Hans Blix is most famous for his role as head U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq in 2003, when he countered the Bush administration's claims that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Before that controversy, Blix had a long and significant career as a Swedish diplomat and foreign minister, and from 1981 to 1997 he served as director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2000, he was called out of retirement by then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to head the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Since his tenure as a weapons inspector, Blix has chaired the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission that works to reduce the threat of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

After U.S. President Barack Obama's April 5 speech in Prague, Czech Republic, in which he called for a world without nuclear weapons, Foreign Policy and Johan Bergenäs at the Monterey Institute of International Studies sought out Blix's thoughts on the future of nuclear proliferation. Bergenäs asked Blix about some of today's most important security issues, including the Iranian nuclear dilemma and nuclear disarmament.

Foreign Policy: For many years, you have called for a reawakening of the nuclear disarmament movement. Has that reawakening begun?

Hans Blix: President Obama's speech in Prague has the potential of opening a new era in international political and security relations. For years the world was sliding into an ever colder peace, faith in military solutions, and arms buildups. We may now see a development toward sanity, conciliation instead of confrontation, and efforts to move toward a world without nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are becoming very expensive theoretical gadgets. The world does not need nuclear weapons to fight terrorism. It is also hard to see how the world would have use [for] aircraft carriers in order to fight terrorists; helicopters and drones may be more useful. However, it will take time before nuclear weapons are eliminated. Meanwhile, their existence may have some deterrent effect.

During the Cold War, political animosity propelled arms races. Now it seems upsurges in arms acquisitions and developments -- space war, nuclear developments -- trigger political animosity. A decrease in weapons developments and acquisitions would lead to a sense of greater security.

FP: Do you think that any Iranian regime will give up its enrichment program, or must a solution to that crisis include an indigenous enrichment program?

HB: Even though I don't think it is conclusively shown that Iran plans to develop nuclear weapons, there are reasons for the suspicions. The program's rationale -- which might have fluctuated -- could be weapons, but it also seems conceivable that it could be simply to demonstrate the capability for enrichment. Even an enrichment capability might have some deterrent effect. At the same time, such a capability is likely to increase tensions, and therefore, it would be desirable that it be suspended for a prolonged period of time. I doubt that Iran would renounce enrichment for good.

In my view, the Western approach to Iran has been marred by some unwise elements. Demanding that enrichment must be suspended before the Western states will dignify Iran with any talks has been humiliating and counterproductive. Preconditions might [have been] accepted by a party that is terribly eager for direct talks. Iran was not. Rather, it was the Western side that wanted Iran to talk. Not surprisingly, Iran has stonewalled [them] and continued its program. Offering Iran friendship might not be needed, but demonstrating respect might be more conducive to agreement than showing contempt or condescension.

In the very short period that [the Obama] administration has grappled with the Iranian issue, I think it has moved wisely, avoiding threats and showing that it recognizes and respects the Islamic state as the reality it is.

FP: If there were just two options, how would you weigh the choice between an attack on Iran or a nuclear-armed Iran?

HB: The consequences of an attack on Iran would very likely be a nuclear-armed Iran! There would be a delay, but nuclear weapons that are hypothetical today would be certain in a few years time. Secondly, an attack would probably have horrible consequences on the supply of oil coming through the Persian Gulf; it would impact the world economy.

Nuclear arms in Iran would neutralize the threat of the Israeli nuclear weapons. I do not see that as a disaster; these weapons should not have been developed in the first place.

FP: What role does the IAEA have to play in the Iranian nuclear issue?

HB: Demands that Iran must accept more IAEA inspections and answer more questions to show its peaceful intentions are made with the knowledge that neither Iran nor anyone else can prove the negative and with the hope that something will be found that incriminates Iran. Even if Iran were to succeed in making itself look fairly credible, the enrichment program would be -- rightly -- said to increase tensions, because Iran could one day change its mind about how to use [the program].

I am not saying that IAEA inspections are meaningless. Far from it! The more effective and professional they are, the more likely it is that when nothing disturbing is found, it is because there is nothing disturbing. However, giving a "clean bill of health" is as impossible for the IAEA as for a doctor. Small bugs can hide.

FP: What leverage does the United States have vis-à-vis Russia on that country's stance toward Iranian nuclear issues?

HB: Russia may well be opposed to military threats and actions against Iran. However, the logic seems right that if Iran can be persuaded to suspend its enrichment program for a prolonged period, the U.S. should no longer feel a need for the missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Even though Russia does not see the action as a direct and current threat, it unquestionably sees it as unfriendly and provocative.

The U.S. has many good reasons -- apart from Iran -- to rebuild good relations with Russia. For its part, Russia has good reasons to be averse to a nuclear weapons option developing in Iran under any circumstances. I doubt that Russian and Chinese reluctance to go along with tougher sanctions against Iran is the reason why Iran has not yet been persuaded to suspend its enrichment program.

FP: What should be done in the lead-up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010?

HB: It may be hard actually to achieve many big things before [the conference in] 2010. However, some things could be done. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty needs to be, and quite likely will be, renegotiated before that time. Nuclear weapons could be taken off high alert by unilateral actions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear weapons could be removed from Europe, and Russian tactical nuclear weapons could be moved into central storage deep in Russia. The U.S. and Russia could begin bilateral talks about deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could be ratified by the United States and several other states. Negotiations about a verified Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty should have started.

FP: You were 17 years old when the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and you lived through the Cold War. Do you see any differences between Cold War policymakers and those in the post-Cold War era?

HB: I think most of those who saw the pictures that were coming from Coventry, Stalingrad, Dresden, Guadalcanal, and Hiroshima, and then lived through 45 years of the often nerve-testing Cold War, became strongly programmed to strive for a world with fewer weapons. Those who have come to political consciousness after the end of the Cold War do not have the memories of the deadly tensions that existed. They march in the streets against global warming -- which is fine -- but they need to wake up to the reality that there is more than one "inconvenient truth." The world is in an economic and environmental crisis, yet it is still spending about $1.3 trillion a year on the military. There are still over 20,000 nuclear warheads around, and more states and nonstate actors may seek to go nuclear. Until recently, moreover, we had a U.S. administration that repeated as a mantra that "all options are on the table."

As 9/11 is gradually fading, confidence in militarism gradually failing, and interdependence rapidly accelerating, the chances are now good that we shall move toward a revival of disarmament. But it won't come automatically. We need all to work and argue for it. The military-industrial complexes are alive and well almost all over the world.

Hans Blix was head of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 to 1997 and served as head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission from 2000 to 2003.