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Iran’s influence: Much is made over radical Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr’s ties to Iran. But it’s actually other Iraqi politicians who are closest to Iran, says Ansari.

FOREIGN POLICY: In last night’s State of the Union address, President Bush said that many Shiite extremists are taking direction from Iran. Just how much influence does Iran have over Shiite groups like the Mahdi Army, Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia?

Ali Ansari: The influence is a mixed bag. There is actually more Iranian influence among those Shiites who are in the government in Iraq rather than among those who are in the militias. But it is quite clear the Iranians have decided to see if they can back as many different horses as they can with the Shiite groups. In regards to the Mahdi Army, the Sadrists are not actually very close to Iran. There have been times when the tensions between Sadr and Iran have been pretty big. So it’s a simplification to say that the Iranians are directly, in a sense, the Shiite militias. In fact, they’ve been by and large a force for restraint and moderation.

FP: Bush said, “Shiite and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat…. They have the same wicked purposes.” Just how similar are Shiite and Sunni extremist groups?

AA: There’s no doubt that all extremists share some characteristics. But there are obviously some quite interesting differences. Shiites do not tend to engage in the sorts of suicide bombings that the Sunnis tend to engage in. And you certainly don’t see, by and large, Shiites beheading their opponents.

The nihilistic global domination argument that some of the more radical Sunni groups have is not something that you see expressed on a wide scale among Shiites. They have fairly specific political ambitions. With his speech, Bush is heading down the route of saying they’re basically all the same and they all hate us, which is an awkward argument to make. It’s going to lead to more problems.

FP: Bush claimed that if U.S. forces step back before Baghdad is secure, we can expect an “epic battle” between Shiite extremists backed by Iran, and Sunni extremists aided by al Qaeda. The entire region could be drawn into the conflict. How likely is that scenario?

AA: The language is a bit excitable in some ways, but the premise of what he says is true. There’s a vacuum there, and the neighboring powers will get involved. One thing he misses: He says, “Shiite extremists backed by Iran and Sunni extremists backed by al Qaeda,” but “Sunni extremists backed by Saudi Arabia” is what he really wants to say.

In Iran, the more sober voices are saying they’d actually like it much better if the Americans stayed and provided a much more stable structure, rather than leaving, creating a vacuum, and letting Iraq disintegrate into a sort of non-state in the middle of the Middle East. And you’d have the Syrians, Turks, Iranians, Jordanians and Saudis all seeking to influence the outcome of any struggle there. I think it’ll be fairly vicious. Whether it’s an epic battle on the scale Bush is saying is a different matter.

FP: Does Iran want sectarian warfare in Iraq—a cleavage between Sunnis and Shiites?

AA: The collapse of the Taliban and the removal of Saddam Hussein allowed the Iranians to imagine themselves in a different environment. Suddenly, things became possible that otherwise would have been impossible. The Iranians clearly see themselves as the regional arbiter, if not the regional hegemon. Iran’s argument is: “We will inherit Iraq. At the very least, Iraq will be our neighbor. At the most, we can exert a far greater influence in this area than we hitherto thought possible.”

So Iran would rather have stability and order. At the moment, Iran has this slightly incoherent strategy, but the broad thrust of it is, “We can irritate the Americans enough to get them out, but we don’t want them to go too quickly—not until they’ve given us a bit more stability. It’s in our interests to have a peaceful western border and not to allow the Saudis, Jordanians, Syrians and perhaps others to move in a big way.”

FP: Bush said, “We are working with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf States to increase support for Iraq’s government.” Absent from that list of countries was Iran. Do you think the United States would ever move to direct talks with Iran as part of an effort to stabilize Iraq?

AA: Ultimately, the United States is going to have to get to grips with the reality of Iran. Whether talks will happen in the future or not is another matter, but I don’t see it happening in the near term. It’s a great pity. The United States missed a great opportunity with the Iraq Study Group’s report. At the moment it seems that, given a choice between a simple roundtable and ignoring Iran, the United States has opted for the choice of ignoring Iran. And it’s a great pity, because it’s going to make life more difficult.

FP: Bush said that in imposing sanctions on Iran, the United Nations made it clear that the world will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Are sanctions having an effect on Iran?

AA: I think they are, actually. But it’s not so much the sanctions—it’s the perception of what they might entail. Also, it’s actually Ahmadinejad’s political and economic incompetence that is causing the problems in Iran. The sanctions just sharpen the point a little bit and make Iran feel more vulnerable. The truth is that had Iran had a more stable political leader or been on more stable economic footing, the current sanctions would not really have made much difference. So you have to see it very much in the context of the fact that the economy in Iran is a mess.

FP: Two weeks ago, Bush said that one of the consequences of failure in Iraq is that Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. He made a similar statement in yesterday’s speech. Is he right?

AA: It would embolden some groups in Iran. Their view is that they’ve got the United States on the run, and one more push and Iraq will fall in their lap. In many ways it’s just as fanciful a notion as what you get from any in the conservative movement in the United States. So, you’ve got two particular groups of people, one in Washington and one in Tehran, thinking along the same lines.

Ali Ansari is a history professor at the University of St. Andrews and author of the recently published book Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East.