Robert McNamara is worried. He knows how close we’ve come. His counsel
helped the Kennedy administration avert nuclear catastrophe during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Today, he believes the United States must no longer rely on
nuclear weapons as a foreign-policy tool. To do so is immoral, illegal, and
dreadfully dangerous.
It is time—well past time, in my view—for the United States
to cease its Cold War-style reliance on nuclear weapons as a foreign-policy tool.
At the risk of appearing simplistic and provocative, I would characterize current
U.S. nuclear weapons policy as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully
dangerous. The risk of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch is unacceptably
high. Far from reducing these risks, the Bush administration has signaled that
it is committed to keeping the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a mainstay of its military
power—a commitment that is simultaneously eroding the international norms
that have limited the spread of nuclear weapons and fissile materials for 50 years.
Much of the current U.S. nuclear policy has been in place since before I was secretary
of defense, and it has only grown more dangerous and diplomatically destructive
in the intervening years.
Today, the United States has deployed approximately 4,500 strategic, offensive
nuclear warheads. Russia has roughly 3,800. The strategic forces of Britain,
France, and China are considerably smaller, with 200–400 nuclear weapons
in each state’s arsenal. The new nuclear states of Pakistan and India
have fewer than 100 weapons each. North Korea now claims to have developed nuclear
weapons, and U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that Pyongyang has enough fissile
material for 2–8 bombs.
How destructive are these weapons? The average U.S. warhead has a destructive
power 20 times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Of the 8,000 active or operational
U.S. warheads, 2,000 are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched on 15 minutes’
warning. How are these weapons to be used? The United States has never endorsed
the policy of “no first use,” not during my seven years as secretary
or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by
the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or
nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so. For decades,
U.S. nuclear forces have been sufficiently strong to absorb a first strike and
then inflict “unacceptable” damage on an opponent. This has been
and (so long as we face a nuclear-armed, potential adversary) must continue
to be the foundation of our nuclear deterrent.
In my time as secretary of defense, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Air
Command (SAC) carried with him a secure telephone, no matter where he went,
24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. The telephone of the commander,
whose headquarters were in Omaha, Nebraska, was linked to the underground command
post of the North American Defense Command, deep inside Cheyenne Mountain, in
Colorado, and to the U.S. president, wherever he happened to be. The president
always had at hand nuclear release codes in the so-called football, a briefcase
carried for the president at all times by a U.S. military officer.
The SAC commander’s orders were to answer the telephone by no later than
the end of the third ring. If it rang, and he was informed that a nuclear attack
of enemy ballistic missiles appeared to be under way, he was allowed 2 to 3
minutes to decide whether the warning was valid (over the years, the United
States has received many false warnings), and if so, how the United States should
respond. He was then given approximately 10 minutes to determine what to recommend,
to locate and advise the president, permit the president to discuss the situation
with two or three close advisors (presumably the secretary of defense and the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and to receive the president’s
decision and pass it immediately, along with the codes, to the launch sites.
The president essentially had two options: He could decide to ride out the attack
and defer until later any decision to launch a retaliatory strike. Or, he could
order an immediate retaliatory strike, from a menu of options, thereby launching
U.S. weapons that were targeted on the opponent’s military-industrial
assets. Our opponents in Moscow presumably had and have similar arrangements.
The whole situation seems so bizarre as to be beyond belief. On any given day,
as we go about our business, the president is prepared to make a decision within
20 minutes that could launch one of the most devastating weapons in the world.
To declare war requires an act of congress, but to launch a nuclear holocaust
requires 20 minutes’ deliberation by the president and his advisors. But
that is what we have lived with for 40 years. With very few changes, this system
remains largely intact, including the “football,” the president’s
constant companion.