a page one newspaper story, and the text of the constitution is now a bestseller. In Britain, the government’s attempt to portray the constitution as a mere “tidying up exercise” fell flat when the media reported that continental politicians were trumpeting the document’s historic importance.

If there is one thing that unites Europe, it is a distrust of the establishment. So the fact that nearly every mainstream politician supports the constitution does not help the cause of ratification either. In the Netherlands, Europhiles worry that the same strand of populism that propelled right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn to prominence could sink the constitution. In France, the yes campaign acknowledges that a desire to “have a go at the establishment” is motivating many on its side. And one can be sure that British voters will be urged to wipe the smile off Blair’s face by rejecting the constitution.

Integration has allowed the EU to fulfill its primary function of making another great European war unthinkable. But integration has also created a popular demand for accountability. Politicians and chattering class elites can no longer drive the project forward behind closed doors, as they have for the last half-century. Farsighted European integrationists have always sought popular engagement with the EU and its ideals. Without that debate, they argued, the European project was unsustainable.

The problem is that there is still no agreement on what Europe should be. Different countries want radically different things. Some Europeans dream of creating a social Europe that can stand in opposition to cutthroat American capitalism. Others want to arm Europe with the world’s most competitive global economy. The battle over the constitution is a classic example of these differing visions. If France votes no, it will do so because the constitution is too economically liberal. If Britain votes no, it will be because the document is too dirigiste. The ultimate irony of deepening Europe’s integration is that it might just make it impossible to finesse the continent’s vast differences.