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Crisis manager: Gareth Evans believes the best way to solve a conflict is not to get into one in the first place.

Foreign Policy: How does the response to current world crises compare with the past?

Gareth Evans: We’re getting better. Since the Cold War ended, we’ve done remarkably better as an international community at reducing the number of conflicts, the number of battle deaths, and the number of genocides or major massacres. Some terrible overreactions and some mistakes have been made, and may be made again in Iran if we’re not extremely careful. But the truth of the matter is that more wars are stopping than starting.

FP: This seems surprising, considering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the situation in Burma.

GE: It’s counterintuitive, but the figures do speak for themselves. It shows we’re not all wasting our time. For the first time, you’ve got institutional commitment to preventing these conflicts over a long period of time. This has produced the notion behind responsibility to protect (R2P), a doctrine that attempts to resolve the basic conceptual dilemma at the heart of the nonresponse of the international community through the 1990s to the succession of catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. At the moment, I’m involved with some other global NGOs and friendly governments to create a center in New York called the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect. It’s designed to be an international information clearinghouse to help resolve conceptual problems concerning R2P. If we can produce a few papers that demonstrate cases of preventative work to stop potentially catastrophic situations, then that’s a way of getting acceptance.

FP: What countries are on the brink of a crisis right now?

GE: We’re not seeing it right now in Sri Lanka, but there’s potential. I created a bit of a storm by saying Sri Lanka was an R2P situation. I didn’t say genocide or mass killing or ethnic cleansing was happening, but it was a situation that could deteriorate because of underlying ethnic tensions. The most serious is Iraq 2007. Of the U.S. presidential candidates, not one of them is expressing any particular concern about the R2P implication of a troop pullout. All the candidates talk about the need to maintain some residual troop presence for institutional protection and to deal with the al Qaeda phenomenon. But no one wants to talk about the necessity for an international troop presence to be there to avoid a much more bloody war of all against all. It’s potentially huge, the scale of the bloodshed that could erupt.

FP: What about the situation in Burma? Is the international community—in particular, China—doing enough to stop the government crackdown?

GE: Attitudes in China are evolving, and not just because of the embarrassment with the 2008 Olympics. There is a fundamental reassessment of Chinese foreign policy going on. Compare and contrast China’s response to Burma with India’s. China has actually been better—more explicit language about the nature of the concern. The most the Indians could offer was the need for peaceful dialogue and more inclusion, which is really disconcerting for a major democracy. But the Chinese were working quite actively behind the scenes—and still are—to persuade the generals. At the end of the day, the Chinese are the only game in town. Nothing the rest of us can do will make a difference.

FP: Is this a matter of China looking out for its own interests, or is it truly beginning to realize it has a moral role to play in world affairs?

GE: It’s beginning to realize that in this globalized world, how you’re perceived impacts your capacity to wield influence. If the Chinese are perceived as totally, cynically indifferent to quality of democracy and the quality of life experience of countries around the world they have the capacity to influence, then that capacity to influence is going to diminish. All the wealth and power in the universe is worth nothing if people find distasteful large chunks of your policy.

FP: As U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration nears its end, what are your thoughts? How does it compare with previous administrations? Has anyone surprised you?

GE: I don’t think I misread Bob Zoellick or Richard Armitage at all. I misread Paul Wolfowitz. I don’t think any of us realized the extent to which the neocon drum was beating. I would have also underestimated Cheney’s role. I dealt with him back in Bush Sr.’s administration, and I found him not a crazed ideologue but a fairly competent administrator. Clearly, he was under adult supervision with Bush Sr. and Brent Scowcroft and James Baker. That’s the best U.S. foreign policy administration I’ve dealt with—with due respect to the Clinton years—in respect to competence and clarity of purpose and general sophistication and ability to ride the waves.

FP: What is your take on Iran? Is an attack inevitable, and what would be the repercussions of a nuclear-armed Iran?

GE: My organization and I are a bit at odds with current thinking in the U.S. and EU, which is wholly tactical and not at all strategic. While an ideal solution would have been to persuade the Iranians through a package of incentives to accept international fuel, I doubt it was ever deliverable. It’s not deliverable now. There’s too much pride; there’s too much testosterone; there’s too much sense of regional significance among the Iranians. What has to happen now is a new red line beyond “Thou shall not enrich.” The real red line should now be: “Thou shall not translate thy technological capability to military form; thou shall not enrich to weapons grade; thou shall not make nuclear bomb devices; thou shall be very careful about what kind of missile delivery system you put in place.” If you draw that red line and make it absolutely clear that if there’s any move towards militarization, then basically all hell will break loose and there will be a unanimous international response to it.

People keep telling me there’s still a 50 percent chance of the U.S. taking military action against Iran. I’ve been inclined to not put it as high as that, but that’s probably getting closer to reality. It would unleash an absolute flood of terrorist assaults, attacks, and destabilization efforts. All bets would be off.

Gareth Evans is president and chief executive officer of the International Crisis Group.

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