Hans Blix is most famous for his role as head U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq in 2003, when he countered the Bush administration's claims that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Before that controversy, Blix had a long and significant career as a Swedish diplomat and foreign minister, and from 1981 to 1997 he served as director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2000, he was called out of retirement by then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to head the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Since his tenure as a weapons inspector, Blix has chaired the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission that works to reduce the threat of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

After U.S. President Barack Obama's April 5 speech in Prague, Czech Republic, in which he called for a world without nuclear weapons, Foreign Policy and Johan Bergenäs at the Monterey Institute of International Studies sought out Blix's thoughts on the future of nuclear proliferation. Bergenäs asked Blix about some of today's most important security issues, including the Iranian nuclear dilemma and nuclear disarmament.

Foreign Policy: For many years, you have called for a reawakening of the nuclear disarmament movement. Has that reawakening begun?

Hans Blix: President Obama's speech in Prague has the potential of opening a new era in international political and security relations. For years the world was sliding into an ever colder peace, faith in military solutions, and arms buildups. We may now see a development toward sanity, conciliation instead of confrontation, and efforts to move toward a world without nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are becoming very expensive theoretical gadgets. The world does not need nuclear weapons to fight terrorism. It is also hard to see how the world would have use [for] aircraft carriers in order to fight terrorists; helicopters and drones may be more useful. However, it will take time before nuclear weapons are eliminated. Meanwhile, their existence may have some deterrent effect.

During the Cold War, political animosity propelled arms races. Now it seems upsurges in arms acquisitions and developments -- space war, nuclear developments -- trigger political animosity. A decrease in weapons developments and acquisitions would lead to a sense of greater security.

FP: Do you think that any Iranian regime will give up its enrichment program, or must a solution to that crisis include an indigenous enrichment program?

HB: Even though I don't think it is conclusively shown that Iran plans to develop nuclear weapons, there are reasons for the suspicions. The program's rationale -- which might have fluctuated -- could be weapons, but it also seems conceivable that it could be simply to demonstrate the capability for enrichment. Even an enrichment capability might have some deterrent effect. At the same time, such a capability is likely to increase tensions, and therefore, it would be desirable that it be suspended for a prolonged period of time. I doubt that Iran would renounce enrichment for good.

In my view, the Western approach to Iran has been marred by some unwise elements. Demanding that enrichment must be suspended before the Western states will dignify Iran with any talks has been humiliating and counterproductive. Preconditions might [have been] accepted by a party that is terribly eager for direct talks. Iran was not. Rather, it was the Western side that wanted Iran to talk. Not surprisingly, Iran has stonewalled [them] and continued its program. Offering Iran friendship might not be needed, but demonstrating respect might be more conducive to agreement than showing contempt or condescension.

In the very short period that [the Obama] administration has grappled with the Iranian issue, I think it has moved wisely, avoiding threats and showing that it recognizes and respects the Islamic state as the reality it is.

FP: If there were just two options, how would you weigh the choice between an attack on Iran or a nuclear-armed Iran?

HB: The consequences of an attack on Iran would very likely be a nuclear-armed Iran! There would be a delay, but nuclear weapons that are hypothetical today would be certain in a few years time. Secondly, an attack would probably have horrible consequences on the supply of oil coming through the Persian Gulf; it would impact the world economy.

Nuclear arms in Iran would neutralize the threat of the Israeli nuclear weapons. I do not see that as a disaster; these weapons should not have been developed in the first place.

FP: What role does the IAEA have to play in the Iranian nuclear issue?

HB: Demands that Iran must accept more IAEA inspections and answer more questions to show its peaceful intentions are made with the knowledge that neither Iran nor anyone else can prove the negative and with the hope that something will be found that incriminates Iran. Even if Iran were to succeed in making itself look fairly credible, the enrichment program would be -- rightly -- said to increase tensions, because Iran could one day change its mind about how to use [the program].