Q: Labeling U.S. foreign policy over the past eight years as the “George W. Bush” foreign policy seems like a misnomer. Many influential members of his inner circle collaborated to craft what you call “Bush’s Legacy.” Policy on Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, and, most importantly, Iraq seemed to have been dominated by inner-circle neoconservatives and to a lesser extent the military, while policy on China, for example, was strongly influenced by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. How did the strong personalities in the Bush administration—from Colin Powell to Condoleezza Rice to Donald Rumsfeld—influence the Bush Legacy?

David Frum: Well yes, that is always true of any administration. There will be much fruitful work for biographers and historians disentangling who exactly did what. Let me suggest one thought that should be kept in mind, however: Many of these “strong” personalities had a strange way of going passive at crucial moments. One rises in Washington as much by avoiding blame for failure as by gaining credit for success—and the best way to avoid blame is to stake out an ambiguous position that allows one later to claim to have been right all along. Many of the leading figures in the Bush years were masters of this technique.

Q: Many claim that Iraq’s magnitude distracted Bush from problems at home—he failed to upgrade infrastructure, provide a solution to the growing health insurance crisis, rethink Social Security, and ultimately reform the financial system. Do you believe that, while financially and physically distracted in Iraq, the United States squandered an irrecoverable opportunity to lay the political, legal, social, and economic groundwork necessary for the next president’s success in a multipolar world?

DF: I have often written that I don’t believe that George W. Bush ever had a well-considered domestic agenda. So in that sense, no, Iraq did not distract him. More urgently: Success in Iraq is a crucial part of building a better groundwork for world order. The Persian Gulf is obviously a hugely strategic part of the world. Replacing a reckless, brutal, and WMD-seeking dictatorship with a representative government, defeating an Islamist insurgency in the heart of the Islamic world, and liberating Iraq to rejoin the world market—these will be large events, with large consequences.

Q: You argue that “The U.S. homeland has enjoyed almost complete immunity from acts of international terrorism” during Bush’s term. Although this is certainly true, I have been disturbed by the fast-growing number of attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where it seems that the Taliban and al Qaeda are staging a comeback. Generals in the military have recently sounded the alarm that we may lose the fight if urgent measures are not taken to increase troops and resources. Hasn’t attention in Iraq tied our hands in dealing with this other front in the war on terror?

DF: To some extent, yes. As a matter of interest, I am writing these answers at the Dutch and Australian military base in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan—and I have witnessed here some of the consequences of U.S. and allied underinvestment in this country in the 2002-06 period. That said, the counterinsurgency lessons learned in Iraq are already proving hugely useful in organizing the new NATO strategy to quell the insurgency here.

Q: You mention “new bilateral trade agreements” as one of the positive foreign-policy legacies of the Bush administration, yet as the economy has shown weakness, the mood in recent months has turned against opening U.S. borders. Did President Bush fail to convince the American public of what he perceived to be the value of free trade? How long will it take for such trade agreements to be appreciated?

DF: The mood in the United States has been turning against open trade for almost half a decade—victim, I think, of the stagnation of the wages of ordinary workers during the Bush years. I wrote a defense of the Bush foreign policy, not the Bush domestic policy. Even before the mortgage meltdown, Americans were feeling anxious about their living standards, and politicians of course exploit those anxieties, as Barack Obama, for example, did with his attacks on NAFTA during the Ohio primary.

Q: The United States has struggled to persuade other NATO countries to take on serious commitments in manning the mission in Afghanistan, as you point out. After the Bush years, will NATO continue to be a viable military alliance, capable of true consensus?

DF: If NATO was in trouble, Vladimir Putin has saved it. The Russian invasion of Georgia reminded the nations of Eastern and Central Europe why they need NATO— and they in turn will be raising powerful and effective voices inside the councils of Europe.

Q: I hoped in your discussion of the Bush administration’s foreign policy that you would address the impact that controversies over torture, Guantánamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib have had on U.S. influence and credibility on the international stage. Have these scandals shattered the international image of America as a beacon of freedom?