Iran in his sights: President Bush’s address to the nation on Jan. 10, 2007, signaled a tougher approach to Tehran.

President Bush: “Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.”

Karim Sadjadpour, Analyst, International Crisis Group: If you asked U.S. officials, they would say that they’ve had evidence all along that Iran has been conducting illicit activities in Iraq, whether it’s supporting radical Shiite groups, or even radical Sunni or Kurdish groups. And up until now, the United States has turned a blind eye to Iran’s disruptive behavior because they felt they needed Iran’s cooperation to help stabilize Iraq and they didn’t want to take on Tehran. Now, we’re seeing a shift in policy. It seems like a much more provocative, proactive U.S. approach toward Iran. But Iran’s influence should be put in context.

In 2005, the question being asked was: How much influence does Iran have over the Shiite militia groups like the Mahdi Army, Moqtada al-Sadr’s army? In 2007, Iraq has degenerated to such an extent that the question to ask is not how much influence Iran has over Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, but how much influence Moqtada al-Sadr has over his own Mahdi Army. Sectarian and militia groups once considered monolithic have splintered into mini-militias and sectarian groups, and therefore the idea that Tehran somehow has the control over all these groups is probably exaggerated, and it follows that engaging Iran is not a panacea to bring about stability.

Cliff Kupchan, Director for Europe and Eurasia, Eurasia Group: It’s true that radical Shia elements have been central to the vicious cycle of sectarian violence. It’s also true that some are supported by Iran. The implicit deduction that one could make —that Iran is therefore centrally involved in the violence—just doesn’t follow. It’s my own view that there are elements in Iran, and especially the Revolutionary Guards, that have provided funding, if not weaponry, to radical Shia militias. The president was tapping into anti-Iranian sentiment in the congress and the public in the speech. It is a statement of much more aggressive policy toward Iranian activity in Iraq, than was previous U.S. policy.

“The consequences of failure are clear—Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”

Sadjadpour: Iran thinks the United States is bogged down in a Vietnam-style conundrum, and that neither the U.S. nor the international community has the will to challenge Iran like it might have in 2003. So I don’t think that an abrupt U.S. withdrawal would change Iranian strategy on the nuclear issue. Although the Bush administration has finally come to the conclusion that Iraq is not going as well as it should be, the Iranians reached that conclusion long ago.

Kupchan: From my recent meetings with Iranian officials and high-level advisors, it’s clear that the Iranians view themselves to be on a roll right now, from advances in the nuclear program to Hezbollah to Bahrain, that it’s the coming age of the Shiite Crescent. Certainly withdrawing from Iraq would further embolden an already confident and risk-acceptant Iranian leadership. It could incrementally embolden them in the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But you’re emboldening the bold.

A better formulation [than “the consequences of failure…”] would be “the consequences of different U.S. policies.” The president might have argued that our best chances to avoid extremism, the toppling of moderate governments, chaos, and nuclear weapons is to try more troops. That’s a rational argument. But the rebuttal to [his actual] argument is just too easy: The consequences of failure are clear—because we’ve failed.

“Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces.

Sadjadpour: [Until recently,] the primary source of unrest in Iraq was the Sunni insurgency. It wasn’t being driven by Iran. In fact, the Sunni insurgents were attacking Iran’s Shiite friends. Up until a certain point, Iran’s influence over the Shia was as a restraining influence, because Iran doesn’t want to see sectarian warfare in Iraq. Iran doesn’t want to see a cleavage between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East, because even though Iran itself is Shiite, it perceives itself and wants to be the vanguard of the entire Islamic world, not just the Shiite world. So it doesn’t benefit Tehran to see growing Sunni concern about Shiite ascendancy and Iranian ascendancy. Second, by all accounts, the slew of arms has been primarily from Iraq to Iran, not vice-versa. There’s no shortage of free arms in Iraq.