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| NET EFFECT: HOW TECHNOLOGY SHAPES THE WORLD |
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Posted October 2007  |
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| How to Do It: Circumventing the Censors |
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Most Internet censorship regimes—including those in Burma, China, and North Korea—rely on list-based software that flags and then blocks access to certain keywords, domain names, and URL addresses. Such technology can be highly effective. But it is also possible for ordinary citizens to get around it using some simple techniques. Here’s how to do it.
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Related to this article:
For additional Web extras from the November/December 2007 issue of FP, click here. |
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Level 1: Figure out what you need
Anyone hoping to circumvent Internet censorship should first answer two basic questions: First, how much technological know-how do I have? That will determine which technologies are available to you. And, second, what kind of risk am I taking by trying to evade the censors? In places where legal penalties aren’t as stiff, a great variety of options will be available. Those living under more strict regimes will need to employ techniques that are more secure and more secret.
Level 2: Try on a mask
The easiest and most readily accessible technologies are Web-based circumventors. These are special Web pages that allow users to type in a Web address and surf blocked Web sites normally. They require little or no technological know-how. There’s no software to install. And many are free and publicly available. Some of the most popular are Anonymizer.com, Anonymouse.ws, Proxify.com, and The-cloak.com.
Level 3: Get some distance between you and the censors
Web-based circumventors, particularly public ones, have a downside. Most censorship regimes already know about them and may already block them. In such cases, more advanced technologies will be necessary. That may mean using a proxy server, which acts as a cushion between the user and the end destination. A little bit of technological know-how will be required here to reconfigure your Web browser’s settings. Most proxy sites have simple directions for downloading, installing, and using the software. Check out squid-cache.org, privoxy.org, and publicproxyservers.com.
Level 4: Dig a tunnel
Although proxy servers are often capable of getting around Internet filtering, they offer only a low level of security and privacy. Under more advanced censorship regimes, downloadable “tunneling” software may be necessary. These systems route a user’s Web surfing through an encrypted channel to a computer in a noncensored locale. People who live in repressive regimes can tunnel to the computer of an uncensored friend or purchase access to commercial tunneling services. Go to http-tunnel.com, hopster.com, and htthost.com.
Level 5: Go incognito
Under the strictest regimes, anonymous communication systems, or ACS, offer the best chance of unfettered access to the Web. They work much the same way that tunnels do, except they provide additional levels of privacy and anonymity. Like tunnels, they require users to install software, so they may be impossible to use in Internet cafes and other public access points. People hoping to use these systems should have a more advanced knowledge of computers. Some of the most powerful ACS systems can be found at tor.eff.org, anon.inf.tu-dresden.de, and freenetproject.org.
If none of these techniques gain you access the outside world, throw away your computer and get a shortwave radio.
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| E-lectioneering |
| By Julie Farby |
Two years ago—while Howard Dean’s then campaign manager, Joe Trippi,
was hailing his candidate’s rapid ascent in the Democratic primaries as
a “dot-com miracle”—a true revolution in online political
campaigning was happening some 7,000 miles across the Pacific. In South Korea,
the world’s most wired country, presidential candidate Roh Moo Hyun was
harnessing the power of the Internet and cell phones to reach South Korea’s
tech-savvy youth. The result? Roh, a self-educated human rights lawyer and political
outsider, made history by capturing a winning 49 percent of the vote.
Roh’s use of interactive video clips, Internet chat groups, and e-mail
policy recommendations to reach young voters make Dean’s cyberfundraising
seem parochial, a notion supported by a recent report released by the Pew Internet
& American Life Project (pewinternet.org/PPF/r/134/report_display.asp).
In an examination of the 137 online ads used by President George W. Bush, Sen.
John Kerry, and the Republican and Democratic national committees between January
and August 2004, Pew researchers found that none contained political endorsements
or invitations to campaign events. When the Bush and Kerry campaigns did utilize
the Web, it was to raise (nominal) funds, organize volunteers, or get out the
vote. Only a single ad—a banner in which First Lady Laura Bush invited
viewers to click and read a special message on education—attempted to
sway tech-savvy voters with a specific policy proposal. Michael Cornfield, a
senior Pew researcher says that, overall, online advertising in this election
cycle was “a failed experiment.”
Despite the campaigns’ meager inroads on the Internet, however, Jonah
Seiger, cofounder of media consulting firm Connections Media, cautions against
counting the Internet out too soon. “The Pew Internet study was hugely
important, but it is also just a snapshot,” Seiger says. “There
has been a lot of spending since the report was released.” After the first
and third presidential debates, for instance, the Democratic National Committee
spent $400,000 on ads posted on 50 Web sites, including MSNBC and Salon.com,
that touted the reasons “Kerry won.” Not to be outdone in post-debate
spin, the Bush campaign launched a massive Web advertising effort called Debate
Facts (www.georgewbush.com/DebateFacts)
to counter many of Kerry’s online ads.
Roh’s ability to harness the power of the Web in the ways that distinguish
the Internet from traditional media outlets—above all, by encouraging
voter involvement—has yet to be mimicked in the United States. “Every
political campaign consultant, including myself, would welcome the opportunity
to have won the race because of shrewd online experimentation,” Seiger
concedes, “but no one is willing to risk losing because of that decision.”
Perhaps another four years will be long enough to muster the courage.
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| Watch a Terrorist Attack in Second Life |
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The targets of attacks inside Second Life vary. Sometimes, certain kinds of “avatars,” or virtual characters, are specifically targeted. “Furries,” for instance, which are avatars that take the shape of animals such as raccoons, foxes, and wolves, seem to be favorite targets of attack for reasons known only to Second Life junkies. The video below shows a furry being blown up.
These kinds of attacks are easy to dismiss as digital pranks. But other, more disturbing attacks and protests have also taken place against the virtual homes of real corporations, including the Reuters news agency, the music company Sony BMG, and the athletic apparel company Reebok. These corporations view their virtual presence inside Second Life as a marketing tool that can translate into real–world profits. But some members resent the growing presence of corporations inside their virtual world, as detailed in the video below, a news report conducted by a reporter who embedded with the Second Life Liberation Army.
Actions taken against corporations in Second Life have ranged from bomb explosions to street protests modeled after those in real-world cities such as Seattle and London. So far, no real harm has come from these attacks. The question, however, is whether it someday might.
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