“Yes.” — Husain Haqqani

ARIF ALI/AFP/Getty Images

Barbecue season: If the United States doesn’t push Musharraf out, will we see more scenes like this?

Washington has consistently overestimated Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s value as an ally in the war on terror. Under Musharraf’s military rule, terrorism in Pakistan has increased and terrorist safe havens have expanded. Billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Musharraf’s authoritarian regime has done little to stem the tide of anti-Americanism sweeping this nuclear-armed Muslim nation of 160 million people.

After Musharraf’s decision in early November to suspend Pakistan’s constitution and impose martial law under the guise of emergency rule, even his limited utility as Washington’s partner has dissipated. And now that Pakistan’s military, police, and intelligence services are busy arresting Supreme Court judges, beating up protesting lawyers, and tracking opposition politicians, they certainly aren’t able to focus their energies on flushing out terrorists.

It is true that after 9/11 Musharraf withdrew Pakistani support for the Taliban regime and cooperated in U.S. military operations that led to the liberation of Afghanistan. But any Pakistani ruler would have done the same. Presented with a stark ultimatum—support the United States or be bombed back to the Stone Age—what choice did Musharraf have?

Nor is the general irreplaceable when it comes to combating international terrorists. In the first two years following 9/11, Pakistan under Musharraf helped detain several high-ranking al Qaeda figures, primarily acting on U.S. intelligence. In his recent memoir, Musharraf acknowledges that the offer of large rewards by the U.S. government served as an incentive for Pakistan’s law enforcement personnel in apprehending al Qaeda operatives. There is no reason to believe this incentive would have been less effective if someone other than Musharraf were wielding power in Islamabad.

In fact, Musharraf himself is part of the problem. He has dithered in shutting down homegrown jihadi networks that were created during the 1990s by Pakistani intelligence for its proxy war in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. He has been unwilling to treat the Afghan Taliban as a terrorist threat, and his decision to make distinctions between al Qaeda and the Taliban has resulted in the Afghan group’s comeback in recent years. Overall, Musharraf’s mistakes have made the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan a terrorist safe haven, leading to the creeping Talibanization of Pakistan.

Meanwhile, unqualified U.S. backing has encouraged Musharraf to suppress dissent at home while posing as a relatively liberal dictator abroad. Mainstream political parties and moderate civil society groups have borne the brunt of Musharraf’s repression while Islamist parties have been given carte blanche to expand their influence. Incredibly, jihadi groups have had a freer hand than Musharraf’s civilian detractors.

The analytical mistake at the heart of U.S. support for Musharraf is the view that Pakistan’s Army is the most influential institution in the country (which is true) and that U.S. interests are best served by buying leverage with Pakistan’s generals through foreign aid (which is false). During the past 53 years, the United States has provided some $21 billion in overt aid, about $17 billion of which has been given to military regimes and primarily for military purposes. The Army is Pakistan’s most influential institution precisely because of U.S. support, not independent of it.

For years, the generals have told the Americans that the United States needs Pakistan more than the reverse, and key U.S. policymakers clearly believe this story—to Musharraf’s great benefit. There is, however, a long history of the United States’ attempting to purchase influence with the Pakistani Army only to find that Pakistan’s generals do not keep their end of the bargain. The Americans assume that they run the relationship because they are the more powerful party, but in fact it is Pakistan’s military rulers who end up calling the shots.

By abandoning Pervez Musharraf, the United States could signal that it will not tolerate Pakistan becoming “Myanmar lite,” a nation permanently dominated by its military. Once Washington makes it clear that it will no longer support Musharraf, Pakistan’s military will have to start negotiating with the country’s political parties and civil society instead of dictating to them. Only then will Pakistan be able to emerge as a normal country with predictable patterns of political change, which will make it easier to ensure the security of its nuclear weapons and to fight the terrorists who benefit from the country’s present chaos. It is time for Musharraf to go and for civilian rule to return.

Husain Haqqani is a professor and director of the Center for International Relations at Boston University, and author of Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).