What the four-stars are reading -- a weekly column from Small Wars Journal.
April 17, 2009
Fighting terrorism with psychotherapy
Who's
best at dealing with a terrorist, a Delta Force marksman or a
therapist? Are terrorists motivated by political anger, religious
fervor, or mundane psychological insecurities? If people join terrorist
groups due to psychological frailty, might an army of counselors do
more good than an army of soldiers?
Writing at Small Wars
Journal, Lawrence E. Cline, an instructor at the Naval Postgraduate
School, discusses Saudi Arabia's program for reforming imprisoned
jihadists.
Beginning in 2004, Saudi Arabia's Interior Ministry
began a program that attempts to rehabilitate prison inmates convicted
of involvement in jihadi extremism. Included in the program have been
some Saudi citizens repatriated from Guantánamo Bay.
The program
begins with psychological evaluations by psychologists, psychiatrists,
and other social scientists. Those deemed suitable for the program then
receive extensive counseling from religious clerics. According to
Cline, these clerics have a mission of reeducating the inmates on the
meaning of "jihad" with the goal that after release from prison the
inmates will no longer be a threat to Saudi Arabia or other Muslims.
Has
the Saudi reeducation program worked? According to studies reviewed by
Cline, results have been mixed. One study cited only 35 recidivists out
of 1,400 participating and released inmates, a 2.5 percent recidivism
rate. On the other hand, the Saudi Interior Ministry released a list of
85 wanted alleged terrorists, 11 of whom were from Guantánamo and had
gone through the program.
In spite of that embarrassing setback,
Cline asserts that the Saudi program's recidivism rate is far lower
than that achieved by prison systems in most countries. Self-selection
explains much of this apparent success; those deemed incorrigible never
enter the program, while many other terrorist inmates refuse on their
own to participate. Graduates who end up members of terrorist cells in
Yemen or elsewhere outside Saudi Arabia are not listed as failures.
What
has the Saudi government learned about its terrorist inmates? For many,
perhaps most, politics or religion were not the reasons for joining the
jihadi cause. Rather:
Terrorist movements seem to provide a
sense of adventure, excitement, vision, purpose, camaraderie, and
involvement with them has an allure that can be difficult to resist.
But the ideology is usually something you acquire once you're involved.
Other
reasons Saudi authorities discovered included a poor understanding of
Islam, weak family backgrounds, difficulty dealing with authority, and
personal crises, such as a recent jilting by a girlfriend.
Every culture has to deal with young men who respond badly to these pressures; each deals with the consequences in its own way.
At
its most successful, Saudi Arabia's counseling program will not
rehabilitate the most fanatical of its terrorist inmates. But if Saudi
society can address the psychological factors that create terrorist
recruits, it might be able to dry up a bit the terrorist recruiting
pipeline.
Who should pay for Somalia's pirates?
For
the past eight years, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have been forced
to adjust to "asymmetrical warfare," where the enemy isn't the one they
planned for and fights in a way that neutralizes the U.S. military's
advantages. Now it's the U.S. Navy's turn to fight an asymmetrical
conflict, this time against Somalia's pirates.
The recent drama
involving the Maersk Alabama ended badly for the pirates, three of whom
were shot dead by U.S. Navy snipers. Somalia's pirates were unfazed by
this minor setback and seized several more merchant ships the following
day.
The Obama administration faces pressure to solve the piracy
problem. Those applying the pressure can point to basic policy guidance
of the U.S. Navy which lists "preserving freedom of the seas" and
"facilitating and defending peaceful commerce" as key strategic
objectives. When they wrote this, Navy officials may have had visions
of enemy submarines and guided missile cruisers rather than Somali
teenagers in motorboats.
Of course, the U.S. Navy is no stranger
to piracy. Two hundred years ago, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
responded to the Barbary corsairs by burning the pirates' boats and
ports, marching on the pirates' cities, and dethroning uncooperative
pashas.
Just as in Thomas Jefferson's day, resolving the piracy
problem off Somalia might require these same measures. But for now, no
U.S. policymaker who remembers the "Black Hawk Down" incident in
Mogadishu in 1993 wants to volunteer for another such tour of duty in
Somalia. In addition, the Shabab group, suspected of being an al Qaeda
affiliate in Somalia, would use a noisy, high-visibility intervention
in Somalia as an opportunity to mobilize support for its cause.
Can
the U.S. Navy use its surveillance abilities and firepower to attack
the pirates' boats? The Navy's problems with this approach parallel the
problems U.S. soldiers and marines have faced fighting asymmetric
adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan. The pirates' boats blend in with
those of common fishermen. The international media audience will view
preemptive attacks on Somali boats and crews as the U.S. Navy murdering
innocent fishermen.
Officials in the U.S. Defense Department
were probably happy to see the State Department lead the U.S.
government's response this week to the Somali piracy problem. On April
15, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton read a statement that discussed
the government's position. Notably, she asserted, "[B]ecause it is
clear that defending against piracy must be the joint responsibility of
governments and the shipping industry, I have directed our team to work
with shippers and the insurance industry to address gaps in their
self-defense measures."
In other words, shippers, shipping
companies, and the maritime insurance business should no longer expect
a free ride from the U.S. Navy. The police cannot be everywhere. Across
the world, people have adjusted to that by hiring doormen, night
watchmen, and security guards; carrying pepper spray; or keeping a
pistol in the nightstand. It seems as if Clinton is calling on the
shipping industry to similarly adjust.
Robert Haddick ofSmall Wars Journalis a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and was the director of research for a large private investment firm. He writes atWesthawkandThe American.
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