What the four-stars
are reading -- a weekly column from Small Wars Journal.
June 12, 2009
Is the U.S. Army the
slowest student in Afghanistan?
A June 7 New York
Times story raised
troubling questions about the quality of Afghanistan's soldiers and policemen. After
years of effort with little to show for it, one might wonder why it is taking
so long to train a competent Afghan security force. Are Afghans just slow
learners? Or is the slowest student in Afghanistan actually the U.S. Army?
That is the harsh judgment of Sergeant First Class Morgan Sheeran, a 27-year veteran of
the U.S. Army and Ohio National Guard who recently returned from a long tour as
an advisor to the Afghan National Police. In a scathing
essay for Small Wars Journal,
Sheeran accuses many (though not all) of the Army leaders and units he
associated with in Afghanistan of either failing to understand basic
counterinsurgency (COIN) principles or of deliberately neglecting to implement
them. Sheeran says those who criticize COIN's effectiveness in Afghanistan are premature
since, after more than seven years in the
country, much of the Army continues to resist actually implementing a COIN
strategy. Here, Sheeran sums up his experience:
The Army makes a considerable amount of
noise about COIN, but fails in the actual implementation of it ... Advisors were
thinly resourced and I saw the inefficiency and counterproductive behaviors and
practices implemented by some maneuver units. There were certainly those who
"got it," while a neighboring battlespace would be under the sway of
someone who recoiled at any reference to COIN ... I worked with small unit
leaders in Afghanistan who were making the most basic of COIN errors on a daily
basis because they had absolutely no idea what they were doing from a doctrinal
perspective. They were conventionally trained warriors in a COIN fight doing
the best that they could without any formal training in the doctrine whatsoever
... These were Soldiers of elite units, not [Individual Ready Reserve]
augmentees ripped from civilian pursuits.
To Sheeran, the blame for this failure lies mostly with the
Army's training and education system, which has not caught up with realities on
the ground.
But Sheeran's complaints don't end there. Last week I discussed
General James Mattis's insistence
that the U.S. military will only be able to prevail in future wars if
it pushes autonomy, authority, and responsibility down to the lowest ranking officers
in the field. Alas, according to Sheeran, the risk-averse and micromanaging Army leadership in Afghanistan is as far as could be from this goal:
There was recently an acknowledgment by
a Command Sergeant Major that he used surveillance assets to monitor the wear
of the uniform in remote locations ... The military is fielding the best sensors
that the world has ever seen, eclipsing the "gee-whiz" gadgetry of the Gulf War
in sophistication. This should be used to empower and inform the Soldier on the
ground downrange, not be another level of control for an [lieutenant colonel]
in a well heated or air-conditioned [command post]. As implementers of a
distributed methodology the Army is an abject failure on the whole. Far too
much central command and control is being exerted by battlespace owners.
One hopes that Generals Mattis, Petraeus, and McChrystal
are reading Sergeant First Class Sheeran's essay.
How to recover from
failure
No one would dispute the assertion that the U.S. military
has suffered more than a few failures this decade. But what has been learned
from these setbacks is the crucial question, both to recover from their
consequences and to avoid more major mistakes in the future.
First, says Hoffman, was the failure to anticipate how
adversaries would adapt to the U.S. military's overwhelming conventional
superiority. In retrospect, the U.S. military's failure to anticipate this
decade's irregular warfare environment is baffling. The fight against the Viet
Cong, the rise of Middle East terrorism in the 1970s, the U.S. government's own
support for insurgencies in Afghanistan and Central America in the 1980s, and the
"small wars" in the Caribbean and Latin America in the 1990s should have
provided Pentagon planners with a clue of what was to come. Instead, these
planners seem to have been intoxicated by their overwhelming success in the one
notable exception to this four-decade pattern, the 1991 Gulf War.
Next, Hoffman discusses the failure to learn. When a military
institution realizes it has a problem, as the Pentagon finally did by 2004,
Hoffman recommends first turning to history for help. Another source of
learning is allies who have suffered through similar circumstances. Finally,
the Army's traditional practice, extending back to at least the Civil War, is
to dismiss failed generals and rapidly promote those who have achieved local
success. This is how General David Petraeus was able rise from an outpost in
Mosul, Iraq, to command of the Middle East and Central Asia in a relatively
short amount of time.
Finally, there is the failure to adapt. After learning what
needs to change, a military commander must compel a risk-averse and rules-based
institution to actually change its ways. As Sergeant First Class Sheeran's
essay illustrates, in Afghanistan the Army's adaptation could charitably be
described as incomplete. Hoffman points to some other late adapters to the
national security demands of this decade including the U.S. Air Force and much
of U.S. civilian government.
Ideally, good institutional anticipation would preclude the
need to later learn and adapt. But relying on forecasts is a foolish strategy,
not only because forecasting is so prone to error but also because those whose
forecasts require a change in the status quo are typically rewarded with
mockery rather than attention.
Thus, organizations like the U.S. military are left with the
need to learn and adapt as quickly as possible. It will not be easy to keep up
with dispersed and autonomous enemy structures who have themselves demonstrated
remarkable abilities to anticipate, learn, and adapt.
Robert Haddick ofSmall Wars Journalis a former U.S. Marine
Corps officer and was the director of research for a large private investment
firm. He writes atWesthawkandThe American.
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