Developments in Afghanistan since the Taliban were overthrown in autumn 2001 reveal the gap between Western rhetoric supporting democratization and development in Muslim societies and the actual commitment that Western countries are prepared to make. Afghanistan also puts the widespread portrayals of societies thirsting for Western democracy in sharp contrast with the reality of local political structures and traditions.

Afghanistan cannot be developed by its existing weak and deeply divided government—an administration only in name—or by current Western approaches to aid, which depend on working through that government. Yet if the country is not to sink back into the conditions that produced the Taliban and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan must see real development. Since it is out of the question for the United States and its allies to occupy and administer Afghanistan themselves, the West must develop a strategy based on working with, and not against, regional forces.

Eighteen months after the Taliban fell, the overwhelming majority of the population has yet to see signs of economic reconstruction. The Taliban remain active in much of southern Afghanistan and have recently intensified attacks on U.S. troops and Western aid workers. The current timetable calls for national elections in 2004, followed by the establishment of an elected government and a withdrawal of both U.S. troops and international peacekeepers. This plan looks doubtful if not delusional.

For valid reasons of speed, geography, regional politics, and safety, the Bush administration chose to conquer Afghanistan not with U.S. troops but with those of local anti-Taliban forces backed by U.S. airpower. The continuing U.S. hunt for the Taliban and al Qaeda also depends heavily on...