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Questionable legacy: A shadow hangs over Benazir Bhutto’s record on nuclear proliferation.

With Pakistan in turmoil and the Bush administration rapidly losing patience with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the time seems ripe for Benazir Bhutto’s return to power. But how would the former prime minister handle the most critical international issue confronting Pakistan today? We are not talking about dealing with Islamic extremists within its borders, though that is perilous enough. Even more critical to the international community is the matter of securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and eradicating the final vestiges of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear Wal-Mart. Bhutto may say all the right things on this issue, but history raises troubling questions about her performance when it comes to nuclear weapons.

In the fall of 1989, less than a year into her first term as prime minister, Bhutto attended a conference for Islamic heads of government in Tehran. On the sidelines, then President of Iran Hashemi Rafsanjani pulled Bhutto aside to talk about a critical matter:

“Our countries have reached an agreement on special defense matters,” Rafsanjani said, according to a Bhutto aide who was there. “This agreement was reached on a military-to-military basis, but I want us to reaffirm it as leaders of our governments.”

Bhutto maintained that she knew nothing of any defense pact with Iran. “What exactly are you talking about, Mr. President?” she asked, gesturing for the aide to move closer to overhear.

“Nuclear technology, Madam Prime Minister, nuclear technology,” said the Iranian leader.

Two years earlier, A.Q. Khan, a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, had sold Iran components and plans for centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for weapons or to fuel civilian reactors. The equipment and knowledge gave Iran a jump-start in its secret program to enrich uranium, which the United States and other countries now claim is part of a plan to produce a nuclear weapon.

Bhutto has confirmed the story and consistently said that she was furious to find out from Rafsanjani that Pakistan was providing its nuclear technology to Iran. She said she responded by ordering that no nuclear scientist be permitted to travel outside Pakistan without her approval. Although Bhutto publicly declared her opposition to nuclear weapons for Pakistan, she often took a different line in private discussions and talked about extending the nuclear legacy of her late father, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who began the effort in 1972 to build an “Islamic Bomb.”

The military ousted Benazir Bhutto as prime minister in 1990, in part because her ties to the United States had raised fears that she would sacrifice the country’s nuclear program. “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability simply cannot be safe under the leadership of a Westernized woman,” said Maulana Sami ul-Haq, the head of one of the Islamic parties aligned with the intelligence service at the time.

After engineering a political comeback and winning reelection in October 1993, Bhutto reemerged wiser and wilier, determined to avoid confrontation with senior military and intelligence officials. So when Khan requested an appointment with her in December 1993, Bhutto saw an opportunity to recruit an ally. By that time, Khan was recognized as the public face of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, an open secret in the country and the world. He was wealthy and influential, supported by the generals and intelligence masters Bhutto feared most.

Arriving at Bhutto’s office, Khan explained that he knew the prime minister was scheduled to pay a state visit to China later that month. He asked if she would make a detour on his behalf. “If you are going to North Korea, it would be very nice if you could talk to Kim Il Sung about helping us with this nuclear thing,” said Khan, according to Bhutto’s own recollection.

“What do you mean, ‘this nuclear thing’?” Bhutto asked.

Khan explained that the North Koreans were willing to sell Pakistan the designs for a version of the No-Dong missile, which could carry a nuclear payload. Bhutto pointed out that Pakistan already had missiles capable of reaching India. But Khan said he and the generals wanted longer-range missiles with a bigger warhead capacity.

Though she recognized the danger that a new missile could heighten the arms race with India, Bhutto saw an opportunity to curry favor with Khan and his military backers. When she returned from her trip, Bhutto handed over the designs for the missile to Khan. U.S. intelligence agencies believe this exchange was the beginning of Khan’s relationship with North Korea, a relationship that would later yield North Korea the enrichment technology they vitally needed to launch their own nuclear weapons program. Bhutto maintains, however, that she authorized payment for the designs in cash only—not by bartering Pakistan's centrifuge technology.