Considering that Iran is listed by the U.S. State
Department as the world's No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism (and Americans are
one of its main victims), that is disquieting news. The dangers were well
summed up by another bipartisan report, this one issued by former Senators Chuck
Robb and Dan Coats: "Iran's
nuclear development may pose the most significant strategic threat to the United States
during the next Administration. A nuclear-ready or nuclear-armed Islamic
Republic ruled by the clerical regime could threaten the Persian Gulf region
and its vast energy resources, spark nuclear proliferation throughout the
Middle East, inject additional volatility into global energy markets, embolden
extremists in the region and destabilize states such as Saudi Arabia and others
in the region, provide nuclear technology to other radical regimes and
terrorists (although Iran might hesitate to share traceable nuclear
technology), and seek to make good on its threats to eradicate Israel."
No wonder there is general agreement across the U.S. political spectrum that, as President-elect
Barack Obama said in the second presidential debate in October, "We cannot
allow Iran
to get a nuclear weapon." Yet what is he actually prepared to do to stop the
mullahs?
Bush relied on tough talk and toothless diplomacy
conducted by France, Britain, and Germany. Those negotiations went
nowhere, but that doesn't discourage Obama from vowing to place even more
emphasis on diplomacy once he takes office. He has vowed to use "sticks" as
well as "carrots" but, given the opposition of China and Russia in particular,
there is scant cause to think that he will be any more successful than Bush in putting
real multilateral pressure on Iran. Indeed, an Iranian spokesman has already
rejected Obama's approach, saying, "Tehran's
stand is the same as before; that is, if they [the U.S. administration] want suspension,
we have repeatedly announced that we will not suspend [enrichment activities]."
The likelihood is that the Iranians will continue
to string Obama along, as they've strung along the Europeans, drawing out the
negotiations to give themselves time to produce a bomb. Once they actually go
nuclear, they realize from observing North Korea's experience that their
leverage to demand concessions from the West will soar and the West's capacity
for an effective response will plummet. (North Korea is another country
where Bush has done little to head off a serious threat.)
For all the empty talk of "tough diplomacy," the
uncomfortable reality is that there is only one option that in the short term
is likely to forestall Iran
from going nuclear: airstrikes on its atomic installations. That is hardly an
ideal solution, and, given how dispersed and protected Iran's nuclear facilities are, not
even a series of sorties is likely to eradicate the threat. But bombing could
at least set back the Iranian program for a number of years, which is more than
diplomacy is likely to accomplish.
Bush has implicitly threatened such a strike when
he has said time after time that "all options are on the table," but he has never
made any moves to prepare either the U.S.
military or the U.S.
public for such action. Some reports suggest he went so far as to discourage Israel
from mounting its own raid.
No doubt President-elect Obama is listening to the
numerous voices inside and outside his incoming administration that cite the many
drawbacks of an attack on Iran.
And, no question, the drawbacks are real. These range from the possibility of
the Iranian people rallying around the mullahs to the possibility of the mullahs
closing the Strait of Hormuz or carrying out terrorist strikes on U.S. forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or as far
afield as Europe or the Americas.
There are even greater potential pitfalls associated
with a serious attempt to stamp out terrorism emanating from Pakistan. "Preemption lite" -- the
current approach of picking off terrorist leaders with armed Predator drones --
can help to weaken and slow the jihadists, but it can hardly defeat them. That
would, in all likelihood, require an invasion of western Pakistan, perhaps accompanied by preemptive airstrikes
on Pakistan's
nuclear installations. That is an undertaking so daunting as to make even the
most hawkish of analysts turn dovish.
Pakistan is, after all, a country of 160 million people with nuclear weapons and
more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel. Even if most of its armed
forces could be convinced not to resist a large-scale, U.S.-led incursion (and
that is by no means a certainty), the invading troops would have to deal with
the nightmarish prospect of pacifying the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
This region is home to more than 6 million Pashtuns living amid treacherous,
mountainous terrain that has never been fully brought under control by any
outside power. Next door is the North-West Frontier
Province, which has a population of 20 million and has also become
a playground for jihadists. Sending U.S. troops to take on such a
difficult task would be virtually unthinkable, barring another tragedy on the
scale of 9/11.
And that's precisely the point. We Americans shy
away from preemptive action because we can imagine all too clearly the costs of
action. But we lack the imagination to see the costs of inaction. Or, rather,
we can imagine the costs, but we tell ourselves, fingers crossed, that we may
never have to pay them. Perhaps we will not live to see a major attack, emanating
from Pakistan or Iran, on our
soil or the soil of an allied country. Perhaps we will indeed dodge the bullet
-- or, more aptly, the bomb. Or perhaps not.
In a prosperous democracy it is all too easy for
our leaders to succumb to the same soothing narcosis as the general populace,
content to imagine that problems do not really exist because they have not yet fully
materialized. That is the illusion that Churchill fought against in the 1930s
and Clarke in the 1990s. They both failed. Now, as the United States and
our allies fail to act decisively against present-day dangers, we know why.