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Maliki’s turn: General Petraeus has done his job. Now it’s time for Iraqi leaders to step up.

Traveling across Iraq as the surge ended, it was impossible to ignore the dramatic improvements in security. In 10 days on the ground in and around Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, we did not hear a shot fired in anger. Remember the “triangle of death” just south of Baghdad? Soldiers now jokingly call it the “triangle of love.”

Jokes aside, Iraq remains a dangerous place—and a number of significant attacks did take place out of earshot during our trip. But overall violence against Iraqi civilians and U.S. and Iraqi forces has fallen to levels not seen since early 2004. And as U.S. forces have stepped down from the surge, Iraqi security forces have started to find their feet. In recent months, the Iraqi Army has conducted successful operations in Amara, Basra, Mosul, and Sadr City (and they are currently engaged in operations in Diyala province). Iraqi security forces now control most of the country. In Basra, a southern metropolis infested with Shiite militias a few short months ago, we were able to tour the entire city in an Iraqi Army convoy accompanied by only a handful of coalition advisors.

Up north, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is still deadly. Half of all attacks now occur in and around Mosul, where AQI remnants continue to find sanctuary. U.S. military commanders and intelligence analysts, however, now believe the group has been strategically defeated. AQI remains capable of intimidation, assassination, and periodic spectacular bombings, but it no longer poses a threat to the viability of the Iraqi state. The same goes for Iranian-backed “special groups,” which have been substantially degraded by recent offensives.

Despite the improved security environment, no one in Baghdad, including Gen. David Petraeus, is doing a victory dance (even as a rising number of commentators in Washington do just that). Those on the ground know that because none of the fundamental political grievances underlying Iraq’s ethnosectarian conflict have been resolved, the security gains remain fragile and reversible.

Genuine reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites remains elusive. The “Sunni Awakening”—the Sunnis’ decision to cooperate with U.S. forces against AQI—ranks among the biggest reasons for the decline in violence in Iraq. But don’t be fooled: The awakening represents an accommodation with the United States, not the Shiites who dominate Iraq’s government. These security gains could dissolve if the Sunni “Sons of Iraq”—many of them former insurgents—are not integrated into official forces or gainfully employed, and if emerging tribal leaders don’t get an opportunity to share power at the local and national levels through elections. Yet Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government, to the great frustration of many Sunnis and U.S. military commanders, has been slow-rolling integration of the Sons of Iraq. Nor is the Iraqi prime minister likely to incorporate the most important elements due to their former allegiances to the Baath Party, Saddam’s army, or the insurgency. Smoldering grievances among even a small percentage of the 100,000 armed Sons of Iraq could reignite a rebellion.

Much has been made about the supposed goodwill Maliki accrued among Sunnis by taking on Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi militia in Basra and Sadr City. But we did not detect this goodwill on the street. Many Sunnis remain deeply distrustful of the central government. Although Maliki has brought a few members of the Sunni-dominated Iraqi Accordance Front (known as “Tawafuq”) back into the government, he is reconciling with the wrong Sunnis. These “Green Zone” Sunnis have little grass-roots support and are rivals to the Sunni Awakening groups. Indeed, analysts worry that Maliki and Tawafuq are now collaborating to undermine the growing political power of the Awakening in the lead-up to elections—a move with deeply destabilizing possibilities.

Tensions among Shiites pose another threat. This spring, violence in Iraq largely occurred within the Shiite community as Iraqi security forces clashed with Sadr’s militia and Iranian-backed special groups throughout much of central and southern Iraq. Since then, the Jaish al-Mahdi has been significantly weakened, special groups leaders have fled to Iran, and Sadr is in the midst of remaking his militia into a social protest movement. Nevertheless, Sadr’s movement is hardly defeated, and there are extremist elements calling for a return to violence. Pulling the Sadrists fully into the political process and away from these extremist voices will require fair provincial and national elections. Yet we heard great concerns that the ulterior motive of recent offensives in southern Iraq was to weaken the Sadrists politically, and that Maliki’s Dawa Party and its chief ally, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, will attempt to use their current monopoly on power and control of the Iraqi security forces to tilt the elections in their favor.