Photoillustration by Travis Daub for FP

The Terrorism Index 2008
Signs of progress in Iraq have left America’s top foreign-policy experts experiencing a rare sensation: optimism. But, according to the fourth Terrorism Index, the U.S. national security establishment is in sharp disagreement with the presidential candidates—and alarmed that its so-called allies may soon harbor its worst enemies.

Get Some Intelligence
By Shuja Nawaz

Osama bin Laden needs an extensive logistics network to stay active and in touch with his followers, and that presents an opportunity. Here’s how I’d catch him.

Penetrate his network through double agents—locals and Arabs who could slowly work their way into al Qaeda’s logistics chain. Over time, they could help map his activities and likely movements. Bin Laden cannot move easily without a sizable group of followers, so watch for the double-cab pickups that traverse the mountainous, wooded terrain of the northern Hindu Kush, his most likely hide-out. Look in Dir and Chitral districts, plus the contiguous Afghan provinces across the border. Bin Laden is not likely to settle in the more open, vegetation-free zone further south. Inventory the hujras or meeting houses that have been hired by foreigners through local Taliban and other sympathizers (bribes will get you everywhere in the tribal areas, so use cash to find out what you need to know). Taliban leaders use satellite phones, which are easy to track. Thurayas are the preferred brand, and there’s even a shop in Peshawar that sells them.

The United States and Pakistan must operate independently to prevent leaks. Organize the Pakistani cell as a fresh unit, using carefully screened Afghan and frontier experts from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence. Link them to a small team of commandos tasked solely with ferreting out the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Locate the team inside Pakistani Army headquarters to avoid any leaks from ISI, and support it with a technology crew that can track electronic communications. Equip the commandos with fast-moving Apache and Mi-17 helicopters for rapid response. They’ll need the latest night-vision goggles, not the obsolete models that the United States currently supplies.

Above all, avoid collateral damage. As Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, recently told an interviewer, “I traveled three months to recruit and only got 10-15 persons. One bombing by the Americans that killed innocents, and I got hundreds of recruits!”

Shuja Nawaz is a veteran journalist, analyst, and author of the recently released Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Partner with Pakistan
By Lt. Gen. Talat Masood (Ret.)

The Bush administration is looking for illusive, quick results when a long-term perspective is crucial for success. Frequent U.S. airstrikes by drones in Pakistan’s tribal belt and the recent limited land operation in South Waziristan by U.S. forces have sparked anger throughout the country. Outraged moderates are joining hands with religious parties, asking the government to review Pakistan’s alliance in the war on terror. The government will resist such pressure, but it will be hard to pacify the public if these strikes escalate.

Indeed, the Taliban and al Qaeda would like nothing more than to fight the Americans on Pakistani soil, giving the impression that they are resisting foreign aggression. It would be extremely politically difficult for the Pakistani military to continue counterinsurgency operations if the United States sent in ground troops.

The United States needs to face the fact that it will not capture Osama bin Laden without Pakistan’s help. If U.S. policymakers have misgivings about elements of the ISI or other intelligence agencies, now is the time to address them, given that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the Army chief of staff, and the present civilian government are serious about fighting terrorism and militancy.

Working through the tribes is the best approach. Bin Laden is most likely surrounded by several rings of security personnel who are extremely loyal, heavily armed, and constantly on the move. By relying on human intelligence supplemented by technical intelligence, it should be possible to identify his general location. Gathering information from the people will not be easy, however, as they fear reprisal from the militants. The Taliban and al Qaeda’s second- and third-tier leadership under detention is another valuable source of intelligence. Capturing pro al-Qaeda warlords can help, as they have considerable knowledge about the location and movement of top leaders.

Today, bin Laden is a source of inspiration for Islamist radicals, not an operational commander. Thus, although his capture may be an important symbolic victory, it will not be a strategic defeat for al Qaeda or the Taliban. But the United States will not accomplish either symbolic or strategic victories against its enemy unless it has Pakistan as a partner.

Lt. Gen. Talat Masood is a retired general of the Pakistani Army.