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Dynamic duo? Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have clawed their way to the top. Now, they have to figure out how to work together.

Barring something entirely unforeseen, we now know the name of the next leader of China. The only problem is, we don’t know which name it is. That’s because, at last week’s 17th Communist Party Congress, a tightly scripted political convention that happens every five years, China’s leaders did something unprecedented: They named two potential successors to President Hu Jintao. The two men, Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping and Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, were elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee. Because they are both rising stars in their early 50s, their appointment to China’s highest decision-making body marks them as the likeliest candidates to succeed President Hu, whose term as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled to expire in 2012.

Past successions have been much more straightforward. Due in part to his firm control of Shanghai during the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square, Deng Xiaoping chose Jiang Zemin as his successor. Likewise, Hu was elevated as the “heir apparent” to Jiang Zemin in 1992. Xi and Li have now been given an opportunity to acquire valuable leadership experience and political capital. But for the first time, two candidates will implicitly be competing with each other in the race to become the next Chinese president. In a political system that abhors uncertainty and extols stability, this is a significant development.

It’s too early to say how the competition will take shape. Xi and Li could make perfect partners; likewise, it could get ugly. The one thing that is certain is that these two men could not be more different. They belong to two competing factions, represent two different socioeconomic groups and geographic constituencies, and have contrasting policy priorities. The choice between Xi and Li, therefore, is about much more than sheer political power. China’s political and economic direction may well hinge on how well these men succeed—or fail—at working together.

Xi Jinping is the candidate of entrepreneurs and the emerging middle class. His father was the veteran Communist Xi Zhongxun, who served as a member of the Politburo, China’s second most powerful decision-making body, in the early- to mid-1980s. The younger Xi’s ascendance to the country’s top leadership reflects the growing power of princelings, leaders who are the children of former high-ranking officials. Princelings probably form a less cohesive network than other political factions, but their shared political identity and interests may push them to work together as a formidable elite group. (In the new 25-member Politburo, Xi and his fellow princelings occupy seven seats, in comparison with just three seats in the previous Politburo.) A majority of princelings have advanced their careers in the more prosperous coastal regions, as Xi Jinping did by serving as a top provincial leader in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, the power base of former President Jiang Zemin.

Like most princelings, Xi has leadership experience in economic administration and favors pro-market reforms. In the provinces that he ran, Xi was particularly noted for his promotion of the private sector. His likely policy priorities lie in enhancing economic efficiency and promoting market liberalization, continuing China’s high rates of GDP growth, and expanding China’s integration into the world economy. Not surprisingly, Xi is popular with the foreign business community. But he has another thing going for him: Early in his career he served as a personal assistant to the minister of defense, making him one of the few leaders of his generation to have military ties.

Xi’s record is formidable, but he is not without his weaknesses. As with most princelings, Xi often scores poorly in intra-Party elections. In the election for alternate members of the 15th Central Committee in 1997, Xi received the fewest votes among the 151 alternate members elected. Both the Chinese public and the Party political establishment are often critical of princelings whose “helicopter-like rises” have more to do with political connections than performance.

Unlike Xi, Li Keqiang hails from a humble family background. Li grew up in Anhui province and began his career as a farmer. His father was a low-ranking local official. He overcame these obstacles, rising through the ranks of the Chinese Communist Youth League, Hu Jintao’s most important power base. Li served in the Youth League’s central leadership for 16 years, including five years as first secretary. Many new members of the Central Committee, the 300-member body that appoints the Politburo, are Li’s former colleagues, so he is not lacking political allies. Li’s ascension to the top leadership indicates the coming of age of the Youth League faction, known as the tuanpai. The new Politburo boasts eight tuanpai leaders, accounting for roughly one-third of the seats of this powerful leadership body.