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The FP Debate: Samuel Huntington’s Legacy
Page 3 of 4

Day 3: Larry Diamond

Samuel P. Huntington's work was so prolific and such a force of intellectual nature over so many decades, it is hard to pick his best and worst insights. Naturally and instantaneously, his admirers have been drawn to perhaps his greatest, most original work, Political Order in Changing Society -- the one book I retain on my shelf in its original form from my freshman year, the binding broken, the heavily underlined pages struggling to hang together.

It was a brilliant and enduring insight to establish, all over again after Hobbes, the primary of political order -- the most basic question of political science. But this was not the hopelessly conservative book it was often denounced as in the 70s. It was a study of the need (in the midst of modernization) for political institutionalization, the need to create rules, organizations and patterns of behavior to acquire the value, stability, predictability and general acceptance that would make them last. This in turn meant they had to become, in his famous four-fold typology, adaptable to new challenges and generations, complex in evolving multiple diversified subunits, autonomous from other social groupings or purposes that might subordinate or capture them, and coherent in sharing a unified sense of purpose and accepted procedures for resolving disputes. That insight and the larger thinking about political institutions, order, and change in that book -- for example, that stability required modernization of political institutions to keep pace with socioeconomic development, became a core building block for generations of future work on political development. Huntington understood what the Communist Chinese will have to wrestle in the next two decades, that "modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability," that countries can pass through dangerous periods as their old social structures are rattled and people are freed up for new forms of mobilization and belief. Huntington understood -- and this was one of his greatest insights -- that refashioning political order in the midst of social change requires filling the gap with new, durable, and effective political institutions. "Organization," he wrote on the final page of Political Order, "is the road to political power, but it is also the foundation of political stability and thus the precondition of political liberty."

For me, however, Huntington's most enduring work will prove to be The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Its generalizations are not as sweeping because it is bound by historical time, but 35 years after the inception of what he himself identified as a third decisive wave of democratic change in global history, the key drivers of democratic change he elucidated -- social, economic, cultural, regional, and political -- remain the central players in drivers of democratic change. That countries were undergoing simultaneous processes of political, economic, and social change leading in similar (democratic) directions; that their positive dimensions of success were "snowballing" or gathering momentum into demonstration effects that were rolling across borders; that there important tactical lessons of moderation and pragmatism that could be learned and transferred to other transitions were all immensely important insights that actually helped to advance democratic change after this book was published in 1991. Not all of it was new, but it had never been formulated with such elegant clarity and global comprehensiveness, nor had any political science scholar had the temerity to offer such practical tips as this one dealing with departing autocrats: "the least unsatisfactory course may well be, do not punish, do not forgive, and above all do not forget."

I think The Third Wave was Huntington's most flawless book -- a remarkable illumination of analytic thought, global perspective, and diverse historical trends and explanations. In this field, it stands in marked contrast to his essay of less than a decade before in Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1984), where, reviewing what he (and many colleagues) had thought to be the social science conditions for democracy, he concluded:

The substantial power of anti-democratic governments (particularly the Soviet Union), the receptivity to democracy of several major cultural traditions, the difficulties of eliminating poverty in large parts of the world, and the prevalence of high levels of polarization and violence in many societies all suggest that, with few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached.

That was a huge bonehead mistake, missing the third wave momentum that was already gathering, but it did not stop a great social scientist from regrouping, uncovering where he went wrong, and documenting the scope and causes of the great transformation that followed.

In his later years in particular, Huntington became too obsessed with the cultural variable, which took on a deterministic air in seeing a grand cultural conflict brewing between East and West, and Christianity and Islam, over differences on values, immigration, and democracy itself. The huge mistake I think he made here was to essentialize rival cultures in ways that made conflict inevitable. Of course, there is a prescient caution in the book, warning Americans (like George W. Bush) "not to attempt to shape other civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power." But it is simply wrong to suggest that "pluralism, individualism, and rule of law" represent the "distinctive" value inheritance of the Christian world. The story of the Third Wave, which proceeds in a way that leaves Huntington at odds with himself, suggests that with creative efforts at institution building and civic mobilization, these values can indeed become universal, and indeed I think ultimately democracy, freedom, and the rule of law are becoming universal values.

Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Stanford's Hoover Institution and the author of Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Times Books, 2005).



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