“States Want the Bomb for International Status”
That’s not the whole equation. Nonnuclear states are certainly keenly aware that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are also the five “legal” nuclear weapons states under the NPT. But the desire for status or prestige on its own is rarely enough to motivate a decision to go nuclear.
Take, for instance, the case of Argentina in the 1970s and early 1980s. From its grandiose staging of the 1978 World Cup to its 1982 invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands, the Argentine military junta’s appetite for nationalist self-expression appeared to have no bounds. The junta also embarked upon an enormous, economically questionable expansion of Argentina’s nuclear technology base, seeking to have at least six operating nuclear power reactors and achieving mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. But, contrary to what many experts think even today, it did not embark on a nuclear weapons program, and indeed no influential voices within the state even wanted to do so. In fact, when the growth in its nuclear program threatened to entrap it in a nuclear arms race with Brazil, Argentina swallowed some pride and sought a diplomatic rapprochement with its neighbor. Argentina’s military rulers understood that introducing the prospect of mutual annihilation into a region characterized by limited conflicts of interest would be—in one admiral’s words—a “strategic absurdity.” It’s a point of view also shared by many of the world’s nonnuclear states today.
“Rogue States Are More Eager to Go Nuclear Than Are Others”
Nonsense. Much recent press attention has focused on the nuclear activities of the unpleasant regimes of North Korea and Iran. It previously focused on Iraq and Libya. Those countries’ nuclear programs clearly do (or did) give cause for alarm. But they are hardly the only ones that have played fast and loose with the rules of the nonproliferation regime. For instance, last year, even democratic South Korea informed the IAEA that as late as 2000 it had been secretly producing weapons-grade uranium, in violation of commitments not to do so.
Indeed, if we use history as our guide, we might want to worry as much about the South Koreas as we do about the Libyas. For in fact, few of the members of the nuclear weapons club actually fit the “rogue state” designation. Apart from the original five, we find India, a democracy with international credentials so strong, it even has a chance for permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. And then we find Israel and Pakistan, states that may not be universally admired but certainly have long enjoyed a close embrace from the United States. And it might be added that all three of these nuclear gatecrashers were headed by democratically elected leaders when they made their crucial decisions to cross the nuclear threshold. In short, few states may want the bomb, but no regime type provides a sure vaccination against nuclear weapons ambitions.
“Countries That Master the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Want to Produce Weapons”
Don’t jump to conclusions. The desire to produce or amass plutonium or enriched uranium is a red flag, but it’s not a smoking gun that proves nuclear weapons ambitions. In fact, it can be driven by all sorts of motives apart from a desire for nuclear weapons.
Resource-poor states such as Japan view the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle as a necessary correlate to their goal of energy independence. Japan’s choice is arguably driven by economic motives, but there are other motives unrelated to the bomb. For instance, Argentina started its secret uranium enrichment program in 1978, when the United States cut off enriched uranium exports to states that had not accepted the NPT. Without enriched uranium, Argentina would be unable to fuel its self-designed research reactors—a particular point of pride for a country with little in the way of high-technology industry. It also wanted to be able to fuel a pair of German-made TR 1700 diesel attack submarines, which it was considering transforming into nuclear subs. Thus, even though the work was conducted in total secrecy, Argentine scientists built their enrichment plant to make reactor-grade, not bomb-grade enriched uranium. Today, the world is closely watching Iran’s progress on enrichment. The Iranians may very well want enriched uranium as a pathway to the bomb, but it would be unwise to dismiss as mere propaganda the other motivations that they cite.
“Policymakers Need Better Data on States’ Nuclear Capabilities”
Not only. Overstating Iraq’s nuclear progress has certainly given U.S. intelligence a black eye, but former weapons inspector David Kay is also right to note that “the real challenge for intelligence is going to be giving to our political leaderships not just judgment about capabilities, but judgments about real intentions. And that is tough.” That’s true. But still, the intelligence community could develop much better judgment than it’s showing now. It could begin by simply considering nascent nuclear programs innocent until proven guilty. For ultimately, most states either don’t want or don’t think they can muster a credible nuclear deterrent. Recognizing that the world is not full of nuclear illuminati would allow the international community to relax a bit, avoid offending large swaths of states, and concentrate resources on the few dangerous governments that really do want a bomb.
Still, how does one determine where the real threats are? The late Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan made an incisive suggestion after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests caught the intelligence community napping: “Learn to read.” After all, Moynihan pointed out, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party, newly elected at the time, had publicly advocated going nuclear for a decade. Moynihan was basically right, and not just about India. People who want nuclear weapons tend to want them badly. They therefore find it hard to resist telegraphing their intentions.
Of course, bluntly telling the world you want nuclear weapons is not for everyone. That’s why it’s essential for the intelligence community not only to learn to read, but to learn to read between the lines. A good deal of analysis can be done long-distance, using open sources. But diplomats, spies, or politicians can also glean critical information by meeting key players face to face. Unfortunately, American experts and envoys have often squandered such opportunities, showing a decided tendency to lecture rather than listen. They could do worse than to follow the lead of Henry Kissinger, who, as secretary of state, responded with restraint to India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” of 1974—and was reciprocated by an Indian state that ended up waiting another quarter-century before deciding to build an actual nuclear arsenal.
Judging state demand for nuclear weapons is tough, but we can do better than we’re doing today. And we have no other choice but to try.
