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Current Article
Seven Questions: Castro’s Decline
Page 1 of 1
Posted December 2007
In 1961, 12-year-old Cuban immigrant Carlos Saladrigas arrived alone in Miami with nothing but three dollars in his pocket, five bottles of rum, and a box of cigars. Now a successful businessman and a prominent U.S. critic of the Cuban regime, Saladrigas shares his thoughts on Fidel Castro’s decline and the political future of his homeland.

AFP/Getty Images
Fading away: Like all good old soldiers, Fidel Castro seems poised to exit the scene quietly.

Foreign Policy: Fidel Castro hinted this week, in a letter read on national television, that he may soon be stepping down to make room for a new generation of Cuban leaders. Since it seems that his brother Raúl has been primarily in charge for some time now, how significant would it be if Fidel gave up his formal role?

Carlos Saladrigas: In many ways, what Fidel said, he’s said before. There’s not a whole lot that’s new. What is new is the way it was presented in the news there. Out of his whole, long letter, [the regime] chose to highlight the transfer of power to the younger generations. In Cuba, like in all Communist regimes, symbols like this are used to send messages, and they do mean a lot. So, I am optimistic that Fidel Castro is not going to renew or reaccept the significant post that he has had before, and that they’re paving the way for a significant reorganization of the government.

FP: As someone who has been waiting for the end of the Castro era as long as you have, how does it feel to see him go out with a whimper rather than a bang?

CS: I never expected a bang. That’s wishful thinking. This is a regime that still has significant strength, and unfortunately a lot of the policies we have had against Cuba for many years have only served to reinforce the regime rather than weaken it. This is the beginning of the end; there’s no question. Everyone in Cuba—including inside the regime—has a clear awareness that change is necessary. The question is: When, how, and in what manner?

FP: From talking with people inside Cuba, what’s your sense of the mood in Havana these days? How aware are people there of these political developments? Do they have access to the same information we do?

CS: They are getting the same information, but they don’t have access to the type of analysis and opinions that we get on this side. So, they formulate their own opinions. The rumor mill begins, and it takes on a life of its own to the point where people there are almost living in parallel reality. But there’s no doubt that the Cuban people’s expectations for change are rising, in great part because of the things Raúl Castro has been saying for over a year and a half. I would find it dumb, or at least difficult to understand, if this man were raising the type of expectations for change that he’s been raising and is not ready to deliver.

FP: Is Fidel still viewed as the leader of Cuba or have we, in a sense, already entered the post-Fidel era?

CS: Fidel, as a man, has always obtained an incredible amount of his legitimacy through the power of his personal charisma. That has served him well, not only internally, but externally. But for years, this man has been in decline. When you see your leader who you’ve come to respect—maybe not liked, but respected—on television telling people how to cook rice or how to fool around with a stupid light bulb, that’s not the image Cuba expects of its leader.

FP: Some analysts say that while Cubans have been willing to put up with a certain amount of abject poverty under the Castro regime, they won’t be as patient under his successor. Do you think there’s anything to this argument?

CS: There’s a lot of truth to that. Fidel Castro’s government obtained legitimacy in three fundamental ways. The first is his personal charisma. The second has been the perennial confrontation with the United States. That has been an incredible source of legitimacy for this regime, again both internally and externally. And the last has been the successes of the revolution in education and healthcare.

Raúl Castro is inheriting a difficult situation. He doesn’t have Fidel’s charisma, so he cannot obtain charismatic legitimacy. I don’t think he’s willing or able to have this continuous confrontation with the United States. And the achievements of the revolution are crumbling due to a lack of infrastructure investment in these sectors for years and years. So, the only choice Raúl has for his government is to obtain legitimacy through results. And the only way they can achieve results is through major and significant reforms. The option of doing nothing is increasingly less attractive.

FP: Do you think that if Fidel leaves his official position, it would make the lifting of the U.S. embargo any more likely?

CS: A lot of it depends on what happens. If Fidel takes an elder statesman role and he is limited to what he is doing now, which is just giving opinions on any subject from A to Z, he will become highly irrelevant to Cuba’s future. If Cuba makes some serious changes—particularly economic changes—the next [U.S.] president, whether Republican or Democrat, is going to be hard-pressed to not respond in a meaningful way. I don’t think the United States can continue the foolish policy of saying, “I am not going to engage at all until the process of democratic consolidation is complete in Cuba.” This is the moment to engage more directly and have more Americans going to Cuba, whether academics or cultural exchanges, but particularly Cuban-Americans. That is going to strengthen the civil society movement in Cuba and the opposition. It is those forces that will ensure that the process of democratic reform will accelerate as the regime undertakes economic reforms.

FP: Do you think that optimism like yours is pervasive in the Cuban-American community in Miami, or has there been too much false hope in recent years?

CS: I think optimism here is very pervasive. The problem is: What kind of optimism? The Cuban-American community is split between those who believe in a “big-bang” theory of transition and those who believe that transitions are microprocesses that tend to work over time. The big-bang proponents are very optimistic that a social collapse is inevitable in Cuba, and there will be a huge power vacuum and the regime will collapse and somehow democracy will emerge like a phoenix out of that collapse. I, and the majority of others, believe that the more likely scenario is a gradual process of change. But either way, everybody’s optimistic.

Carlos A. Saladrigas is vice chairman of Premier American Bank in Miami and the cochairman of the Cuba Study Group.


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