Part II: The Case for Redeployment and Other Difficult Steps

Upon taking office, Obama will likely face great pressure from various parties -- military, Iraqi, and partisan -- to relax his plans to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq. There will likely be coordinated arguments about the fragility of the current situation, the risk of squandering the gains of the "surge," and the need to maintain troop strength through the provincial and national elections. These arguments should be resisted. The catalog of political frailties and security risks are real, but there is little reason to believe they will be any less real in six months or in a year. Postponing withdrawals would continue to freeze the current situation in place, while squandering the best opportunity the United States will ever have to reshape its commitments to Iraq.

There is only one chance to make a first impression. The transition to a new administration represents a unique -- and short-lived -- opportunity to establish a new relationship with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people. It is absolutely essential that upon taking office, Obama clearly affirms, publicly and privately, his commitment to his timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops. At the same time, the president should assure the Iraqis that he intends to jointly coordinate and manage the drawdown of U.S. troops. Any uncertainty about American intentions in this regard should be corrected. Front-loading withdrawals would help significantly with the July referendum on the SOFA/WA.

Several broad recommendations should guide the administration's policy:

• Make a significant "down payment" on troop withdrawals. There will be tremendous pressure to postpone the initial withdrawals because of the intense calendar of Iraqi events detailed above. This would be a mistake. A visible, significant early withdrawal would help significantly with the SOFA/WA referendum, would send an important message to Iraqi leaders, and would break the institutional inertia that threatens to lock in the current strategy. Only the certainty of a U.S. withdrawal will shift the incentives of Iraqi politicians to move quickly towards a minimally acceptable political accommodation. Many Iraqis are deeply concerned about alleged secret annexes to the SOFA/WA and that the United States does not really intend to leave. The more clearly the commitment to withdrawal can be articulated, the better -- for both Iraqi and American political purposes.. The military is already prepared for such an initial withdrawal, and should have little problem implementing such early cuts -- and would welcome the freeing up of resources for Afghanistan and other challenges. Critics will argue that this is not the right time to begin withdrawals, but it never will be.
• Lower expectations about U.S. ability to micro-manage or shape Iraqi politics. The United States' goals and expectations in terms of shaping Iraqi domestic politics should reflect its diminishing commitments and presence. One way to operationalize this would be to focus U.S. efforts on the political front on encouraging the implementation of the Iraqi Parliament's Political Reform Document -- the comprehensive set of political reform and power-sharing commitments adopted as part of Iraqi negotiations over the SOFA/WA. This ambitious document, drafted and agreed upon by Iraqi politicians rather than by American observers, would address most of the pressing issues undermining stability in Iraq... if implemented.
• Establish a new relationship with the Iraqi government. The Iraqi leadership has a deep, well-established relationship with Bush administration officials, not to mention a significant set of private understandings. The Iraqis are uncertain about the Obama administration, and likely hope to resume business as usual with the new team. It is important to make clear that relations will change. The withdrawal of combat brigades and the defining the mission of residual forces should be jointly managed with the Iraqis, but at the same time it should be made clear that the age of the blank check and permanent commitments has come to an end. This does not mean creating a hostile relationship or negative dynamic. The emphasis should be on partnering to manage the drawdown of U.S. forces and the building of a new, constructive relationship. But it does mean doing something early on to demonstrate the new approach -- to show that conditionality is real, and that the Bush blank check has ended.
• Shape the debate on the SOFA/WA. U.S. policy and public statements should be highly attuned to the urgency of shaping the debate over the SOFA/WA. Deep suspicions about American intentions and a pervasive mood of hostility toward the United States are currently shaping the Iraqi political debate. If left unattended, these suspicions -- fanned by opponents of the agreement -- could well lead to a deeply undesirable outcome in the July referendum. Obama should move early and aggressively to reassure the Iraqi public about its commitment to the SOFA and to the withdrawal, as well as to the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state. And it is vital that the United States speak with one voice to avoid such confusion: Military commanders should refrain from making statements that throw into question American commitments to the SOFA/WA.
• Restate commitment to Iraqi territorial unity. Many Iraqis believe that Vice President-elect Joseph Biden's old proposal to partition Iraq is the administration's "secret" policy. Such concerns should be addressed with clear statements of commitment to Iraq's territorial, federal unity in order to remove one potential and unnecessary irritant in U.S.-Iraqi relations.

Conclusion

President-elect Obama will have an initial window of opportunity to establish credibility at home, in Iraq, and in the wider regional and international arena. An overly cautious approach to the withdrawal of combat forces would quickly squander this opportunity. Muddying the U.S. commitment to withdrawal could well endanger the prospects for the SOFA/WA referendum in Iraq and may trigger, rather than prevent, the feared deterioration in security and political conditions. Obama must therefore move quickly and aggressively to define his new policy, and not allow the impressive catalog of challenges facing Iraq this year to paralyze U.S. policy. The new president should honor his campaign promises and begin his administration by announcing a significant "down payment" on troop withdrawals and presenting a clear vision for the future of the American role in Iraq. Only then will the incentives be aligned to push Iraq towards a stable future and to shape a sustainable U.S.-Iraqi relationship.