Timothy Geithner should stay away from cheap populism and hold his tongue about the yuan.
KAREN BLEIER/AFP/Getty Images
With just a few words
in his Senate confirmation hearing, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
resurrected the long-held American accusation that China's
penchant for money management is hurting the U.S. economy. "President Obama --
backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists -- believes that China is
manipulating its currency," Geithner wrote in his prepared remarks.
As the argument goes,
an undervalued Chinese currency makes the country's exports artificially cheap,
giving Chinese goods an unfair competitive edge. Reduced demand for American
goods hurts U.S.
manufacturers and limits the size of the U.S. job market. China is taking
jobs from the American heartland.
Blaming China for flailing U.S. manufacturing may be good
domestic politics, but Geithner should hold his tongue. First, there is little
evidence that a currency appreciation would have an effect on the U.S. economy --
let alone a positive one. Regardless, China will be compelled to
appreciate its currency out of economic necessity in coming years. And because
the United States
has very few channels through which to push for appreciation, theyuan is better left alone.
Geithner's is certainly not the last Western complaint we
will hear of China's
currency, particularly now with an economic crisis in full swing. Yet many
experts contend that there is actually no connection between the yuan and the
health of U.S.
manufacturing. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified in
2005: "I am aware of no credible evidence that ... a marked increase in the
exchange value of the Chinese [yuan] relative to the dollar would significantly
increase manufacturing activity and jobs in the United States."
The transition away from manufacturing is a long-term
international trend that goes far beyond competition from Chinese exports. Jobs
have been cut because technological improvements have simply made each worker
more productive. A study by Alliance Capital Management (now AllianceBerstein)
found that manufacturing employment in the world's 20 largest economies
declined by 22 million workers from 1995 to 2002, while manufacturing output in
those countries increased 30 percent. During that period, China lost 15 million manufacturing jobs, while
the United States
lost just 2 million.
If anything, Chinese currency intervention actually has
several positive consequences for the U.S. economy. China has a large investment in U.S. debt, which helps keep U.S. interest
rates low, allowing firms to make investments that would be unattractive at a
higher cost of borrowing. Such investments increase the amount of capital
available and thereby boost employment and the size of the economy. An
undervalued yuan also reduces U.S. dollar inflation. And by keeping imports
cheap, it increases the purchasing power of the average U.S. consumer.
Nor is the oft-cited U.S.
trade deficit with China,
which reached $246 billion in 2008, truly a result of currency manipulation or
the resulting lower wages paid to Chinese industrial workers. In fact, the
imbalance is the result of a gaping difference between U.S. savings
and investment. In 2008, the U.S.
savings rate was a mere 3 percent, whereas China's savings rate was a whopping
50 percent. In 2006, the ratio of domestic savings to national investment in
the United States
was 68 percent; meaning 32 cents of every dollar invested needed to come from
foreigners. The same ratio was 118 percent in China,
meaning that China
sent abroad 18 cents out of every dollar the country invested. Unless these
savings and investment patterns change, a rising yuan will have no effect on
the U.S. trade deficit with China.
In any case, market forces will
compel China
to appreciate its currency in coming years for domestic reasons. Today, the
People's Bank of China (PBOC) devalues its currency by purchasing U.S. Treasury
securities. In doing so, it must first convert yuan to dollars, thereby
releasing more Chinese currency into circulation, devaluing it and increasing
inflation in the process. The PBOC "sterilizes" the purchase by simultaneously
selling yuan-denominated PBOC bonds, which remove yuan from circulation,
negating the inflationary effect of the intervention.
But sterilization is becoming problematic for the PBOC. First,
the process has not been fully effective. Money-supply growth accelerated from 14.6 percent in 2004
to 17.8 percent in 2008, pushing China to a peak inflation of 8.7
percent in 2008, far above the government's target of 4.8 percent. Likewise,
due to the immense scope of China's
past intervention, the amount of PBOC bonds outstanding is now equal to more
than half of the total amount of yuan in circulation. Demand for PBOC bonds is
low, which means interest rates are rising and relatively high, about 5.31
percent currently, compared with U.S. short-term interest rates near
0 percent. The cost to the PBOC of receiving little or no interest on the U.S. bonds it
owns and paying 5 percent interest on its own bonds is more than $4 billion a
month, according to estimates by Goldman Sachs. China's foreign currency holdings,
which total more than $2 trillion, are growing faster than the Chinese economy.
In coming years, these realities will make intervention and sterilization
untenable.
Pegging its currency to the
U.S. dollar, the PBOC has also forfeited the ability to use monetary policy to
manage its economy. As China's
economy grows larger and less correlated with that of the United States',
this will become increasingly problematic. There is also a large opportunity
cost, as $2 trillion of foreign reserves could be invested in any number of
beneficial internal projects.
There is neither need --
nor a way -- to browbeat China
into appreciating the yuan sooner. Diplomatic pressure has had limited effect
thus far. The United States
also has the option of appealing to the World Trade Organization to impose
trade sanctions, or it could impose sanctions unilaterally. Both are unlikely.
The G-7 is currently split on whether currency intervention should be allowed,
as other members have threatened intervention themselves in recent weeks. As
for unilateral sanctions, they would be more detrimental to the U.S. economy than the policies they would seek
to punish, even if China
did not retaliate, which it likely would.
If the United States
is looking to pressure China,
perhaps it would do better to focus on issues where real results are possible.
It should encourage China
to honor the commitments it made in joining the WTO, such as reducing pollution
and improving its human rights record. And finally, if it truly seeks to make
its workers more competitive with those in China
and elsewhere over long term, the United States should take a hard
look in the mirror, and focus on raising worker productivity and reforming its
educational system rather than on illusory exchange rate gains and
protectionist policies.
Tibita Kaneene is a
freelance analyst who has worked as an investment banker, currency trader, and in
private equity.
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