The Great Depression made the United States the world's unquestioned financial leader. The current crisis can do the same for China.
PAUL J. RICHARDS/AFP/Getty Images
Fear itself: Like the U.S. during the Great Depression, domestic concerns are keeping China from opening up to world markets.
In the Great Depression, as in the current economic crisis, the
downturn was particularly severe because of a lack of leadership in the
international order. The dominant financial power of the 19th century,
Britain, was financially exhausted by the First World War. The new
major creditor, the United States, had emerged as a strong economic
player, but did not yet have leadership committed to the maintenance of
an open international economic order. The simple diagnosis was that
Britain was unable to lead, and the United States unwilling.
If
the scenario sounds familiar, it should. The story from the Great
Depression has an uncanny echo in current debates about international
economic leadership, with the United States playing the role of Britain
-- the exhausted debtor economy -- and China taking the place of the
United States as the world's largest creditor. But if China is the
America of this century, can it do a better job than the United States
did in the 1930s? The way in which the emerging superpower takes to
this role will determine in large part how the world will emerge from
the downturn and the shape of the new global economic order that will
follow.
Charles Kindleberger, the late economist, argued that
the United States should have acted as a lender of last resort in the
early 1930s, continuing to keep its financial markets open to
investment and its market open to foreign goods, rather than heading
down the path of protectionism. It should also have stimulated the
world economy through countercyclical fiscal policy.
But at the
time of the Great Depression, there were all kinds of convincing
reasons why Americans did not want to take on the burden of a worldwide
rescue. Sending more money to Europe was seen as pouring money down the
drain, and after all, Europeans had fought the world war that had been
the root cause of the financial mess. Economically, helping Europe
would have made a great deal of sense from a long-term perspective, but
politically it was a non-starter with no short-term payoff.
In
the middle of the current financial crisis, a deep-pocketed China faces
the same dilemma: swallow its pique and help save the same countries
that got us into this situation, or look to its own short-term
interests first. Today, there are increasing demands that China
contribute more to internationally coordinated rescue packages through
a reformed International Monetary Fund (IMF). China is also one of the
few economies still growing in 2009, though most economists have
reduced their estimates of growth rates. Finally, China and the United
States are the only countries that are large enough, and have
sufficiently well-ordered government finances, to launch major efforts
at fiscal stimulation.
Beijing's leaders might feel like they
have already taken their best shot. The initial stages of the credit
crunch in 2007 were managed so apparently painlessly because sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) from the Middle East, but above all from China,
were willing to step in and recapitalize the debt of U.S. and European
institutions. Between November 2007 and March 2008, the SWFs provided
$41 billion of the $105 billion injected into major financial
institutions. Had this process continued, the events of 2008 would have
included problems with U.S. real estate and a severe stock market
decline, but no meltdown of financial institutions.
But after
March 2008, the availability of funds to prop up the global financial
system shriveled up. The pivotal moment in today's events came when the
state-owned China Investment Corp. (CIC) was unwilling to go further in
its exploration of buying Lehman Brothers. CIC's turning back will be
held up in the future as a moment when history could have shifted in a
different direction.
Today there may be plenty of reasons why
the Chinese will be tempted to pull back from their engagement with the
world economy, and the external political logic sounds very much like
the U.S. case of 1931. Some of the economic arguments reverberating
around Beijing are very reasonable: There is a great deal of
uncertainty, and the SWFs have lost a lot of money already and might
lose more. China's investments in U.S. securities in 2006 proved to be
a huge costly mistake. Clearly the CIC would have initially lost
further billions had it tried to rescue Lehman. Other lines of thought
are more emotional and political: Might not 2008 be a righteous payback
for the U.S. bungling of the 1997-1998 Asian crisis? Trying times tend
to heighten paranoia.
There are also many domestic reasons why
China might be wary about opening up to the global economy. The Chinese
banking system is still quite opaque and might still have to wrestle
with the legacy of problems of the 1990s, in particular, bad loans to
big state-owned corporations that were the consequence of a political
logic of directed credit. China is investing large amounts in
education, but it may be more difficult to build a creative and
innovative society that replicates the dynamism of the United States in
the second half of the 20th century (which was fed in large part by
openness, above all openness to immigration). China also faces a
problem of aging and even demographic decline after the 2040s as a
legacy of its one-child policy, which has also created a potentially
destabilizing surplus of young males. With all these threats to
stability, an authoritarian though reformist regime may find it harder
to respond flexibly to popular demands and may be prone to try to
mobilize a reactive nationalism to fend off challenges to its authority.