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Current Article
Seven Questions: Musharraf’s Martial Plan
Page 1 of 1
Posted November 2007
Can Pervez Musharraf hang tough in Islamabad? Najam Sethi, editor of Pakistan's Daily Times and one of the country’s most respected political analysts, sees a leader who is reviled everywhere but where it matters most: in the barracks.

JOHN MOORE/Getty Images
They’ve got his back: So far, Pakistan’s security forces are casting their lot with Musharraf.

Foreign Policy: What is the situation on the ground since President Musharraf declared a state of emergency? Are the protests widespread? Who is out in the streets?

Najam Sethi: The sentiment broadly is very anti-Musharraf. It cuts across regions and ethnicity and ideology and classes. The [actual] protests are largely being led by lawyers, and the involvement of the political parties is pretty thin. Across the country, there were tamer protests [Tuesday], and generally they were tamer than [Monday]. So, I think the government probably thinks they have a handle on this.

No one in the country believes these emergency measures are aimed at the war on terror. Musharraf has invoked the provisional constitutional motion to knock out the Supreme Court. And then he issued the emergency measures to silence contempt.

FP: Is there a legitimate risk of Musharraf’s ouster, perhaps by other military leaders?

NS: No, I don’t think there’s any risk at all. The country was awash with rumors [Monday] that perhaps there’d been a coup against him. But that is completely unlikely. Army high command is totally loyal to Musharraf. The young commanders are all handpicked by him. One recent provocation that played into Musharraf’s hands in terms of his support within the Army was when one of the judges of the Supreme Court ordered criminal cases to be launched against the Army commanders who participated in the storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad. That sent a wave of anger throughout the Army high command. They thought they were serving the public interests, and here is the Supreme Court saying they committed a criminal act. That is not to say that if there were a prolonged and bloody protest movement, there might be some who begin to think of Musharraf as a liability. But right now that is not the case.

FP: Is Musharraf a genuine partner in the U.S.-led war on terror, or is he playing a double game?

NS: It’s difficult to answer. Musharraf has been personally targeted by the terrorists, not once but twice. Clearly, he has a personal interest in doing something about it. The Army also has a political interest in putting down Talibanization in Pakistan. Having said that, there’s no easy way to carry out military operations in particular areas without meeting difficulties in your own electoral alliances. That has been Musharraf’s singular problem. On the one hand, he was committed to the war on terror and was under a lot of pressure to move into particular [frontier] areas. On the other hand, his alliance partners weren’t particularly happy with that, because their constituents come from these areas. He thought he could do a balancing act. In the end, it all caught up with him.

FP: Musharraf just swapped 25 top Islamist militants for more than 200 Army prisoners captured in South Waziristan. What do you make of the move?

NS: If you look at the Army casualties, they’ve been very high in the war against terror. This is an Army that is not used to taking such casualties. There’s a very serious problem of morale and motivation. Many of the people who are fighting in the [frontier] areas belong to the same ethnic communities. These border forces were not created for internal duties, but external duties geared toward India. Twenty-five percent of the Army is ethnically Pashtun. These are all Pashtun areas where these troops are supposed to operate. So, people from the same ethnic background are being asked to mount operations against people with a similar background. That is why there are cases that are unprecedented in Pakistani Army history in which soldiers have been putting their hands up and saying we won’t fight, who have been willingly taken prisoner by the Taliban. Early on, the Taliban were executing and beheading them. Now they’re capturing these soldiers and setting them free. They are telling these soldiers, “You are being misled by your president, who is an American agent. You cannot be fighting America’s war.”

FP: Is now the time for Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif to come back to power? Doesn’t Pakistan need fresh faces?

NS: This is the heart of the issue. Sharif and Bhutto are both discredited in many ways, as are most politicians in this country. Now, Musharraf has been discredited and the Army has been discredited. So, who is not discredited? The only people are those who have never had power: Islamic parties, because they’ve never been in government. The people of Pakistan are against Musharraf, but they aren’t outraged enough to pick up a stone and throw it at the police without anyone to defend them, because the political parties are not here to defend lay people. They only defend their top leader. There is this whole callousness to the political system. The public sees through that.

The likeliest option right now is that the government will keep Sharif out [of the country] and allow Bhutto to run in the elections. This will lead to a two-way fight, not a three-way fight. Bhutto will have some votes, most will be with Musharraf, and the balance will be with the mullahs. The idea is to balance Bhutto out with the mullahs and keep everyone in check. Musharraf will end up playing the chess match again, pulling strings here and there. That is his current plan.

FP: If you had U.S. President George W. Bush’s ear, what would you tell him to do regarding Pakistan?

NS: I would say to [Bush] that he screwed up in the past by being soft on Musharraf, but in principle, he’s on the right track now—finally. Musharraf has to be told in no uncertain terms that this is the line in the sand. He cannot postpone the elections. He has to bring in more partners because, in the political vacuum, the Islamists will move in.

FP: Do you think Musharraf will adhere to the January elections timetable?

NS: I think you have to keep him to that promise. You have to get him to hold elections and relinquish at least 50 percent of his power. We need a civil-military transition right now. And the line is coming through. You see the changes in the last 48 hours. Forty-eight hours ago, the prime minister was saying that they might postpone the elections. The ruling party was saying there’s no need to give a firm date. Today’s headlines were that all of them were queuing up to say the elections are going to be held on time.

But as long as Musharraf has the Army with him, he’s not going to be weak. That’s the problem. As long as you are in charge of the Army, the Army obeys you. They’ve never had it so good. So, you can be extremely unpopular and still rule.

Najam Sethi is editor of the Daily Times and the Friday Times based in Lahore.

  • For other timely interviews with leading world figures and expert analysts, visit FP's complete Seven Questions Archive.

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